Facts:

The application by the Amicus Curiae seeks clarification on the working of the High Power Committee (HPC), especially in relation to the orders passed by the HPC imposing penalties based on actual adjudication.

Issues:

The validity and permissibility of penalties, including additional penalties, imposed by the HPC based on documents produced by the units, even if they result in penalties larger than the originally imposed ones.

Held:

The HPC, after fixing normal recovery norms, proceeded to examine records of different units. The court agrees with the norms adopted by the HPC and holds that penalties larger than originally imposed are valid as long as they are based on the records produced.

Decision: The HPC is entitled to look into records and pass orders in cases where documents were submitted by January 15, 1998. Units with imposed penalties can approach the HPC for reconsideration within one month of the order, based on new material. The HPC is required to briefly indicate reasons for its orders.

Facts:

Respondents allotted 7.06 acres of Government land in 1961, subject to conditions of use and non-alienation.

Laoni Rules, 1950, and Revised Assessment Policy imposed restrictions on alienation of assigned lands.

In 1991, respondents executed a Power of Attorney, empowering a builder for various actions regarding the land.

Government initiated proceedings to cancel the land assignments due to alleged irregularities.

Issues:

Validity of the land assignments made in 1961.

Actions of the Collector in initiating proceedings and subsequent government ratification.

Held:

The High Court observed that the District Revenue Officer lacked jurisdiction in considering the matter, as a mandamus was issued to the Collector to hear and dispose of the explanation.

The Court directed the Collector to complete the proceedings initiated by his order dated 3rd of January, 1995, as ratified by the Government, in accordance with the law.

The High Court's observation on the District Revenue Officer's lack of jurisdiction.( Paragraph 15)

The Court's decision to dispose of the appeal, directing the Collector to complete the proceedings.( Paragraph 16)

Facts:

The respondent claimed eviction of the appellants under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, asserting a bona fide requirement. The appellants resisted, contending that the property was vested in the Custodian of Enemy Properties for India, and therefore, could not be sold. They relied on Section 18 of the Enemy Property Act, 1968, and argued that the Rent Controller had no jurisdiction under Section 19 of the said Act. The appellants also challenged the legality and genuineness of the sale deed.

Issues:

Whether the property was vested in the Custodian of Enemy Properties for India.

Jurisdiction of the Rent Controller under the Enemy Property Act.

Validity of the sale deed.

Applicability of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

Held:

The court highlighted the legislative intent behind rent control laws, emphasizing their role as social legislation to protect tenants from unjust eviction. It stressed that a hyper-technical interpretation of the laws should be avoided to prevent frustration of the legislative objectives.( Para 5)

The appellants argued that the property was vested in the Custodian of Enemy Properties for India, citing communication from the Custodian. The Rent Controller had overlooked the distinction between the Evacuee Property Act and the Enemy Property Act. The court held that questions regarding vesting, authenticity of the sale deed, and consequences of vesting/non-vesting should be determined at trial. The appellants' claims were not baseless, and they should have been granted leave to defend.( Para 6)

The court considered the appellants' reliance on Annexure P-1, an intimation by the Custodian confirming the vesting of the property. The Rent Controller's failure to recognize the difference between the acts led to legal infirmities in the orders.( Para 8)

The appeal was allowed, setting aside the orders of the Rent Controller and the High Court. The appellants were granted leave to defend the eviction petition, and the Rent Controller was directed to expedite the case's disposal.( Para 10)

FACTS:

The court had previously directed, in M.C. Mehta v. Union and Others, that certain industries relocate in compliance with the Master Plan of Delhi.

The Master Plan required hazardous industries to shift within three years, and heavy/large industries were directed to shift to Delhi Metropolitan Area and the National Capital Region.

The owners were instructed to surrender excess land, and the court specified the manner in which surrendered land should be used.

The court, in its previous order, did not direct compensation for the surrendered land.

ISSUES:

Failure of industries to surrender excess land as per the court's previous order.

Contention by industries that surrender should involve compensation under Section 15 of the Delhi Development Act.

HELD:

The court rejects the contention that DDA is bound to acquire the land under Section 15 and pay compensation. The court notes that the absence of a compensation directive was deliberate, as an implicit compensation element was present in the increased FAR granted.( Para 5)

No indication or affidavit shows that there was a demand for compensation at any point during the proceedings. The court emphasizes the importance of obeying the law for the profitability of the owners.( Para 6)

The Master Plan of 1990 made it obligatory for hazardous industries to shift within three years, and the spirit was for existing heavy and large industries to relocate within a reasonable time. Industries not complying have themselves to blame.( Para 8)

Directs all industries to voluntarily surrender excess land within one month; otherwise, DDA should file execution applications. The District Judge, Delhi, to execute the court's order and report compliance within four weeks of filing.( Para 10)

Clarifies that the direction in the order dated 10th May 1996 only pertains to the surrender of land. Another order on 4th December 1996 addresses the procedure for industries wanting to start new conforming activities.( Para 12)

Facts:

The recruitment to the posts of Assistant Engineers involved a combination of direct recruitment and promotions. The last direct recruitment was in 1984, and subsequent promotions on an ad-hoc basis led to disputes regarding seniority and adherence to recruitment rules. The government's decision to regularize ad-hoc promotions without consulting the Public Service Commission became a focal point of contention.

Issues:

Validity of ad-hoc promotions beyond six months without consulting the Public Service Commission.

Regularization of ad-hoc service and grant of seniority without following the quota rule.

The power of the government to relax recruitment rules and its implications.

Breakdown of the quota rule and alleged bias in the promotion process.

Held:

The wholesale regularization without following the quota rule and consulting the Service Commission is deemed invalid. Rule 5 does not empower the government to relax recruitment rules extensively.

Ad-hoc service can be regularized under Rule 23, subject to eligibility and fitness, but without counting for seniority outside the promotee quota.

The reasons given for relaxation are insufficient, and such relaxation may lead to chaos in the recruitment process. Long years of service do not justify implied relaxation of rules.

The state's biased actions in restricting direct recruits and promoting junior engineers indicate a breakdown of the quota rule, but there is no evidence that suitable candidates were not available for direct recruitment.

Facts:

On 16-09-94, Joseph Poulo took Gracy from a convent on false pretenses.

Gracy was found dead on a railway track, and the appellant was implicated in her murder, rape, and robbery.

Issues:

Whether the circumstances surrounding Gracy's death point conclusively to murder, rape, and robbery by the appellant.

The adequacy of evidence supporting the rape charge.

The reliability of circumstantial evidence connecting the appellant to the crime.

Held:

The deceased was last seen alive with the appellant, and subsequent circumstances, including the recovery of Gracy's body, support the charges of murder and robbery. The theory of suicide is deemed implausible.

The charge of rape is not substantiated due to the absence of injuries indicative of forcible sexual assault and conflicting forensic reports.

Discrepancies in witness testimony are deemed non-material unless substantial and related to vital aspects. The medical evidence supports the conclusion of homicide.

Facts:

Appellants are defendants in a civil suit filed by the respondent for declaration, partition, and recovery of possession.

Concurrent proceedings include the respondent's application for a Succession Certificate under Section 372 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925.

Trial Court decreed the suit, declaring the respondent as the sole heir, and granted the Succession Certificate. Appellate Court overturned the decision.

The High Court held that the decision on the grant of the Succession Certificate operates as res judicata in the civil suit.

Issues:

Whether a decision on the grant of Succession Certificate bars the same issue in a subsequent civil suit?

Applicability of res judicata principles to Succession Certificate proceedings.

Held:

The general principle of res judicata requires an issue to be directly and substantially in question in the earlier suit. Mere incidental findings do not fall within the ambit of res judicata. (Pawan Kumar Gupta Vs. Rochiram Nagdeo referred)( Para 7)

Decision on the grant of Succession Certificate is not a final adjudication. It is a determination of prima facie title and does not conclusively settle the rights between parties. The effect is limited to providing indemnity to the debtor.( Para 11)

Section 387 of the Indian Succession Act clarifies that decisions under Part X of the Act, including Section 372, do not bar the same question being raised in a subsequent suit or proceeding between the same parties.( Para 13)

Explanation VIII to Section 11, which extends the scope of res judicata, does not apply to decisions made in Succession Certificate proceedings. The protective umbrella of Section 387 prevents such decisions from falling within the field of Explanation VIII.( Para 15)

A decision made in a proceeding under Section 372 for the grant of Succession Certificate does not bar parties from raising the same issue in a subsequent suit. The High Court erred in applying the principle of res judicata.( Para 17)

Conclusion: The judgment sets aside the High Court order and remands the case for reconsideration of the second appeal on its merits.

Facts:

The murder of a Gram Sarpanch, with six individuals convicted for various offenses, including criminal conspiracy. The High Court acquitted most of them, convicting only two for the offense under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code.

Issues:

Credibility of the FIR based on the non-examination of the scribe.

Reappreciation of evidence and jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

False implication and reliability of eyewitness accounts.

The discrepancy in the involvement of the accused in the murder.

Held:

The Division Bench pointed out errors in the High Court's decision, stating that the assailants cannot escape conviction under Section 302 with the aid of Section 34, if not Section 149 of the IPC. The court expressed the need for a reappraisal of evidence in the interest of justice.

Decision: The appeal filed by A1 and A3 was allowed, and their conviction and sentence were set aside. They were acquitted. The remaining appeals were dismissed.

Facts:

Dasarath Singh, an auto-rickshaw driver, was allegedly murdered during the commission of a felony - the stealing of the auto-rickshaw by some unknown passengers. The auto-rickshaw was reported stolen, and the driver's body was recovered, but the vehicle was never found. The insurance company compensated the owner for the loss of the auto-rickshaw.

Issues:

Whether the death of Dasarath Singh was an accident arising out of the use of a motor vehicle, allowing the claimants (wife and children) to seek compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act.

Held:

The Court analyzed the circumstances and concluded that the murder of Dasarath Singh was accidental, occurring in the process of committing the theft of the auto-rickshaw. The stealing of the vehicle was the object of the felony, and the murder was incidental to the act of stealing. (Para 14)

The Court rejected the contention that murder, by definition, cannot be an accident. It distinguished between intentional felonious acts leading to murder and accidental murder, emphasizing the proximity of cause. In this case, the murder was accidental. (Para 11)

The Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision that the claimants were entitled to compensation under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act. (Para 19)

Regarding the maintainability of the appeal filed by the Insurance Company, the Court referred to a precedent (Shankarayya case) and held that the Insurance Company was not entitled to file an appeal without obtaining leave from the tribunal. (Para 20)