Limitation Under Section 468 CrPC Is Computed From Date Of Filing Complaint, Not Date Of Cognizance: Supreme Court

"The relevant date for the purpose of reckoning the limitation under Section 468, Cr.PC is the date of filing of complaint or the date of initiation of criminal proceedings," Supreme Court of India, in a significant ruling dated April 9, 2026, held that the period of limitation under Section 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) must be calculated from the date of filing the complaint or lodging the FIR, and not from the date the Magistrate takes cognizance of the offence.

A bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria set aside a Delhi High Court order, categorically observing that "the computing point of limitation for the purpose of Section 468, Cr.PC is held to be the date of filing complaint – the date of initiation of criminal proceedings."

The appeal arose out of a May 2011 altercation outside a Delhi court between the appellant and the respondent, who was representing the appellant's sister in a separate matter. This incident resulted in cross-FIRs, with the appellant's FIR registering offences under Sections 323, 341, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). The Delhi High Court subsequently quashed the appellant's FIR on the ground that the charge-sheet was filed over a year after the incident, concluding that the Magistrate's cognizance was barred by the one-year limitation period prescribed under Section 468 of the CrPC.

The primary question before the court was whether the relevant date for computing the period of limitation under Section 468 of the CrPC is the date of filing of the complaint or FIR, or the date on which the Magistrate actually takes cognizance of the offence. The court was also called upon to determine whether proceedings initiated via a police report under Section 173 of the CrPC require a different limitation calculus than direct complaints to a Magistrate.

Law Settled By Constitution Bench

The Supreme Court noted that the core issue was no longer open to debate, relying heavily on the Constitution Bench judgment in Sarah Mathew v. Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases. The court explained that taking cognizance is entirely an act of the Magistrate, which may be delayed due to systemic or personal reasons over which the complainant has absolutely no control. The bench reasoned that a diligent complainant who approaches the authorities promptly cannot be severely prejudiced by the court's subsequent delay in taking judicial notice of the offence.

Date Of Filing Remains The Material Date

Reiterating the legislative intent behind the limitation framework in Chapter XXXVI of the CrPC, the court emphasized that Section 473 of the CrPC specifically postulates the condonation of delay caused by the complainant. The court stressed that this statutory scheme makes it clear that the date of filing is the only dependable criterion for limitation. Relying on the legal maxim actus curiae neminem gravabit (the act of the court shall prejudice no one), the court reinforced that judicial or administrative delays cannot render a timely complaint infructuous.

Initiation Of Proceedings Is The Starting Point

The respondent argued that the Sarah Mathew precedent applied only to complaints filed directly before a Magistrate under Section 2(d) of the CrPC, and not to FIRs culminating in a police report under Section 173 of the CrPC. The Supreme Court decisively rejected this artificial distinction, clarifying that the date of initiation of criminal proceedings remains the benchmark in both procedural scenarios. The bench observed that whether a case is instituted upon a police report or a direct complaint, it is the initial lodging of the grievance that rightfully stops the limitation clock.

"Whether the case belongs to one instituted before the Magistrate under Section 173 or it is upon a complaint filed before the police, what matters is the date of initiation of criminal proceedings."

"Giving up an argument where a point of law is already decided is a professional virtue. It is part of ethics in professional conduct before the Court."

Lawyers Must Respect Binding Precedents

In a significant obiter regarding professional ethics, the Supreme Court strongly reprimanded the practice of arguing against settled law merely to demonstrate argumentative skill. The court stated that the disclosure of honest and full facts, along with conceding the applicability of binding precedents, is a fundamental duty lawyers must discharge in fairness to the justice system. The bench bluntly noted that lawyers "are not expected to breach the rules of the game to argue against settled principles or contrary to well settled law, just for the sake of doing it."

Giving Up Untenable Arguments Saves Judicial Time

The court emphasized that eating up valuable judicial time with worthless submissions against binding Constitution Bench judgments is unacceptable. The bench stated that giving up an argument where a point of law is clearly decided by a higher court is a core professional virtue. The court warned that stock contentions attempting to dilute established law—such as arguing that a specific nuance was previously missed—cannot be entertained unless truly exceptional grounds exist to distinguish the binding decision.

Concluding its judgment, the Supreme Court held that the Delhi High Court committed a patent error in quashing the FIR based on the date of cognizance rather than the date of institution. The appeals were allowed, the impugned High Court order was set aside, and the trial court was directed to proceed with the matter expeditiously in accordance with the law.

Date of Decision: 09 April 2026