Facts:

The manufacturer availed the procedure for payment of duty under Rule 96ZO(3) but sought to claim the benefit of Section 34(4) for the determination of actual production and re-determination of duty.

Issues:

Whether a manufacturer, having chosen the procedure under Rule 96ZO(3), can later claim the benefit of Section 34(4) for determining actual production.

Held:

The court considered the conflicting views on the matter, particularly the decisions of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and the Allahabad High Court.

The court held that Rule 96ZO(3) and Section 34(4) are two alternative procedures at the option of the assessee. The procedures do not clash, and a hybrid procedure cannot be adopted.

Manufacturers who opted for the lumpsum payment under Rule 96ZO(3) cannot claim the benefit of determination of production capacity under Section 34(4), as it is explicitly excluded.

The court overruled the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Pravesh Castings (P) Ltd. and endorsed the reasoning of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Sathavahana Steels & Alloys (P) Ltd.

The court set aside orders made by the Tribunal in cases where furnace capacity had been wrongly fixed and directed the Tribunal to bring the orders in conformity with the court's view.

The appeals were allowed, and no costs were awarded in the circumstances of the case.

FACTS:

For the assessment periods 1978-79 and 1979-80, the Sales Tax Officer assessed the respondent (M/S. Popular Trading Company, Ujjain) under the Madhya Pradesh Sthaniya Kshetra Me Mal Ke Pravesh Par Kar Adhiniyam, 1976. The respondent, a dealer in coconuts, was assessed entry tax on 'watery coconuts' under the Act.

ISSUES:

Whether 'watery coconut' falls within the scope of the entry for taxation under the Act.

HELD:

The appellate authority rejected the claim of the assessee that 'watery coconut' is not liable to payment of entry tax. The matter was carried to the Tribunal and then to the High Court, where the High Court held that 'watery coconut' is not taxable under the relevant entry of the Act.

The appellant contended that 'watery coconut' undergoes a natural process of ripening to become a coconut, falling under the category of 'oil seed.' The High Court's view was criticized for overlooking the essence of the matter.

The Supreme Court emphasized the importance of the phrase 'that is to say' in the entry, stating that 'watery coconut' does fall under the definition of 'oil seed' and is, therefore, taxable. The court explained that 'watery coconut' does not cease to be an 'oil seed' merely because it yields some watery substance.

Reference was made to the decision in Sri Siddhi Vinayaka Coconut & Co. and Others v. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, where it was clarified that 'watery coconuts' are not outside the scope of the relevant provision.

The court rejected the High Court's interpretation, stating that 'watery coconut' is indeed taxable under the relevant entry of the Act. The order of the High Court was set aside, and that of the Tribunal was restored.

In conclusion, no costs were awarded, and the appeals were allowed accordingly.

REFERRED CASES:

Ganpat Lal Lakhotia Vs. State of Rajasthan and Others, (1997) 10 SCC 455 : (1997) 104 STC 91

State of Tamil Nadu Vs. Pyare Lal Malhotra and Others, AIR 1976 SC 800 : (1983) 13 ELT 1582 : (1976) 1 SCC 834 : (1976) 3 SCR 168 : (1976) 37 STC 319

Sri Siddhi Vinayaka Coconut and Co. and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, AIR 1974 SC 1111 : (1974) 4 SCC 835 : (1975) 1 SCR 440 : (1974) 34 STC 103 : (1974) 6 UJ 470

Sri Krishna Coconut and Co., Ambajipeta Vs. Commercial Tax Officer, Amalapuram, AIR 1966 AP 128 : (1965) 16 STC 511

Facts:

The case revolves around the appointment of Regional Transport Officers in Andhra Pradesh. The recruitment process is governed by the Andhra Pradesh Transport Services Rules, particularly Rule 3(a). The dispute arose when employees from the State Transport Authority and the Secretariat were appointed as Regional Transport Officers through transfer, challenging the validity of these appointments.

Issues:

Whether the appointments of Regional Transport Officers from the State Transport Authority and the Secretariat, through transfer, are in accordance with the Andhra Pradesh Transport Services Rules and the Presidential Order of 1975.

Held:

The court held that the appointments were valid, emphasizing the overriding power of the State Government under para 5(2) of the Presidential Order of 1975. This provision allows the State Government to make provisions contrary to the scheme of local cadres prescribed under para 5(1), giving precedence to public interest and administrative exigencies over promotional interests.

Decision: The court allowed the appeals, setting aside the judgments and orders under appeal. There was no order as to costs.

Facts:

After passing the 12th Examination, appellants sought admission to the B.Ed Course. Despite scoring between 63 to 65%, their attempts were unsuccessful. They approached the High Court under Article 226, challenging the district-wise distribution of seats among four districts—Parbhani, Nanded, Bead, and Later.

Issues:

The challenge centered around the contention that the district-wise allocation of seats, without indicating a nexus to the intended goal, violated Article 14 of the Constitution.

Held:

The appellants argued that the admission process, based on a common admission test, rendered district-wise seat distribution invalid. Citing previous rulings, the Court held that such allocation, without a clear connection to the objective of securing the best possible talent for admission, is violative of Article 14. The Court emphasized that even reasonable classification must have a nexus with the intended objective.

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeal without costs, acknowledging the impracticality of directing admission for the appellants after a five-year lapse. However, if fresh admissions are initiated, the appellants should be given an opportunity to seek admission to the B.Ed course.

Facts:

Respondent No. 1 selected as Ziledar, seeking appointment as Tehsildar.

Recruitment rules specified sources for Tehsildar appointments - direct recruitment, promotion, and transfer.

Government instructions clarified reservation policies for different classes of posts.

Respondent claimed entitlement to Tehsildar post based on seniority and reservation, challenging the non-application of reservation in a prior recruitment.

Issues:

Applicability of reservation policies to appointments by transfer to Class II posts.

Respondent's entitlement to Tehsildar post based on previous promotion to Deputy Collector.

Held:

Class III post of Ziledar and Class II posts of Deputy Collector and Tehsildar examined.

Respondent promoted to Deputy Collector, equivalent to Tehsildar, not entitled to claim reservation benefits.

Recruitment rules and facts establish the respondent's ineligibility for Tehsildar post.

High Court's order set aside, and the writ petition dismissed. No costs awarded.

Facts:

Recruitment for First Fireman: Originally 50% by direct recruitment and 50% by promotion. Later changed to 100% promotion.

Appellants recruited as Apprentice Firemen in 1985, completed training, and appointed as First Firemen in 1990.

Respondents (4 to 143) appointed on ad hoc basis as Fireman 'B' in 1987 due to urgent needs before the change in recruitment rules.

Promotion Process: Selection for promotion to First Fireman took time; respondents were finally selected and regularized in 1992.

Issues:

Dispute over seniority between direct recruits (appellants) and promotees (respondents 4 to 143).

Whether the period of ad hoc service of respondents should be counted towards seniority.

Held:

Recruitment Rules Change: Initially, 50% vacancies by direct recruitment, later changed to 100% promotion for First Fireman.

Ad Hoc Promotion: Ad hoc promotion found permissible under Para 216 of the Railway Establishment Manual.

Seniority Counting: Respondents entitled to count entire period of ad hoc service towards seniority as they were duly selected and regularized.

Appellants' Condition: Appellants' seniority subject to finalization of the promotion selection process, clearly mentioned in their appointment letters.

Decision: Appeals dismissed. Respondents entitled to count ad hoc service for seniority. Appellants' seniority subject to finalization of promotion selection.

Facts:

ERA Educational Trust applied for permission to establish a Medical College.

The Central Government, after Medical Council recommendations, twice rejected the application.

High Court, in an extraordinary manner, granted interim mandatory relief allowing the college to operate despite the government's refusal.

Union of India and Medical Council appealed against the High Court's order.

Issues:

Validity of the interim mandatory relief granted by the High Court.

Exercise of extraordinary powers under Article 226 in establishing a Medical College.

Held:

The High Court's extraordinary order violated norms for interim relief, principles of natural justice, and the requirement of previous sanction from the Central Government for a Medical College.

The Court, despite hesitating to interfere with interlocutory orders, found the High Court's order unjustified by any judicial standard.

Quashed and set aside the High Court's order dated 11.10.1999.

Directed the Medical Council to inspect the college for compliance with regulations within one month.

If deficiencies are found, the college must rectify them.

Upon completion of a 300-bed hospital, the Council will inspect, and if conditions are met, recommend permission to the Central Government.

Students admitted during this period won't get credit until formal permission is granted.

No further admissions except on vacancies from the first batch.

Facts:

The appellants and respondent No. 1 are Executive Engineers in the Public Health Engineering Department.

The eligibility criteria for promotion to the post of Superintending Engineer include a degree in Civil/Mechanical Engineering or its equivalent and 6 years' regular service in the grade.

The respondent No. 1 possessed an AMIE Diploma, recognized as equivalent to a Bachelor's Degree, and applied for promotion in 1991.

The controversy arose around whether the 6 years' service should be counted from the date of obtaining the educational qualification.

Issues:

Interpretation of the eligibility criteria, specifically the significance of the word 'with' in connection with the educational qualification and years of service.

Held:

The eligibility criteria required both the prescribed educational qualification and 6 years' experience.

The word 'with' was interpreted as meaning "Accompanied by; having as an addition or accompaniment," indicating a requirement for both qualification and experience.

Reading 'subsequent' after 'with' was deemed unjustified, and no qualitative difference was recognized in service before and after obtaining the educational qualification.

The decision in N. Suresh Nathan's case was distinguished, emphasizing the specific language of the rule and the purpose of encouraging employees to acquire higher education.

The court upheld the High Court's view, considering the plain meaning of words, the principle involved, and the weight of precedents.

Facts:

The appellant-accused had enmity with the deceased persons, and in seeking revenge for the murder of a relative, nine accused formed an unlawful assembly armed with weapons. The accused waylaid the victims, leading to a violent altercation resulting in the death of two individuals.

Issues:

The application of Sections 34 and 149 IPC, the plea of self-defense, and the credibility of eyewitness testimony.

The trial court convicted certain accused under specific sections, but the High Court altered the convictions on appeal.

Held:

Sections 34 and 149 IPC : The similarity between Sections 34 and 149 lies in the requirement of a common object, intention, or pre-arranged plan. The emphasis on physical presence and promotion of the crime differs. The High Court's acquittal of certain accused was deemed erroneous, considering the presence of elements of both sections.

Evidence and Unlawful Assembly: Both courts accepted the consistent and credible evidence of eyewitnesses. The accused formed an unlawful assembly with the premeditated intention of murdering the victims. The order of the High Court acquitting certain accused cannot stand.

Individual Accused Participation : Specific individuals were identified as actively participating in the attack, establishing their guilt under Sections 34 and 149 IPC. The High Court's conclusions were contradictory and based on an erroneous interpretation.

Section 161(2) and Eyewitness Testimony : Discrepancies in eyewitness accounts regarding the assault do not invalidate the evidence. The omission under Section 161(2) did not significantly impact the case, and contradictions in assault details are common in such situations.

Plea of Self-Defense : The severity of injuries inflicted on victims compared to the accused belied the plea of self-defense. The plea was rightly rejected as an afterthought, given its late introduction and lack of cross-examination.

Decision: The court held that the appeals should be disposed of in favor of the prosecution. The principle guiding appellate courts against interference in acquittal orders was discussed, emphasizing interference only when "compelling and substantial reasons" exist.