Limitation | Delay Condonation Cannot Be An Act Of Generosity: Supreme Court Refuses To Condone 31-Year Delay To Challenge Decree

"Delay condonation cannot be an act of generosity defeating the cause of substantial justice and causing prejudice to the opposite party", Supreme Court, in a significant ruling, held that a massive delay of 31 years in challenging a civil decree cannot be condoned based on unsubstantiated allegations of fraud, especially when court records prove the defendant had contested the suit. A bench comprising Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice K. Vinod Chandran observed that the grounds projected for the delay were a "deliberate falsehood" belied by the trial court's proceedings.

The appellant, Hari Ram, had filed a suit in 1965 seeking a declaration of his khatedari (tenant occupant) rights over 158.3 bighas of land inherited from his father, which was decreed in his favour in 1975 after the first defendant was eventually set ex-parte. Over three decades later, in 2006, the original defendant challenged the decree alleging she never appeared during the trial and that the decree was obtained by fraud. Although the First Appellate Authority rejected the appeal due to the gross delay, the Board of Revenue remanded the matter to the trial court, and the Rajasthan High Court affirmed this remand, prompting the present appeal.

The primary question before the court was whether an exorbitant delay of 31 years in challenging a decree could be condoned on grounds of alleged fraud and denial of opportunity to defend. The court was also called upon to determine whether a plaintiff is legally obligated to file a separate suit to cancel an unregistered, voidable sale deed in order to assert their title by way of an unequivocal conduct.

Record Belies Allegations Of Non-Appearance

The court thoroughly examined the trial court records from 1965 to 1975 and found that the first defendant had actively participated in the proceedings. The bench noted that she had appeared through counsel, filed a written statement, and even led defence evidence by examining two witnesses. The court observed that the subsequent allegations of fraud and manipulation of the vakalatnama were manufactured to explain the excessive delay.

Pleadings Improved At Every Stage

The bench heavily criticised the manner in which the defendant improved her grounds of challenge at successive appellate stages without any factual pleading. Initially, the defendant claimed she only learned of the decree through her lawyer in 2006, which the court viewed as an admission of knowledge. It was only later before the Revenue Board that she alleged the plaintiff had manipulated her signature on the vakalatnama, a claim the court found entirely unsupported by evidence.

Adverse Inference For Withholding Best Evidence

Addressing the unregistered sale deed relied upon by the defendants to claim title, the Supreme Court noted that despite filing an application to produce documents before the trial court, the defendant failed to actually produce the deed. Citing Sections 103 and 140(g) of the Evidence Act, 1872, the bench reiterated that courts must draw an adverse inference against parties who withhold crucial documents.

"When a party in possession of the best evidence, which throws light on the issue in controversy, withholds it, the Court is entitled to draw an adverse inference and there is no responsibility on the Court to call upon the party to produce the document."

No Separate Suit Needed To Repudiate Voidable Deed

The respondents argued that the appellant never sought a formal declaration or cancellation of the 1963 sale deed executed by his mother on his behalf when he was a minor. Rejecting this argument, the court held that repudiation of a voidable transaction does not mandate a separate suit for cancellation. Relying on the precedent in K.S. Shivappa v. K. Neelamma, the bench ruled that the appellant's act of claiming khatedari rights based on mutation entries and obtaining a decree constituted an effective repudiation of the unregistered document.

"The repudiation of a voidable transaction need not necessarily be in a suit instituted to set it aside and could as well be, by way of an unequivocal conduct."

Sale Of Minor's Property Voidable Under Section 8(2)

The court also examined the merits of the alleged sale deed, noting that it disclosed the vendor was a 12-year-old minor at the time of execution. Because no prior permission was obtained from the court, the bench held the transaction was directly hit by Section 8(2) of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956. Furthermore, a subsequent 2005 sale deed executed by the defendant lacked any recitals tracing her title, casting severe doubt on the respondents' claim of being bona fide purchasers.

Failure To Execute Decree Does Not Defeat Title

Concluding on the issue of limitation, the bench emphasised that the 31-year delay was gross and condoning it would cause immense prejudice to the decree-holder. The court firmly rejected the argument that the appellant's failure to file an execution petition implied the defendants were still in possession. The bench noted that a declaratory decree cannot be set aside merely because execution was not sought, as there is no legal presumption that possession remained with the defendants.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the remand orders passed by the High Court and the Board of Revenue. The apex court fully restored the original 1975 decree passed by the Revenue Court in favour of the appellant, thereby putting a quietus to the decades-long property dispute.

Date of Decision: 10 April 2026