Negotiable Instruments Act – Conviction under Section 138 – Presumption Properly Raised – Appeal Dismissed – The appellant challenged the High Court's reversal of acquittal and conviction under Section 138 NI Act, arguing that foundational facts were not proved and no presumption under Sections 118 and 139 should have been raised – Held: Respondent had proved foundational facts and appellant failed to rebut presumption – High Court rightly convicted appellant – No interference called for [Paras 5–9].

Compensation – Quantum of Fine – No Double Recovery – The appellant argued that compensation awarded was disproportionate as the respondent was granted the entire cheque amount of Rs.10,00,000/- in addition to a fine – Held: Fine imposed was Rs.10,10,000/- out of which Rs.10,00,000/- was to be paid as compensation under Section 357(1)(b) CrPC – There was no separate or excess compensation – Argument rejected [Paras 10–14].

Fine and Sentence – Justified in Facts – The Court held that the imposition of fine equivalent to the cheque amount was in consonance with the law laid down in R. Vijayan v. Baby, (2012) 1 SCC 260 – There was no illegality or excessiveness in sentencing – No reduction warranted [Paras 11–14].

Time to Pay Fine – Three Months Granted – On request of counsel for the appellant, the Court granted three months’ time to deposit the fine amount – In default, appellant to undergo simple imprisonment for six months – Amount to be paid to respondent upon deposit [Paras 15–16].

Decision – Appeal dismissed with modification regarding time to pay – Held: Conviction under Section 138 NI Act upheld – Appellant granted three months to deposit cheque amount; default will attract simple imprisonment for six months [Paras 14–16].

Civil Law – Fresh Suit  – Res Judicata – Section 11 CPC – Relief Barred – Earlier findings upheld - The plaintiff’s challenge based on coercion and misrepresentation regarding the execution of Power of Attorney and subsequent sale deeds was earlier rejected by three courts – The issue now raised was identical and held barred by res judicata under Section 11 CPC – Held: Liberty granted by High Court in second appeal did not revive adjudicated claims or create new cause of action [Paras 5-6, 9-10].

Limitation – Fresh Suit Filed Based on Liberty Reserved – Claim Time-Barred – Agreements Executed in 1998 - The second suit filed by plaintiff for declaration and possession was barred by limitation, as the cause of action dated back to the execution of agreements in 1998 – The liberty granted in second appeal cannot override statutory limitation periods – Held: No application of Section 14 of Limitation Act; suit not before wrong forum but improperly framed [Paras 7, 10].

Civil Procedure – Order 23 CPC – Leave to File Fresh Suit – No Immunity from Limitation – Order 23 Rule 1 and Rule 2 CPC Considered - Though liberty to file a comprehensive suit was granted, it does not extend to revive barred or decided claims – The High Court rightly observed that Order 23 CPC does not exempt parties from adhering to limitation laws [Para 7].

Non-Joinder of Necessary Parties – Suit Deficient – Important Stakeholders Not Impleaded – Belgaum Urban Development Authority and Badminton Association were necessary parties to the dispute concerning civic amenities and property layout – Held: Suit rightly found defective for non-joinder [Para 11].

Final Decision – Special Leave Petition Dismissed – Findings of High Court Affirmed – Supreme Court upheld the High Court’s view that the second suit was barred by limitation and res judicata and that liberty granted earlier did not override legal bars – Held: No interference warranted – SLP dismissed [Paras 10, 12].

Matrimonial Law - Admissibility of Secretly Recorded Conversations – Balance between Right to Fair Trial and Privacy – Section 122 of Indian Evidence Act – Appeal Allowed – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal filed by the husband challenging the High Court’s decision disallowing the admission of secretly recorded conversations in a matrimonial proceeding – Held: Spousal communications recorded during marriage are admissible under the exception provided in Section 122 of the Evidence Act where litigation is between spouses – Privacy rights under Article 21 cannot override the right to fair trial in matrimonial disputes – The order of the Family Court allowing such evidence was restored [Paras 8-13].

Spousal Privilege – Exception in Divorce Proceedings – Section 122 of the Evidence Act – Privilege Not Absolute – The Court clarified that Section 122 establishes privilege over spousal communications but expressly carves out an exception in cases of proceedings between spouses – Disclosure of such communications in divorce proceedings is permissible without the consent of the other spouse – High Court’s reasoning invoking privilege was incorrect [Paras 8.1-10.1].

Right to Privacy – Constitutional Scope – Article 21 – Privacy Cannot Override Statutory Exceptions – The Court held that privacy between spouses is protected under common law principles but is subject to statutory exceptions under Section 122 – In matrimonial disputes, privacy does not prevent relevant evidence from being introduced, ensuring balance with the right to fair trial – Constitutional privacy protections are not absolute in private disputes between spouses [Paras 11-12].

Electronic Evidence – Admissibility of Audio Recordings – Sections 65A and 65B of the Evidence Act – Admissibility Upheld with Safeguards – Secretly recorded spousal communications are admissible under the Indian Evidence Act, subject to authentication and compliance with Section 65B certification requirements – The Family Court was correct in accepting electronic evidence including CDs, transcripts, and memory cards [Paras 9.5-10.6].

Precedence of Fair Trial – Balancing Competing Rights – Doctrine of Proportionality Applied – The Court applied the doctrine of proportionality, concluding that in matrimonial disputes, admitting evidence like secret recordings is essential to enable a fair adjudication of claims of cruelty or other matrimonial offences, without disregarding legitimate privacy concerns, which are protected by procedural safeguards such as in-camera proceedings [Paras 10.3-12.6].

Final Decision – Appeal Allowed – Family Court Order Restored – The Supreme Court set aside the impugned High Court judgment and restored the Family Court’s order allowing the appellant-husband to submit the supplementary affidavit and electronic recordings in divorce proceedings – Directed the Family Court to consider the evidence in accordance with law – Appeal disposed of with no order as to costs [Para 13].

Civil Appeal – Tenancy Rights – Communidade Compromise – Dismissal of Appeal – The appellant, Communidade of Tivim, sought permission to enter into a compromise with tenants declaring bifurcation of land in a 60:40 ratio – Administrative Tribunal rejected the permission on grounds that it would effectively convert tenancy rights into full ownership rights, allowing non-agricultural use, thus violating the Goa Tenancy Act, 1964, and the Goa Land Use (Regulation) Act, 1991 – High Court upheld the Tribunal’s order – Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding the compromise illegal as it defeated the statutory framework protecting tenancy rights and agricultural land use [Paras 6-21].

Tenancy Rights – Permissible Modes of Termination – Section 9 of Tenancy Act – The Court held that tenancy under Section 9 of the Tenancy Act can only be terminated by surrender under Section 10, by landlord under Section 11 on limited grounds, or under other statutory provisions – The compromise sought by the Communidade bypassed these provisions and was therefore invalid [Para 16].

Ownership Rights – Deemed Purchase under Section 18A – Procedure under Tenancy Act Mandatory – The Supreme Court reiterated that tenants can only be deemed to have purchased land through the process outlined in Chapter IIA of the Tenancy Act, involving Mamlatdar’s approval and determination of purchase price – The compromise arrangement illegally sought to grant full ownership without following these statutory safeguards [Paras 17-18].

Land Use Restrictions – Violation of Land Use Act – The Court emphasized Section 2 of the Land Use Act, which prohibits non-agricultural use of land vested in tenants – The proposed compromise allowed parties to use land for non-agricultural purposes, in direct contravention of statutory prohibitions, thus rendering it illegal [Para 18].

Communidade Code – Scope of Article 30(4)(g) – Limited Power – The Supreme Court clarified that while the Communidade may deliberate on compromise proposals under Article 30(4)(g), final approval vests with the Administrative Tribunal under Article 154(3), and such approval cannot be granted in violation of tenancy or land use laws [Para 20].

Final Decision – Appeal Dismissed – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, upheld the High Court and Tribunal's findings, and clarified that it expressed no view on merits of tenancy claims pending before the Appellate Court, which must be decided in accordance with law [Paras 22-23].

Senior Advocate Designation – Suo Motu Power of High Courts – Section 16(2) of the Advocates Act – Validity of Suo Motu Designation Affirmed – Supreme Court upheld the power of the High Court to designate advocates suo motu as Senior Advocates under Section 16(2), observing that such designations were permissible under law and the Rules, 2019, as clarified in Indira Jaising (2017) 9 SCC 766 and Indira Jaising (2023) 8 SCC 1 – Held: High Court wrongly struck down Rule 6(9), which validly enables suo motu designation [Paras 2-10].

Indira Jaising Guidelines – Reconsideration and Clarification – Supreme Court noted that Indira Jaising-I guidelines are subject to periodic reconsideration and clarified in Indira Jaising-II that suo motu power remains intact for exceptional cases – Held: Guidelines for transparency apply primarily to application-based designations; suo motu designations by Full Court are preserved under constitutional scheme [Paras 10, 15-18].

Reaffirmation of Suo Motu Power – Recent Judicial Clarifications – Following Jitender @ Kalla v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2025 INSC 667, Supreme Court reiterated that suo motu designations remain valid, subject to fairness, transparency, and adherence to constitutional principles – Held: Rule 6(9) as amended aligns with these principles and requires no further interference [Paras 17-18].

Recognition of Designation as Privilege – Not a Right – Supreme Court reaffirmed that Senior Advocate designation is a discretionary privilege conferred based on merit, not seniority or popularity – Held: Courts must exercise this power fairly without arbitrariness or undue preference, with suo motu designations recognized as part of judicial discretion [Para 19].

Decision of the Judgment – High Court Order Set Aside – Designations of Respondent Nos.5 to 9 affirmed – Amended Rule 6(9) upheld to remain in force until fresh rules are framed – Special Leave Petitions allowed with no costs [Paras 20-21].

Employment Law - Recruitment Process – Improper Exclusion from PPSC – Violation of Article 320 – Recruitment Process Quashed - The appellants challenged the selection of 1091 Assistant Professors and 67 Librarians in Punjab undertaken without consulting the Punjab Public Service Commission (PPSC), violating Article 320 and the 1955 Regulations – The Supreme Court held that the posts were within the purview of the PPSC and could not be removed without following the statutory procedure prescribed under the 1955 Regulations – The retrospective amendment of Regulations after the recruitment was concluded was held invalid and ineffective [Paras 24-26, 28-32].

UGC Regulations – Applicability of UGC (2010) Regulations – State Bound by Adoption – Recruitment Must Follow UGC Norms - The State of Punjab had adopted the UGC Regulations, 2010 by incorporation, which remained binding despite their repeal by UGC Regulations, 2018 – The Supreme Court held that recruitment of Assistant Professors must comply with UGC norms, including academic performance indicators (API) and qualitative assessments, rather than solely relying on multiple-choice question-based tests [Paras 33-41, 46-47].

Policy Decision – Arbitrariness in Recruitment Process – Political Expediency Disapproved - The Court observed that the recruitment process was altered post-haste before State elections, replacing a time-tested UGC compliant process with a simplified test lacking qualitative assessment – Such arbitrary and hasty decision-making, bypassing institutional safeguards and violating established legal norms, was held to be impermissible under Article 14 of the Constitution [Paras 30-32, 48-52, 58].

Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation – Established Recruitment Practices – Deviation Without Justification Invalid - The Court reiterated that any deviation from long-standing recruitment practices requires valid justification – The State’s abrupt change in recruitment policy without valid reasons, undermining fairness, transparency, and established standards, was held to violate the doctrine of legitimate expectation and constitutional guarantees of non-arbitrariness [Paras 58-59].

Final Decision – Recruitment Quashed – Fresh Process Directed - The Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the Punjab and Haryana High Court’s Division Bench judgment, quashed the entire recruitment process for Assistant Professors and Librarians, and directed the State of Punjab to initiate a fresh recruitment process as per the UGC Regulations, 2018, now applicable in the State [Paras 60-61].

Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Section 376 IPC – Exception in Peculiar Circumstances – Continuation Unnecessary – The appeals arose from refusal by High Court to quash criminal cases including Section 376 IPC despite mutual settlement – Supreme Court noted second FIR (376 IPC) was lodged immediately after first FIR by opposite side and complainant categorically expressed no intention to pursue case – Held: Though ordinarily Section 376 IPC cases are not quashed on settlement, facts justified exercise of inherent powers to prevent abuse of process [Paras 3, 5-8].

Settlement After Serious Allegations – Consent of Complainant Considered – Complainant affirmed before Court, through affidavit, that she is settled post-marriage and further prosecution would disrupt personal life – Supreme Court recognized the voluntary, consistent, and unambiguous stand of complainant to withdraw from prosecution as a decisive factor – Held: Court's powers under Section 482 CrPC remain flexible to secure ends of justice in special facts [Paras 5-8].

Second FIR Lodged as Retaliation – Contextual Consideration – The second FIR, containing graver charges, followed a first FIR filed against complainant’s side alleging assault – Supreme Court inferred possible retaliatory motive and concluded continued trial would cause harassment without achieving justice – All proceedings quashed [Paras 3, 7-9].

Final Relief – Quashing Allowed – Supreme Court quashed both FIR No. 302/2023 and FIR No. 304/2023, including Sessions Case No. 29/2024 – High Court’s order refusing quashment set aside – Reaffirmed that inherent powers should be exercised prudently to prevent misuse of criminal law machinery [Paras 9].

Cheque Dishonour – Liability under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act – Quashing of Complaint Set Aside – The High Court had quashed the complaint filed by the appellant on grounds of non-issuance of statutory notice to the partnership firm and failure to arraign the firm as an accused – Supreme Court held that under Section 141 of the Act, a firm is merely a compendious expression for its partners, who are personally, jointly, and severally liable for its acts – Held: Complaint maintainable even without arraigning the firm as accused or serving statutory notice to the firm, provided partners are issued notice and made parties – Permission granted to implead partnership firm as an accused – Impugned order quashing complaint set aside and matter restored to trial court for disposal on merits [Paras 2-12].

Company vs. Partnership Firm – Distinction in Liability – Partnership Firm Not a Separate Juristic Entity – Unlike a company which enjoys distinct legal personality and creates vicarious liability for directors, a partnership firm lacks separate legal existence from its partners – Held: Partners of a firm are personally liable and bound by joint and several liability for actions done in the firm’s name – Notice to partners equals notice to firm – Omission to implead firm is curable and does not invalidate proceedings under Section 138 of the Act [Paras 6.1-7.24].

Interpretation of Section 141 – Legal Fiction of ‘Company’ includes Firm – The term ‘company’ under Section 141 includes a partnership firm by legal fiction – Held: While in company matters directors can be liable vicariously, in partnership the partners are directly, jointly, and severally liable along with the firm – Even absent arraignment of firm as accused, complaint can proceed against partners under joint liability principle – Distinction in treatment of firms and companies upheld to prevent misuse of Section 141 by rigid procedural technicalities [Paras 9.1-9.11].

Decision – Complaint Restored – High Court Judgment Reversed – Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the Madras High Court which had quashed the complaint under Section 138 of the Act, permitted the appellant to implead the partnership firm as an accused, restored the complaint before the Judicial Magistrate and directed disposal in accordance with law [Paras 10-12].

Criminal Law -  Sections 63 and 65 of the Copyright Act, 1957 - Sections 120B and 420 of the - Appeal by Victim Against Acquittal  – Corporate Entity as Victim – Section 2(wa) CrPC – Right of Appeal Upheld – In a case involving sale of counterfeit products infringing trademarks and copyrights, the Court held that the appellant company Asian Paints Limited qualifies as a ‘victim’ under Section 2(wa) CrPC, having suffered commercial and reputational injury due to the criminal acts – The Court clarified that juristic persons like companies are covered under the definition of ‘victim’ and are entitled to file appeal under Section 372 CrPC – High Court’s dismissal of appeal as non-maintainable was set aside and matter remitted for decision on merits [Paras 36-37, 51-52].

Proviso to Section 372 CrPC – Independent and Standalone Remedy – Not Constrained by Section 378 – The Supreme Court reiterated that the right conferred on a ‘victim’ under the proviso to Section 372 CrPC is a substantive and independent right, not restricted by Section 378 CrPC – Appeal by victim is maintainable against acquittal orders, including those passed by the First Appellate Court – Procedural limitations applicable to State or complainant under Section 378 do not dilute the victim’s substantive right to appeal [Paras 43-44, 47].

Appeal Against First Appellate Court Order – Next Level Appeal Permissible – Victim Can Challenge Acquittal in High Court – The Court clarified that where acquittal occurs at First Appellate Court level, the victim’s appeal lies to the next higher court i.e., the High Court – Proviso to Section 372 CrPC is applicable even in such situations – High Court’s restrictive interpretation rejected [Paras 45-47].

Victim Need Not Be Complainant – Distinction Upheld – Corporate Victim’s Right Recognized – The Court upheld the principle that a victim under Section 2(wa) need not be the original complainant or informant – Despite the FIR being lodged by an investigator, the company suffering direct injury is the victim and entitled to file appeal – Distinction between ‘victim’ and ‘complainant’ reaffirmed [Paras 23, 44].

Purpose of Victim Appeal Right – Expansive Interpretation Favoured – The Court reiterated that the 2009 amendment introducing Section 372 proviso was intended to strengthen victim rights in the justice process, granting a right of participation and remedy to victims against acquittals or inadequate outcomes – Liberal and purposive construction of the victim’s right to appeal was adopted [Paras 49-50].

Decision – Appeal Allowed – High Court Judgment Set Aside – Appeal Restored for Merits Hearing – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court’s order rejecting maintainability, restored the appeal before High Court for consideration on merits, and directed expeditious hearing in light of the prolonged pendency since 2016 [Paras 51-52].