Hindu Marriage – Void Marriage – Second Marriage during subsistence of first – Conversion and Re-conversion – Compromise and Quashing of FIR – Woman, originally Muslim, married Hindu petitioner by Hindu rites while first marriage subsisted – Later divorce decree obtained – Held: Marriage void ab initio under Section 11 HMA as contravening Section 5(i); absence of common religion and existence of prior spouse invalidate the marriage – Compromise deed and quashing of FIR upheld – Recall application rejected; subsequent Family Court judgment cannot revive extinguished proceedings [Paras 11–19].

Marriage – Validity – Conversion – Hindu Marriage Act – Petitioner (Hindu) married respondent (formerly Muslim, converted to Islam, later allegedly reconverted to Hinduism) through Hindu rites on 28.06.2020 while her divorce from first husband (Dr. Zafar Sayeed) was pending – Decree of divorce granted only on 19.01.2021 – Held: Under Section 5(i) read with Section 11, Hindu Marriage Act, a valid Hindu marriage requires that both parties be Hindus and neither have a living spouse – Marriage solemnized in contravention is void ipso jure, i.e., non-existent in law from inception [Paras 11–13].

Void Marriage – Legal Effect – A void marriage confers no marital status or mutual rights and obligations – It is to be ignored as non-existent; declaration of nullity is not mandatory but advisable for record and legal clarity – Reliance placed on Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav v. Anantrao Shivram Adhav, (1988) 1 SCC 530; M.M. Malhotra v. Union of India, (2005) 8 SCC 351 [Paras 13–14].

Recall of Order – Compromise Decree – Subsequent Developments – Compromise deed dated 17.02.2024 verified and recorded; FIR under Sections 392, 354, 506 IPC quashed by order dated 09.01.2025 – Subsequent dismissal of petitioner’s Section 11 HMA petition by Family Court (06.05.2025) does not justify recall of High Court order – Judicial pronouncement by competent court is an independent event and cannot undo a compromise-based quashing order [Paras 6–9, 17–18].

Declaration of Marital Status – Judicial Responsibility – Determination of marital status affects the social and legal identity of parties; such declaration can only be made by a competent court in proper proceedings under Section 11 HMA – Courts must ensure full and effective adjudication of marital status [Para 15].

Scope under Article 226 – High Court, while hearing criminal writs, cannot adjudicate disputed factual issues relating to personal law status – Appropriate remedies lie before matrimonial courts [Para 12, 16].

Decision: Application for Recall dated 27.05.2025 dismissed – No ground to interfere with earlier order dated 09.01.2025 quashing FIR based on compromise – Parties at liberty to pursue remedies against Family Court order dated 06.05.2025 [Paras 17–19].

Tenancy Law - Civil Procedure – Partnership Dispute – Order 30 Rule 8 CPC – Eviction Petition – Respondents filed eviction petition against M/s Indian Furniture Store through alleged partner Satish Grover – Petitioner filed application under Order 30 Rule 8 CPC read with Section 151 CPC, contending that his appearance be treated as under protest and Court must first determine whether he was a partner – Rent Controller, instead of deciding the application, directed petitioner to disclose partnership details on affidavit – Held: Impermissible – Rule 8 CPC envisages preliminary adjudication – Person disputing partnership cannot be compelled to furnish details before Court determines his status as partner – Impugned order set aside [Paras 5-7].

Civil Revision – Rent Controller’s Jurisdiction – Rent Controller must first adjudicate application under Order 30 Rule 8 CPC before proceeding with eviction petition – Only upon deciding petitioner’s status as partner can he be compelled to disclose partnership particulars – Impugned order contrary to the scheme of the Code – Civil revision allowed – Rent Controller directed to decide application under Order 30 Rule 8 CPC in accordance with law [Paras 8-9].

Decision: Civil Revision allowed – Impugned order dated 22.08.2025 set aside – Rent Controller directed to first decide application under Order 30 Rule 8 CPC and then proceed with eviction petition [Paras 8-10].

Criminal Law – Misappropriation by Public Servants – Quashment – Petitioners, employees of BEVCO, were prosecuted for misappropriating foreign liquor stock worth ₹27,92,523 during 01.04.2018 to 30.07.2018 – Contended that remittance of the loss amount in accordance with BEVCO’s circular dated 20.12.2017 absolved them of criminal liability – Held: Circular subsequently set aside by Division Bench in WA No. 642/2025 – Repayment made after detection of shortage and without interest – Does not erase the offence or eliminate criminality – Quashment denied [Paras 3–12]

Intent – Shortage of Foreign Liquor Stock – Scale of shortage to the tune of ₹27.92 lakhs held to indicate intentional misappropriation and not mere clerical or operational lapse – Petitioners’ argument that discrepancies were common in BEVCO outlets due to delay in audit and voluminous work not accepted – Court held the magnitude points to deliberate acts requiring trial [Paras 10–12]

Effect of Repayment – Criminal Liability – Repayment of misappropriated amount after misappropriation complete – Criminal liability under Prevention of Corruption Act and IPC not extinguished by post-facto repayment – Held: Criminal trial must proceed as remittance was not voluntary but consequence of detection [Paras 8–12]

Decision: Petition dismissed – Interim stay vacated – Criminal proceedings in CC No. 2/2024 to continue before Special Judge, Muvattupuzha

Family Law – Divorce by Mutual Consent – Jurisdictional Error – Consent Requirement – Fault-Based Petitions – Section 13 vs. 13B HMA – Family Court suo motu passed decree under Section 13B of HMA despite pendency of separate contested petitions under Section 13 filed by husband and wife on grounds of cruelty and adultery – Held: Statutory precondition under Section 13B of mutual consent through a joint petition and second motion was not met – Court lacked jurisdiction to recharacterise fault-based proceedings as mutual consent divorce – Impugned decree set aside [Paras 17–27, 32–33, 36–37, 46–47].

Family Courts Act – Scope of Sections 9 and 10 – Procedural Discretion vs. Substantive Law – Family Court erred in invoking procedural flexibility under Sections 9 and 10 of Family Courts Act to bypass mandatory requirements under Section 13B of HMA – Held: Procedural provisions cannot override express substantive statutory safeguards – Mutual consent must be explicit, contemporaneous, and continuous – Mere separate prayers for divorce do not establish mutuality [Paras 39–45].

Constitutional Law – Article 142 – Limits on Judicial Power – Role of Supreme Court – Family Court assumed plenary jurisdiction analogous to powers under Article 142 of Constitution to mould relief in absence of statutory compliance – Held: Only Supreme Court has authority under Article 142 to grant relief beyond statute – Reliance on Anil Kumar Jain v. Maya Jain affirmed – Decree passed by Family Court ultra vires [Paras 50–52].

Statutory Interpretation – Section 13B of HMA – Substance vs Form – Consent as Jurisdictional Fact – Section 13B not a mere procedural shortcut but a substantive provision requiring mutual, ongoing, voluntary consent by both spouses – Fault-based proceedings cannot be retrofitted into mutual consent divorce – Decree passed without jurisdiction, nullity in law [Paras 21, 25–27, 36–38, 42–44].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned Judgment and Decree dated 18.07.2024 passed by Family Court set aside – Divorce petitions remanded to Family Court for adjudication on merits – No order as to costs [Paras 53–56].

Land Acquisition – Due Process – Sections 3A, 3D & 3G(3) of National Highways Act – Gazette Notification issued in 2022 under Section 3A did not include all petitioners’ properties – Declaration under Section 3D dated 03.07.2024 and subsequent compensation proceedings initiated – Petitioners allege interference with possession without due acquisition – Held: Respondents directed to follow due process before acquisition – Acquisition without compliance violates Article 300-A [Paras 2–2.2, 9]

Constitutional Law – Article 300-A – Right to Property – Seven essential rights recognised by Supreme Court in Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah (2024) 10 SCC 533 form core of Article 300-A – Includes rights to notice, hearing, reasoned decision, fair compensation, expeditious process, public purpose and conclusion – Held: Absence of these renders law vulnerable to challenge – These principles now part of administrative law jurisprudence [Paras 5–7]

Property Law – Completion of Acquisition – Mere compensation not sufficient – Possession of property is essential for valid acquisition – Court reiterates that unless physical possession is taken, acquisition remains incomplete [Para 8]

Decision: Writ Petitions disposed of with direction to follow due process of law – No order as to costs – Miscellaneous petitions closed.

Criminal Law – Dismissal for Default – Acquittal – Petitioner filed complaint under Sections 500, 195, 120B IPC against a developer alleging defamation and conspiracy – Complaint was dismissed for default on 22.07.2024 after petitioner failed to appear due to confusion in reading the next date as 07.08.2024 instead of 07.03.2024 from cause list – Application for restoration filed on 30.07.2024 was rejected by Magistrate on ground of lack of power to recall dismissal – Held: Magistrate rightly rejected restoration as he became functus officio – No provision in CrPC permits restoration after acquittal due to default [Paras 3–4, 10–16]

Acquittal – Consequences of Dismissal – Though Magistrate’s dismissal order did not expressly record “acquittal,” it amounts to deemed acquittal under Section 256 CrPC – Absence of appearance by complainant justified default dismissal – Complainant's remedy lies in appeal, not revision or restoration application – No illegality found in Magistrate’s refusal [Paras 13–16]

Inherent Powers – Scope under Section 482 CrPC / Article 227 – In view of specific remedy available under CrPC (appeal with leave), High Court’s inherent powers cannot be invoked for restoration – Held: Inherent powers are not to bypass express statutory scheme – Petition not maintainable [Paras 12–14]

Court’s Observations – Confusion arose due to mistaken entry of next date as 07.08.2024 in court records – Petitioner is at liberty to seek appropriate remedy in accordance with law – However, current revisional application dismissed as unsustainable [Paras 17–18]

Decision: Revisional Application Dismissed – No power of restoration after default dismissal under CrPC – Petitioner may pursue appropriate legal remedy

Motor Vehicles Act – Claim under Section 163-A – Borrower of Vehicle – Tortfeasor – Not Third Party – Claim Not Maintainable – Deceased, who died in a self-accident, had borrowed the vehicle from his brother and was driving it in a rash and negligent manner – Held: Once the deceased stepped into the shoes of the owner, he ceased to be a third party – Claim under Section 163-A is not maintainable against insurer by borrower/tortfeasor – Tribunal erred in awarding ₹3,93,500 as compensation – Award set aside [Paras 13–19].

Insurance Law – Liability of Insurer – Borrower Driving Vehicle – No Coverage – Deceased was neither a paid driver nor a third party – Policy did not cover owner’s relatives or gratuitous users – Supreme Court in Ramkhiladi v. United India Insurance Co. [(2020) 2 SCC 550] relied upon – Held: No liability on insurer for self-inflicted accident by borrower of vehicle – Deceased, being tortfeasor, not entitled to compensation [Paras 15–16].

Motor Accident Claim – Tribunal's Failure to Determine Negligence – Perverse Award – Tribunal failed to determine culpability despite clear evidence (FIR and claimant’s admission) that deceased was driving negligently – Award granted without proper reasoning or findings on responsibility – Held: Award unsustainable in law and liable to be set aside [Paras 17–19].

Appellate Review – Error in Applying Multiplier – Irrelevant in Present Case – Though appellant argued Tribunal applied incorrect multiplier (16 instead of 15), Court found issue moot since claim itself was not maintainable [Para 10].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Award of Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in MCOP No.696 of 2012 dated 03/12/2012 set aside – Claim petition dismissed – Appellant insurer entitled to recover any amount deposited before Tribunal by filing appropriate application – No costs – Connected miscellaneous petition closed [Paras 19–20].

Service Law – Notional Promotion – Delay in Issuance of Promotion Order – Grant of NFU – High Court sets aside Tribunal Order directing notional promotion with retrospective effect – Respondent promoted to the post of Deputy Director General only on 21.07.2016 despite DPC held on 22.01.2016 and vacancy arising on 01.04.2016 – Tribunal held delay unjustified and allowed notional promotion from 01.04.2016 – High Court disagrees – Held: Promotion becomes effective only upon assumption of duties, not from date of vacancy or DPC recommendation – No mala fide or arbitrariness found in administrative delay – Mere pendency of vacancy and DPC recommendation does not confer enforceable right to promotion from earlier date – Tribunal’s direction unsustainable [Paras 1, 3, 5, 7, 9-11, 26-29, 39-41].

Administrative Delay – Priority to Earlier DPC Panel – Valid Justification – Officers recommended by Supplementary DPC for year 2015-16 were accorded priority – Delay in issuing promotion orders to 2016-17 panel including respondent was due to administrative practice – High Court holds such prioritization is not mala fide or unreasonable – No evidence produced to show that delay was intentional or designed to deprive respondent of NFU – Petitioners’ action not arbitrary [Paras 4, 14-15, 25, 30, 34, 37].

Promotion – Right to Be Considered vs. Right to Promotion – DPC Recommendation – No Vested Right – High Court reiterates settled law that promotion does not automatically follow recommendation by DPC – It becomes effective only from date of actual appointment and assumption of charge – Respondent retired before completing requisite one year in promotional post to qualify for NFU – Therefore, claim of retrospective notional promotion and NFU unsustainable [Paras 13, 29, 39].

Distinction from Earlier Precedents – Krishna Kumar Sinha & Others – Inapplicable – Bombay High Court case distinguished on facts – In that case, competent authority failed to process promotions despite available vacancies and DPC recommendations – Present case involved administrative sequencing based on policy – Hence, benefit of retrospective promotion not attracted – Parity cannot be claimed mechanically without establishing factual similarity [Paras 19-20, 30-32].

State’s Conduct – No Mala Fide Established – Delay Not Attributable to Ill-Will – High Court finds no evidence to suggest the delay in promotion was due to bias, negligence or mala fide action – Mere delay per se without adverse motive does not justify retrospective promotion – Principle that State cannot take advantage of its own wrong applies only where delay is culpable – Not applicable here [Paras 18, 25, 36, 38].

Decision: Writ Petition Allowed – Tribunal’s Order dated 29.05.2024 quashed – No entitlement to notional promotion from 01.04.2016 – No financial or NFU benefits payable – Respondent’s claim rejected – No costs awarded [Paras 41-43].

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 148 – Suspension of Sentence – Deposit of 20% – Not Mandatory – Held: The deposit of 20% of compensation amount under Section 148 NI Act is not an absolute precondition for suspension of sentence – The word "may" in Section 148(1) confers discretionary power on the Appellate Court – It can be waived or reduced below 20% in exceptional cases where compliance would result in denial of liberty or render appeal illusory – Condition must be supported by recorded reasons – Courts must assess the financial capacity of the appellant and the bona fides of the appeal – Reference to indigence, hardship, or disproportionate impact must be considered before imposing deposit condition [Paras 21–22, 72–74].

Criminal Procedure – Right to Bail – Appellate Court's Discretion – Held: Right to bail cannot be taken away solely on non-compliance of condition to deposit compensation under Section 148 NI Act – Suspension of sentence must be based on just and fair conditions – Liberty cannot be made contingent upon financial ability where offence is bailable with maximum sentence of two years – Bail must be granted in accordance with principles of fairness, proportionality and access to justice – Unreasoned denial of bail due to non-deposit under Section 148 would amount to arbitrariness and violate Article 21 of the Constitution [Paras 41, 49–51].

Criminal Law – Appellate Rights – Condition for Hearing Appeal – Held: There is no statutory mandate making deposit of 20% a precondition for admission or hearing of appeal – Non-deposit cannot result in dismissal of appeal – Appellate Courts cannot refuse to hear appeals on merits for want of deposit under Section 148 NI Act – Such refusal would amount to constructive denial of right to appeal and breach of natural justice – Judicial discretion under Section 148 must be exercised judiciously and not mechanistically [Paras 55–57].

Interpretation of Statutes – "May" and "Shall" – Section 148 NI Act – Held: Use of "may" in Section 148(1) of NI Act is deliberate – Legislature conferred limited discretion on Appellate Courts – Reading "may" as "shall" would defeat legislative intent and cause injustice in cases of indigence – Presumption of legislative wisdom must guide interpretation – Word "may" allows judicial balancing between victims' rights and accused’s right to appeal and liberty – Courts should refrain from adopting rigid or literal interpretation where it causes hardship [Paras 16–18, 26–27, 72].

Legal Remedy – Jurisdiction under Section 148 NI Act – Held: Appellate Court’s jurisdiction to order deposit under Section 148 NI Act arises only during pendency of appeal filed by convict – Provision does not apply when no appeal is filed – Also, juristic persons such as companies cannot be compelled to deposit under Section 148 due to lack of personal liberty implications – Differential treatment between natural and juristic persons in enforcement of Section 148 violates principles of substantive equality [Paras 61–62, 66–68].

Legislative Purpose – Section 148 – Fails Proportionality Test – Held: Section 148 NI Act fails to strike a fair balance – It disproportionately impacts poor individuals while exempting juristic persons – The provision has created unintended class-based discrimination – Appellate Courts should prioritize early disposal of appeals in cheque bounce cases rather than compel deposit from financially weak convicts – Enforcing deposit mechanically results in procedural injustice and denial of substantive due process – Principle of proportionality must guide judicial discretion under Section 148 [Paras 75–76].

Appellate Procedure – Suspension of Sentence – Held: Section 430 BNSS (similar to Section 389 CrPC) provides an independent right to seek suspension of sentence – It cannot be curtailed by Section 148 NI Act – Any conditions imposed must meet the test of reasonableness and fairness – Appellate remedy must not be converted into a privilege dependent on financial compliance – Suspension of sentence must be based on merits of conviction and risk of miscarriage of justice during pendency of appeal [Paras 12, 64–65].

Judicial Precedent – Supreme Court Decisions – Harmonious Interpretation – Interpretation aligned with Jamboo Bhandari v. M.P. State Industrial Development Corporation and Muskan Enterprises v. State of Punjab – Earlier conflicting High Court views that treated deposit of 20% as mandatory or led to automatic cancellation of bail for non-deposit either overruled or no longer good law – Appellate Courts must examine each case on its facts and apply discretion with reasons – Decisions based on erroneous reading of “may” as “shall” clarified to be incorrect in law – Future courts directed to adopt purposive and constitutionally aligned interpretation [Paras 25, 27, 29, 33].

Judicial Duty – Duty to Record Reasons – Application of Judicial Mind – Held: Courts exercising powers under Section 148 NI Act are duty-bound to record reasons when imposing or waiving deposit conditions – Blanket or mechanical orders of deposit are unsustainable – Absence of reasoned order vitiates the exercise of discretion – Standard of judicial accountability and fairness applies to interlocutory orders impacting personal liberty [Paras 22, 72, 73].

Decision: Reference answered – Deposit of 20% compensation under Section 148 NI Act is not mandatory – Suspension of sentence can be granted with or without such deposit depending on facts – Right to bail and appeal cannot be defeated by inability to deposit – Matter remanded to Single Bench for decision on merits in light of these findings [Paras 36, 41, 51, 57, 72, 79].