Election Law – Panchayat Elections – Corrupt Practice – Disqualification – Declaration of Returned Candidate as Void – Declaration of Another Candidate as Elected – Non-disclosure of criminal antecedents by returned candidate amounts to corrupt practice and election liable to be declared void – However, declaration of an unelected candidate as elected can be made only if statutory conditions are fulfilled – In absence of allegation or finding that but for corrupt votes the election petitioner would have secured majority of valid votes, declaration of another candidate as elected is impermissible – Tribunal erred in law in declaring respondent No.4 as elected [Paras 11–13].

Punjab State Election Commission Act, 1994 – Sections 89 and 90 – Distinction Between Disqualification and Corrupt Practice – Section 89(1)(a) relates to disqualification existing on date of election – Section 89(1)(b) concerns corrupt practices affecting election – In cases of disqualification, votes polled by disqualified candidate cannot automatically be treated as “thrown away” – Law does not permit presumption as to voting pattern had the disqualified candidate not contested – Ratio reiterated from Supreme Court precedents [Paras 10–12].

Election Tribunal – Procedural Lapses – Mandatory Duty to Follow CPC Procedure – Election petition decided without framing issues, without calling for written response and without recording evidence – Tribunal devised its own procedure ignoring mandatory statutory framework – Election petitions are akin to civil trials and strict adherence to procedure under CPC is mandatory – Failure to frame issues and conduct trial vitiates entire proceedings [Paras 14–15].

Framing of Issues – Importance – Democratic Rights at Stake – Settlement of issues is foundational stage of election trial – Issues determine scope of evidence and adjudication – Tribunal’s casual approach in deciding election petition without issues reflects non-application of mind – Election disputes affect fate of constituency and democratic process, hence require strict procedural compliance [Paras 14–15].

Supervisory and Appellate Interference – Election Matters – High Court justified in setting aside Tribunal’s order where it suffers from patent illegality and procedural impropriety – Tribunal’s order held unsustainable both in law and procedure – Matter remanded for fresh adjudication in accordance with law [Paras 15–16].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Impugned order dated 06.03.2025 passed by Election Tribunal, Sri Muktsar Sahib set aside – Matter remanded to Tribunal for fresh decision after framing issues and recording evidence – Tribunal directed to decide election petition expeditiously, preferably on or before 30.06.2026.

Writ Jurisdiction – Direction for Registration of FIR – Housing Project Dispute – Petitioners sought directions under Article 226 read with Section 482 Cr.P.C. for investigation by CVC/CBI and registration of FIR against NBCC and its joint venture partner for alleged violations of statutory directions, poor construction, misappropriation of funds and cheating – Held: High Court in writ jurisdiction does not ordinarily direct registration of FIR, particularly where allegations arise out of contractual and commercial disputes requiring factual adjudication [Paras 1, 31–33].

Criminal Law – Distinction between Civil Disputes and Criminal Offences – Allegations primarily related to delay in construction, quality of construction, lack of amenities, maintenance issues, non-formation of RWA and unilateral levy of charges – Such issues held to be essentially civil in nature arising from contractual obligations between builder and allottees – Criminal colour cannot be imparted merely by alleging cheating or fraud without clear prima facie criminal intent [Paras 28–30].

Writ Jurisdiction – Article 226 – Disputed Questions of Fact – Petition involved disputed factual issues concerning compliance with NOCs, construction standards, environmental norms and maintenance obligations – Held: Such disputed questions cannot be adjudicated in writ proceedings and require evidence – Writ petition not maintainable [Paras 29–30].

Alternate Remedies – Availability under Statutory Law – Court held that Petitioners have efficacious alternate remedies under Cr.P.C. before the Magistrate for alleged cognizable offences and before civil courts, consumer fora or regulatory authorities for grievances relating to construction defects, delay, amenities and maintenance – Writ jurisdiction declined [Para 32].

Direction to Investigating Agencies – Limits of Judicial Review – Prayer for court-monitored investigation by CBI/CVC rejected – Held: Extraordinary writ jurisdiction cannot be invoked to bypass statutory remedies or convert civil disputes into criminal proceedings [Paras 31–33].

Decision: Writ Petition dismissed – No direction for registration of FIR or investigation issued – Pending applications disposed of [Paras 33–34].

Criminal Law – Dishonour of Cheque – Directors’ Liability – Quashing of Complaint – Petitioners sought quashing of criminal proceedings initiated under Sections 138/141 of the NI Act on ground that no specific role was attributed to them in the complaint – Held: Mere reproduction of statutory language not sufficient – Complaint must aver how each director was in charge of or responsible for the conduct of business at the relevant time – Failure to do so is fatal – Petitioners Nos. 1 and 4 had resigned prior to the alleged offence and such resignation was accepted as per Form-32 – Continuation of proceedings against them is an abuse of process [Paras 9, 10, 11, 15, 17, 18]

Negotiable Instruments Act – Section 138 – Reason for Dishonour – ‘Other Reasons’ – Held: Dishonour for “other reasons” does not constitute an offence under Section 138 NI Act, which requires dishonour for insufficiency of funds or exceeding arrangement – Complaint unsustainable on this ground alone [Para 10]

Company Law – Winding Up Order – Effect – Company under liquidation – Order for winding up passed prior to the institution of the complaint – Held: No proceedings can be continued against company once Official Liquidator is appointed – Complaint against company and its directors not maintainable in such scenario [Para 16]

Vicarious Liability – Directors – Specific Averments Mandatory – Multiple Supreme Court precedents reiterated that vicarious liability of directors under Section 141 NI Act cannot arise without clear and specific averments about their role – A director is not deemed liable solely because of designation – Liability must be based on factual assertions [Paras 11–14]

Decision: CRR allowed – Complaint Case No. C-824 of 2011 pending before the Learned 4th Metropolitan Magistrate, Calcutta is quashed – Proceedings against petitioners under Sections 138/141 NI Act set aside [Paras 20–21]

Real Estate – RERA Registration – Ongoing vs. Completed Project – Completion Certificate Issued Pre-RERA – Appellant’s project had received a valid completion certificate on 17 March 2015 – Tribunal wrongly held project as ongoing due to absence of fire safety certificate – Held: Under Regulation 67 of BDA Regulations, fire NOC suffices at completion stage – Completion certificate valid – Project not registrable under RERA [Paras 10–19]

Statutory Interpretation – Completion Certificate vs. Occupancy Certificate – Occupancy certificate (Sec. 2(zf)) and completion certificate (Sec. 2(q)) have distinct legal purposes – RERA registration depends on completion certificate – Absence of occupancy certificate does not render a project ongoing under the Act [Paras 12–13]

Fire Safety – Compliance Requirements – Regulation 67 of BDA Regulations requires fire NOC, not fire safety certificate, for completion – Fire safety certificate required only at occupancy stage – Tribunal’s reliance on fire safety certificate to invalidate completion certificate is legally incorrect – Project completed before Fire Safety Rules came into force [Paras 14–19]

Binding Effect of BDA Determination – BDA’s 2022 order confirming no need for fresh completion certificate after revised plan was final – Not challenged – Tribunal erred in disregarding binding decision of competent authority under Section 2(p) RERA – Project to be treated as complete [Paras 18–19]

Applicability of RERA – Retroactivity – Supreme Court in Newtech Promoters and Developers Pvt. Ltd. clarified that RERA applies only to ongoing and future projects – Project completed before 1 May 2017 falls outside the purview of the Act – Tribunal misapplied settled law [Paras 10, 14, 20]

Decision: Appeals allowed – Orders of the OREAT dated 27 September 2024 in Appeal Nos. 96 and 97 of 2023 and review orders dated 13 November 2024 in Review Petition Nos. 15 and 16 of 2024 are set aside – Project held to be completed prior to commencement of RERA – Complaints held non-maintainable – No order as to costs.

Criminal Law – Appeal against Acquittal – Scope of Interference – State challenged acquittal of respondents for offences under Sections 323/427/308/506/34 IPC – High Court reiterated that interference with acquittal is permissible only when findings are perverse or manifestly illegal – Trial Court’s view found to be a plausible view based on evidence – Held: No ground made out to interfere with acquittal [Paras 20, 52, 60–61].

Criminal Trial – Identity of Accused – Doubtful Identification – Incident occurred at night and complainant and eye-witness were under the influence of alcohol – Names of assailants not known immediately and disclosed only subsequently on suggestion of third person – DD entry recorded assault by 4–5 persons whereas FIR named only two accused – Serious doubt regarding identity of assailants – Benefit of doubt rightly extended to accused [Paras 41–52].

Evidence – Testimony of Injured and Eye-witness – Contradictions and Inconsistencies – PW-3 and PW-4 gave inconsistent versions regarding arrest of accused, preparation of documents, and presence at spot – Arrest memos did not bear signatures of eye-witnesses – Site plan not signed by complainant – Prosecution version rendered unreliable on material particulars [Paras 30, 53–55].

Investigation – Non-Examination of Material Witnesses – PCR officials were first to reach the spot and allegedly apprehended one accused – PCR officials neither cited nor examined as prosecution witnesses – Failure to examine best available witnesses caused serious dent in prosecution case [Paras 39–40].

Medical Evidence – MLC – Limited Corroborative Value – MLC recorded history of “assault” without naming assailants or specifying number of attackers – Smell of alcohol noted on injured – Medical evidence did not corroborate prosecution case regarding identity of accused [Paras 47–48, 54].

Recovery of Weapon – Doubtful Seizure – Injured claimed to have kept alleged weapons of offence and handed them over to police next day – No seizure effected from spot despite immediate police presence – Recovery found unnatural and suspicious – Use of alleged weapons not proved beyond reasonable doubt [Paras 56–57].

Investigation Lapses – Seizure and Removal of Vehicle – Damaged vehicle removed from spot without any contemporaneous record – IO unable to explain who drove vehicle to police station or how it was secured – Absence of evidence regarding removal and seizure weakened prosecution case [Paras 58–59].

Effect of Death of Co-Accused – Abatement – During pendency of appeal, Respondent No.1 died – Appeal survived only against Respondent No.2 – Acquittal of surviving respondent upheld on merits [Paras 32–33].

Decision: Leave to Appeal granted – Criminal Appeal dismissed – Judgment of acquittal dated 15.12.2016 upheld – No perversity or illegality found in appreciation of evidence by Trial Court – Appeal dismissed.

Arbitration – Jurisdiction – Statutory Arbitration – National Highways Act – Section 3-G(5), Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 42 – Petitioner NHAI contended that Section 34 petition filed by landowners challenging award of arbitrator should lie before District Judge, Mandi, as arbitrator was Divisional Commissioner, Mandi – Held: Notification under Section 3-G(5) merely specifies territorial jurisdiction of arbitrator and does not designate “seat” of arbitration – Office location or venue of hearings at Mandi does not ipso facto constitute seat of arbitration – Neither parties nor arbitrator fixed seat – In absence of designated seat, court where first application under Part I was filed (Bilaspur) would have exclusive jurisdiction under Section 42 – District Judge Bilaspur rightly retained jurisdiction [Paras 11–16, 22–23].

Arbitration – Seat vs Venue – Interpretation of “Place” under Section 20 – Juridical Seat – Mandi not fixed as seat – Mere fact that arbitrator holds office or conducts hearings in Mandi does not confer status of “seat” – Reference made to Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser Aluminium and BGS SGS SOMA JV v. NHPC – Held: Seat of arbitration is the legal anchor of arbitration, and once chosen, confers exclusive jurisdiction – In present case, no agreement or determination regarding seat made – Thus, “Mandi” was only the venue and not the seat of arbitration [Paras 12–16].

Arbitration – Section 42 – First Application Rule – Exclusive Jurisdiction – Where Section 34 petition filed first – Respondents (landowners) filed Section 34 petitions before District Judge, Bilaspur prior in time to petitions filed by NHAI before District Judge, Mandi – As per Section 42, once an application is made in a “court” under Part I of the Act, that court alone has jurisdiction for all subsequent applications – Held: Bilaspur court has exclusive jurisdiction – Petitions by NHAI seeking transfer to Mandi court are devoid of merit [Paras 17–23].

Arbitration – Court under Section 2(1)(e) – Principal Civil Court of Original Jurisdiction – Applicability of Section 42 – District Judge, Bilaspur is a “court” under Section 2(1)(e) – Once Section 34 application was validly filed there, no subsequent application could be filed before Mandi court – Petitioner’s Section 34 application before Mandi filed after respondents’ application in Bilaspur – Held: District Judge Bilaspur had valid and exclusive jurisdiction [Paras 21–23].

National Highways Act – Section 3-G Arbitration – Applicability of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 – Section 3-G(6) expressly applies Arbitration Act, 1996 to arbitrations under National Highways Act – Section 2(4) of Arbitration Act also deems statutory arbitrations under any enactment, including National Highways Act, to be governed by Part I of the Arbitration Act – Hence, Section 34 and Section 42 apply in full to such statutory arbitrations [Paras 2–7].

Decision: All petitions dismissed – Impugned order dated 28.06.2025 passed by District Judge, Bilaspur upheld – District Judge, Bilaspur has exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and decide all applications arising out of the arbitral proceedings – Mandi court has no jurisdiction in view of first application rule under Section 42 – Miscellaneous applications also dismissed. [Para 24]

Mortgage – Redemption – Registered Mortgage Deed – Validity – Signature of Mortgagee – Section 59, Transfer of Property Act – Registered mortgage deed dated 11.11.1971 executed by mortgagors was discarded by courts below solely on ground that it was not signed by mortgagee – Held, Section 59 mandates signature only of mortgagor and attestation by two witnesses – No requirement in law for mortgagee’s signature – Registered mortgage deed carries statutory presumption of validity – Findings of courts below held contrary to law and perverse [Paras 29–31, 36–39].

Property Law – Mortgage and Redemption – Concurrent findings reversed in Second Appeal – Suit for possession by way of redemption initially dismissed by both Trial and First Appellate Courts – Courts below held that Mortgage Deed (Ex. P-1) was not proved as it was not signed by the mortgagee Karam Chand – Further held that defendant no.2 was inducted as tenant by Ishwar Dayal (mortgagor), not by mortgagee – Held: Findings of Courts below based on misreading of law and evidence – Mortgage Deed is valid under Section 59 of Transfer of Property Act even without mortgagee's signature – Execution proved by mortgagors and attesting witnesses – Rent Note (Ex. P-2) signed by tenant Ram Chander and proved by attesting witness – Defendant no.2 admitted tenancy under mortgagee in earlier proceedings – Courts below ignored presumption of truth attached to registered documents under Sections 68 and 90 of Evidence Act – Appeal allowed – Plaintiffs entitled to possession upon redemption [Paras 6, 26-27, 28-31, 32-39, 40-42, 43-46, 47, 49-51, 52-56, 60].

Documentary Evidence – Mortgage Deed – Validity of Unilateral Execution – Mortgage Deed Ex. P-1 disbelieved by Courts below for lacking mortgagee’s signature – Held: Under Section 59 of Transfer of Property Act, signature of mortgagee not required – Deed was registered, signed by mortgagors, attested by two witnesses – Legal presumption attached to registered documents – Also supported by Supreme Court judgments in Tarachand v. Sagarbai, Rattan Singh v. Nirmal Gill, Ishwar Dass Jain v. Sohan Lal – Courts below erred in law in discarding the Mortgage Deed [Paras 28-31, 32-34].

Documentary Evidence – Rent Note – Proof and Admissibility – Rent Note (Ex. P-2) rejected by Courts below based on handwriting expert report – Held: Defendant no.2 did not specifically deny signature in written statement, rather admitted signing “not consciously” – Attesting witness and scribe proved execution – Plaintiffs’ application to summon their own expert wrongly rejected – Rent note over 30 years old – Legal presumption under Section 90 of Evidence Act attracted – Rejection of document by lower courts unjustified [Paras 40-42, 43, 56].

Admissions – Statement before Rent Controller – Defendant no.2 tendered rent to mortgagee Mahender Kumar in earlier Rent Act proceedings – Held: This amounts to clear admission of tenancy under mortgagee – No protest or denial of relationship recorded at that time – Courts below ignored binding admission – Reliance placed on Thimmappa Rai v. Ramanna Rai, where earlier admission held relevant and binding [Paras 44-46, 47].

Tenancy – Creation by Mortgagee – Legal Effect Upon Redemption – Defendant no.2 claimed continued tenancy after redemption – Held: Tenancy created by mortgagee comes to end upon redemption unless expressly agreed otherwise – No such clause in mortgage deed – Reliance placed on Thakar Singh v. Mula Singh (2015) 5 SCC 209 – Further supported by All India Film Corporation Ltd. v. Raja Gyan Nath and Jadavji Purshottam v. Dhami Navnitbhai – Courts below erred in holding tenancy survived redemption – Proper remedy, if any, lies under Rent Act but not applicable here [Paras 57-59].

Presumption – Registered and Old Documents – Mortgage Deed and Rent Note were registered and over 30 years old at time of tendering – Held: Section 90 of Evidence Act presumes authenticity of documents 30 years old – Section 68 also presumes due execution of registered document unless specifically denied – Courts below failed to apply these legal presumptions properly – Findings reversed [Paras 36-39].

Witness Credibility – Testimony of DW3 and DW4 – Courts below relied on deposition of neighbours to hold that defendant no.2 was inducted by Ishwar Dayal – Held: DW3 and DW4 gave vague, inconclusive statements – Neither witnessed induction nor offered reliable timeline – Courts misread depositions to arrive at erroneous conclusion – Findings based on misappreciation of evidence [Paras 53-55].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Judgments and decrees of Trial Court and First Appellate Court set aside – Suit of plaintiffs decreed – Plaintiffs entitled to possession of suit shop on redemption upon payment of Rs. 2,000/- to defendant no.1 – Pending applications disposed of [Para 60].

Motor Accident Compensation – Injury Case – Double Amputation – Enhancement of Compensation – Appellant, a Diploma Mechanical Engineer employed as Foreman, suffered amputation of both legs due to rash and negligent driving of insured tipper truck – Tribunal awarded compensation by treating loss of earning capacity at only 20% – High Court found approach erroneous and contrary to settled law – Held: Double amputation attracts permanent total disablement under Schedule I of Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 [Paras 24–26].

Permanent Disability vs Functional Disability – Assessment – Though medical disability assessed at 100%, functional disability assessed at 60% considering appellant’s educational qualifications, artificial limbs and residual capacity – Tribunal erred in mechanically reducing disability to 20% – Functional disability must be assessed with reference to nature of employment and loss of earning capacity [Paras 19, 25–26].

Loss of Future Earning – Application of Multiplier – Annual income assessed at ₹4,23,612/- without impermissible deduction of professional tax – Addition of 40% towards future prospects applicable even in injury cases – Multiplier of 15 applied as per Sarla Verma – Held: Loss of future earning correctly computed after applying functional disability [Paras 21–28, 34].

Future Prospects – Injury Cases – Applicability – Compensation for future prospects not confined to death cases – Claimant suffering permanent disability also entitled to future prospects – Reliance placed on Pranay Sethi and Pappu Deo Yadav – Tribunal erred in denying such benefit [Paras 27–28].

Employees’ Compensation Act – Relevance in Motor Accident Claims – By virtue of Second Schedule of Motor Vehicles Act, Schedule I of Employees’ Compensation Act applicable to determine percentage of loss of earning capacity – Double amputation treated as 100% loss of earning capacity statutorily [Paras 23–24].

Loss of Income During Treatment – Appellant hospitalised for 73 days – Loss of income during treatment period awarded separately – Tribunal’s computation upheld on this aspect [Paras 21–22].

Attendant Charges – Mode of Computation – Attendant charges need not always be calculated by multiplier method – Where claimant not in vegetative state and has artificial limbs, lump sum compensation justified – Kajal v. Jagdish Chand applied contextually [Paras 29–31].

Cost of Artificial Limbs – Maintenance and Future Expenses – Artificial limbs require periodic replacement and maintenance – Claimant cannot be compelled to initiate future litigation – One-time compensation awarded towards maintenance and future expenses [Paras 32].

Pain and Suffering – Loss of Amenities – Severe permanent disability at young age causes lifelong deprivation of normal enjoyment of life – Compensation must reflect physical, mental and emotional trauma – Substantial amount awarded under pain and suffering, loss of amenities and expectation of life [Paras 33–34].

Just Compensation – Section 168 MV Act – Compensation must be realistic, humane and not illusory – Courts must attempt to restore claimant as far as money can – Tribunal’s award held grossly inadequate and enhanced substantially [Paras 17–18, 35].

Decision: Appeal partly allowed – Tribunal award modified – Total compensation enhanced to ₹75,23,346/- with interest @ 7.5% p.a. from date of claim petition – Enhanced amount payable within three months – No order as to costs.

Civil Law - Order VII Rule 11 CPC – Rejection of plaint – Daughter claiming share in ancestral/urbanised land – Mutation entries and Section 50 DLR Act relied upon to non-suit plaintiff – Held: plaint disclosed triable cause of action – issues of coparcenary, succession, limitation and applicability of special law require evidence – rejection set aside – suit restored [Paras 11–32].

Civil Procedure – Rejection of Plaint – Order VII Rule 11(a) & (d) CPC – Scope – Court to examine plaint averments alone and not conduct mini trial – Existence of cause of action to be tested on pleadings, not ultimate success – Where plaint discloses triable issues, rejection impermissible [Paras 12–15, 29–30].

Succession – Ancestral Property – Daughter’s rights – Section 6 Hindu Succession Act (as amended in 2005) – Plaintiff pleaded property as ancestral and unpartitioned – Detailed proof of creation of HUF or coparcenary not required at pleading stage – Whether property is ancestral or self-acquired is mixed question of law and fact to be decided at trial [Paras 19–20, 28–29].

Mutation – Revenue Records – Effect – Mutation entries neither create nor extinguish title – Only for fiscal purposes – Mutation in favour of sons after father’s death does not defeat substantive inheritance rights of other legal heirs – Reliance on mutation to deny cause of action held erroneous [Paras 15, 18].

Delhi Land Reforms Act – Section 50 – Applicability – Succession to bhumidhari rights – Plaintiff pleaded that land stood urbanised in 2006 – Applicability of DLR Act post-urbanisation doubtful and requires evidence – Special law cannot be conclusively applied at threshold under Order VII Rule 11 CPC [Paras 17–18, 27].

Hindu Succession Act – Section 4(2) (since omitted) – Effect – After omission of Section 4(2), succession governed by HSA even in respect of agricultural land – Plaintiff’s claim raised post-2005 – Whether DLR Act continues to govern succession requires adjudication on facts and law [Paras 17, 24–27].

Limitation – Order VII Rule 11(d) CPC – Mixed question of law and fact – Where plaint pleads continuing cause of action, fraud and later knowledge of alienations, limitation cannot be decided at threshold [Paras 22].

Order II Rule 2 CPC – Bar – Requires comparison of pleadings of previous suits – Such inquiry impermissible at stage of Order VII Rule 11 CPC [Para 21].

Precedents – Applicability – Judgments rejecting vague HUF claims distinguished – Where plaint contains categorical averments of ancestral property and subsisting joint status, rejection at threshold not justified [Paras 23, 28].

Decision: Appeal allowed – Order dated 01.12.2022 set aside – Suit restored to original number – Parties directed to appear before learned Single Judge – All pending applications disposed of [Paras 31–34].