Matrimonial Law - Section 2(s), Section 17, and Section 19 of the DV Act - Shared Household – Definition under Section 2(s) DV Act – Under-Construction Flat Not Covered – The petitioner sought orders under Section 19(d) and (e) of the DV Act for payment of pending installments towards a jointly booked flat claiming it as “shared household” – Held: Shared household under Section 2(s) requires actual residence or right to reside in an existing household – Since the flat was under construction and never in possession of either party, it does not qualify as shared household under DV Act [Paras 4, 24-35].

Residence Rights – Scope of Protection under Section 19 DV Act – Limitation Clarified – Court clarified that Section 19 of DV Act is aimed at preventing eviction from an existing shared household or providing alternate accommodation, and not for enforcing financial obligations relating to prospective properties not in possession – Held: Directions to pay installments for an under-construction flat are beyond the scope of Section 19, which focuses on securing residential shelter of the aggrieved woman [Paras 29-35].

Interpretation of Shared Household – Constructive Residence Doctrine Not Applicable – The petitioner relied on Supreme Court’s judgment in Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi for broader interpretation of shared household – Held: Constructive residence presupposes a right to reside in an existing household and cannot extend to unpossessed, under-construction properties – Right to reside in shared household cannot be enforced where property is not habitable or occupied [Paras 14-16, 32-34].

Financial Orders – No Compulsion to Pay Installments – Statutory Limits – Prayer for directing respondent to pay remaining installments or through salary deductions to developer was rejected – Held: No statutory basis under DV Act for compelling a respondent to complete payment towards acquisition of an under-construction property claimed as shared household [Paras 34-35].

Decision of the Court – Writ Petition Dismissed – The High Court upheld the decisions of ACMM and Sessions Court rejecting relief under Section 19(d) and (e) DV Act, and dismissed the writ petition, discharging the rule [Paras 36-38].

Criminal revision against conviction under Section 138 of NI Act – Petition challenging concurrent judgments convicting petitioner for dishonour of cheque due to i

Cheque Dishonour – Presumption under Section 139 NI Act – Conviction Upheld – The petitioner challenged concurrent findings of conviction under Section 138 of NI Act alleging that the cheque was lost and misused – The Court held that once the signature on the cheque is admitted, a presumption under Sections 118(a) and 139 arises in favour of the complainant, which the petitioner failed to rebut by any credible evidence – Held: Conviction proper, as legal liability was established and defence of lost cheque was rightly disbelieved [Paras 30-41, 48-51].

Compounding of Offence – Necessity of Complainant’s Consent – Composition Application Dismissed – The petitioner’s application for compounding was dismissed as the complainant refused to consent, and the Court reaffirmed that offence under Section 138 NI Act cannot be compounded without the complainant’s approval – Held: No power to force compounding without complainant’s consent [Paras 21-29].

Concurrent Findings of Fact – Revisional Interference Limited – Revision Dismissed – The High Court reiterated the limited scope of revisional jurisdiction and declined to interfere with concurrent findings of the Trial and Appellate Courts which were based on proper appreciation of evidence – Held: No perversity in findings warranting interference [Paras 16-20].

Fine and Compensation – Fine Set Aside, Compensation Upheld – The Trial Court’s direction to impose both fine and separate compensation was modified in light of Supreme Court rulings – Held: Fine of ₹5,000/- set aside, compensation of ₹7,50,000/- maintained considering losses, delay and litigation expenses [Paras 54-59].

Sentence – Six Months Imprisonment Upheld – In view of the deterrent object of Section 138 NI Act, the sentence of six months simple imprisonment was found appropriate and was upheld [Paras 52-53].

Decision of the Court – Partial Relief – Criminal Revision partly allowed by setting aside the fine while maintaining the sentence of imprisonment and compensation awarded to the complainant [Para 61].

nsufficient funds – Plea of lost cheque rejected – Consideration of compounding refused due to absence of complainant’s consent.

Civil Law - Partition Suit – Correction in Preliminary Decree – Sections 152, 153 CPC – Revision Petitions Dismissed – The petitioners challenged the trial court’s order allowing correction in the preliminary decree passed in 1985, whereby the property number in Schedule A was changed from “Plot No. 51” to “Plot No. 57”, Veer Nagar, Jain Colony, Delhi – Petitioners contended they were bona fide purchasers without notice of partition proceedings and that the correction prejudiced their proprietary rights – The Court held that the correction was clerical in nature, permissible under Sections 152,153 CPC, and necessary to reflect the actual subject matter involved in the original suit – The Court refused to decide on lis pendens or title of petitioners, leaving that open to be decided under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC – Revision petitions found to be devoid of merit and dismissed [Paras 20-24, 28-29].

Correction of Decree – Typographical Error in Property Number – Sections 152, 153 CPC – Correction Allowed – The preliminary decree mistakenly referred to the property as Plot No. 51 instead of Plot No. 57 – Defendant No.10, the original owner, had clearly identified the correct property in his written statement – Held: Trial Court rightly exercised its jurisdiction under Sections 152/153 CPC to correct a clerical error which did not change the subject matter or nature of the decree – Substantial justice must prevail over technical mistakes [Paras 20-24].

Lis Pendens – Claim of Bona Fide Purchaser – Determination Deferred – Petitioners contended that their title was protected as they purchased the property during pendency without knowledge of the litigation – Held: Since the present revision was confined to correction of the decree, the question of lis pendens or validity of purchasers’ claim was left open to be determined in appropriate proceedings under Order 22 Rule 10 CPC or otherwise – No adjudication on merits of title [Para 28].

Procedural Objection – Multiple Orders Challenged in Single Petition – Objection Raised – Respondents raised the issue that multiple orders were impugned in a single revision – Held: Though not conclusively ruled upon, the Court proceeded to dispose of the revision on merits in interest of justice [Para 17].

Finality of Partition – Longstanding Decree Not to be Undermined – Partition proceedings initiated in 1982 were upheld by Supreme Court in 2016 – Petitioners raised objections only after appointment of Local Commissioner for final decree – Held: Allowing such objections would defeat the purpose of a decree that had attained finality – Courts must prevent delay and obstruction in execution of lawful decrees [Paras 23-24].

Decision – Revision Petitions Dismissed – The correction of property description in the preliminary decree from Plot No. 51 to Plot No. 57 was upheld – Petitioners’ claim of being innocent purchasers without notice was not adjudicated – All pending applications disposed of – No merit found in either revision petition [Para 29].

Tenancy Law - Eviction – Bona Fide Personal Necessity – Section 13(3)(a)(i) of the Rent Act – Revision Dismissed – The petitioners, legal heirs of the original tenant, challenged concurrent findings allowing eviction from the first floor of a residential premises at Chandigarh on the ground of personal necessity of the landlady for her daughter – Held: The landlady, aged 86, credibly established her bona fide need to settle with her divorced daughter in her own premises in the evening of her life – Courts below rightly found the need to be genuine and not a pretext to relet the premises – No perversity found in findings – Revision dismissed [Paras 2, 9, 11(i)].

Landlord’s Discretion – Tenant Cannot Dictate Manner of Use – Landlord is Best Judge – It was argued that the landlady’s daughter could reside on the vacant second floor or continue to live in Delhi – Held: Tenant has no authority to dictate how or where landlord or her family should reside – Desire for an independent living space on first floor cannot be questioned – Minor details such as floor preference not open to tenant’s objection [Paras 11(i), 11(iv)].

Residential Use – Tuition Classes Not a Commercial Activity – Misuse Allegation Rejected – Petitioner argued that the daughter’s intent to take tuitions post-retirement would amount to misuse of residential premises – Held: Occasional tutoring by a retired teacher does not amount to commercial activity – In any case, this was not the primary ground of eviction – Allegation of misuse found to be unfounded [Para 11(ii)].

Earlier Non-occupation of Vacated Premises – Medical Reason Justified – Tenant contended that ground floor was vacated earlier on personal necessity grounds but was not occupied – Held: Explanation of landlady suffering paralytic stroke and husband's subsequent demise found to be sufficient – Need was not illusory or fabricated – Non-occupation due to health and age-related issues does not nullify present necessity [Para 11(iii)].

Pleading and Proof – Non-possession of Alternate Accommodation – Compliance Sufficient – Petitioners argued that mandatory ingredients of Section 13(3)(a)(i) were missing – Held: Though averments regarding non-possession were not explicitly stated for the daughter, they were made for the landlady whose necessity was in focus – Even otherwise, proof by way of evidence is sufficient compliance – Tenant estopped from raising such plea at revision stage when no such objection was taken in written statement – Reliance placed on Harbhajan Singh vs. Lakhbir Singh, 2019 (2) RCR (Rent) 316 and Navyug Goods Carrier vs. Manpreet Singh, 2018 (2) RCR (Rent) 496 [Paras 9(iii), 11(vi)–11(viii)].

Additional Evidence – Rejected – Attempt to Delay – Tenant sought to introduce additional evidence to prove misuse of premises and subsequent re-letting of ground floor – Held: Appellate Authority rightly rejected the application, noting that all relevant points were already addressed – Found to be an attempt to prolong litigation [Para 11(v)].

Revisional Jurisdiction – Concurrent Findings Not to Be Interfered – Settled Law – Held: No perversity or illegality found in the concurrent findings of Rent Controller and Appellate Authority – High Court under revisional jurisdiction cannot re-appreciate evidence unless findings are patently perverse or illegal

– Revision dismissed [Para 11(x)].

Matrimonial Law - Domestic Violence – Requirement of Domestic Relationship – DV Act – Petition Dismissed - Petitioner challenged concurrent orders of Trial and Appellate Courts which held that no domestic relationship existed between her and Respondent Nos. 3 to 6 since 2013 – Held: The petitioner was residing in a separate household since 2013 and no present or continuing threat of domestic violence existed – No specific allegations against Respondents 5 and 6 and complaint filed after 21 years of marriage without new incidents – Petition dismissed [Paras 4–6, 12–15, 23–25].

Inherent Powers – Section 482 CrPC – Scope Limited – No Perversity Found – Petition Dismissed - High Court reiterated that interference under Section 482 CrPC is limited to prevent abuse of process and secure ends of justice – Held: No perversity or abuse of process found in the impugned concurrent orders – Complaint lacked specific, timely and credible allegations against Respondents 3, 5 and 6 – Petition dismissed [Paras 13, 24].

Allegations Against Relatives – General Allegations Insufficient – Supreme Court Precedents Applied – Petition Dismissed - Allegations against in-laws were vague, stale, and unsupported by material particulars – Held: In light of Supreme Court rulings, such omnibus allegations cannot form basis for criminal prosecution under DV Act – Criminal process not to be used as pressure tactic – Petition dismissed [Paras 15–22].

Right of Residence – Misplaced Reliance on Supreme Court Ruling – Petition Dismissed - Petitioner relied on Prabha Tyagi v. Kamlesh Devi to sustain complaint against in-laws – Held: No claim of shared household or residence sought against in-laws; prayer limited to alternate accommodation – Reliance misplaced – Petition dismissed [Para 22].

Criminal Proceedings – Need for Specificity – SC Guidance in Geddam Jhansi and Kamal Cases – General Allegations Quashed - Court emphasized that domestic violence complaints must contain specific allegations supported by material facts – Held: Bald claims and delayed filing after years of separation cannot justify issuance of summons – Criminal proceedings rightly quashed [Paras 17, 19–21].

Final Order – Petition Dismissed – No Cost – Petition lacked merit and failed to show legal infirmity in lower court orders – Proceedings already abated against deceased Respondent No. 4 – Petition dismissed in entirety [Paras 10, 25].

Criminal Law – Quashing of ECIR – Section 3 and 4 of the PMLA – Petition Dismissed – The petitioner, a well-known actor, filed a petition seeking quashing of ECIR dated 08/08/2021 and second supplementary complaint dated 17/08/2022 under Sections 3 and 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, alleging that she was not named in the predicate offence FIR, had been made a witness therein, and was duped by co-accused Sukesh Chandrashekhar into unknowingly receiving gifts and money constituting proceeds of crime – The Court considered key contentions regarding the petitioner’s alleged lack of knowledge, her role as a witness in the predicate case, parity with other similarly placed individuals, and allegations of selective prosecution – After analysing the scope of Section 3 (including its Explanation), Section 24 and judicial precedents including Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Pavana Dibbur, the Court held that foundational facts under PMLA were sufficiently made out, and that the issue of knowledge and mens rea involved disputed facts requiring trial – It was held that ECIR cannot be quashed at a pre-charge stage where charges are yet to be framed – Petition was dismissed with liberty to the petitioner to rebut the statutory presumption during trial [Paras 1, 23-29, 44-46, 87-92, 98-104, 120-123].

Money Laundering – Quashing of ECIR – Section 3 of PMLA – Petition Dismissed – Petitioner, a public figure, sought quashing of ECIR and complaint under PMLA on the basis that she was a victim and not accused in the predicate offence – The Court held that even if petitioner was a witness in the predicate case, prosecution under PMLA is maintainable upon establishment of foundational facts – Held: Disputed facts regarding knowledge and possession of proceeds of crime require trial – Quashing rejected [Paras 23-29, 87-92, 122-123].

PMLA and Predicate Offence – Independence of Proceedings – The Court held that predicate offence and PMLA proceedings are separate and a person can be prosecuted under PMLA even if not named in the predicate FIR – Reliance placed on decisions of Supreme Court clarifying independent application of both offences – Held: Merely being a witness in predicate offence does not shield petitioner from PMLA proceedings [Paras 44-46, 59-60, 67, 71].

Mens Rea – Knowledge under Section 3 of PMLA – Triable Issue – The petitioner contended lack of knowledge of the criminal antecedents of co-accused Sukesh Chandrashekhar and argued absence of intent – The Court held that knowledge or lack thereof is a matter for trial – Statements of witnesses and petitioner’s own conduct, including deletion of phone data and concealment of gifts, raised sufficient suspicion to warrant trial – Held: Cannot be decided at pre-charge stage [Paras 47-58, 106-114].

Continuing Offence – Enjoyment of Proceeds of Crime – Section 3 of PMLA Explained – The Court upheld that money laundering is a continuing offence and includes ongoing enjoyment or concealment of tainted property – Held: Continued possession of luxury items and financial gains received from co-accused after alleged awareness of his criminality brings the case within the purview of PMLA [Paras 39, 116-118].

Selective Prosecution – Allegation of Pick and Choose Policy – Not a Ground for Quashing – Petitioner alleged that other similarly placed individuals were not proceeded against under PMLA – Court held that claims of unequal treatment or parity cannot justify quashing at pre-trial stage and must be raised at appropriate stage – Held: Enforcement discretion of ED not open to judicial review on this ground at this stage [Paras 80-85].

Quashing Jurisdiction – Section 482 CrPC – Invocation Restricted to Rare Cases – The Court reiterated that the inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC must be exercised sparingly and only in the rarest of rare cases – Held: Petitioner’s plea involved disputed facts and assertions not capable of adjudication at pre-charge stage – Rebuttal of presumption under Section 24 PMLA can be done at trial [Paras 87-92, 98-101, 120-121].

Final Decision – ECIR and Supplementary Complaint Not Quashed – The petition was dismissed, with the Court holding that arguments of the petitioner based on absence of intent, parity, and being misled require evidence and cross-examination – Held: Petition lacks merit; case to proceed to trial [Paras 122-123].

Taxation Law - Income Tax – Reassessment under Section 147 – Full and True Disclosure – Reopening Beyond Four Years Invalid – The petitioner, BPCL, challenged reassessment notices issued under Section 148 for AYs 2013-14 and 2014-15 – Revenue alleged failure to disclose facts regarding dividend income received from BPCL Trust and wrong deduction under Section 32AC – Held: The Court found all relevant facts were fully disclosed in original scrutiny assessments under Section 143(3), including investment in BPCL Trust and dividend income – The reopening beyond four years without specific failure of disclosure was held to be without jurisdiction – Reassessment quashed [Paras 25-30, 34-35].

Reassessment – Change of Opinion – Impermissible Ground – Mere Re-evaluation of Existing Facts Not Sufficient – Assessing Officer reopened assessment based on existing records and submissions made during original assessment proceedings – Court held that such reopening amounted to a change of opinion, which is not a valid reason for invoking Section 147 – The reasons recorded lacked specificity and did not disclose any new material – Held: Reassessment invalid and notices liable to be quashed [Paras 31, 35].

Exempt Income – Section 10(34) – Income Received from Trust Holding Shares – Trust a Sole Beneficiary Structure – Income Already Considered – BPCL had received dividend from a trust holding shares for its benefit – Revenue argued that since the Trust is not a company, dividend cannot be exempt – Held: Petitioner had disclosed this structure during original assessment – Income from the Trust was acknowledged and considered in disallowance under Section 14A – No failure to disclose found – Exemption claim not ground for reassessment [Paras 28-30].

Deduction under Section 32AC – Eligibility of LPG Cylinders as Plant & Machinery – Disclosure Fully Made – Court held that BPCL had disclosed all relevant details regarding claim under Section 32AC, including asset-wise investment – Assessment records clearly reflected those details – Reassessment on this issue was also held invalid as it lacked any failure of disclosure and was a mere reanalysis of same data – Held: Reassessment on this ground also quashed [Paras 34-35].

Decision – Writ Petitions Allowed – Reassessment notices and rejection orders for AY 2013-14 and AY 2014-15 quashed – Held: No failure to disclose material facts and reopening was impermissible change of opinion – Rule made absolute [Paras 37-38].

Civil Writ - Medical Termination of Pregnancy – Direction for Termination on Medical Grounds – Appeal Allowed in Part – Appellants sought permission for termination of pregnancy beyond 24 weeks due to serious foetal abnormalities including Down Syndrome and cardiac defects – Medical Board reports supported substantial abnormalities – Single Judge allowed termination but directed full postnatal care if the foetus was born alive – Held: Such a condition was inconsistent with applicable medical protocols and Government of India guidelines – High Court modified the order to allow assessment by Amrita Institute of Medical Sciences and termination by scientific methods if substantial abnormalities were confirmed – Writ appeal disposed of accordingly [Paras 1–4, 8–10].

Medical Protocol – Role of Advanced Foetal Assessment – Amrita Institute Permitted – Single Bench had directed Medical College, Kalamassery to conduct termination but it lacked facility for iatrogenic foetal demise – Held: In view of Government of India notification dated 06.08.2018, only expert institutions like Amrita Institute could ensure ultrasound-guided foetal demise through potassium chloride injection – Appeal allowed to ensure adherence to scientific and humane procedure [Paras 5–6, 8–10].

Foetal Abnormality – Interpretation of Section 3(2-B), MTP Act – Permissibility Beyond 24 Weeks – Held: Where Medical Board confirms substantial foetal abnormalities, restriction on gestational period under Section 3(2) does not apply – Reliance placed on prior Division Bench rulings and statutory amendment – Direction issued for fresh Medical Board assessment and conditional liberty granted for termination upon confirmation [Para 6, 10].

Right to Health and Dignity – Judicial Approach in Medical Termination Cases – Held: Courts must ensure procedural compliance without imposing unrealistic postnatal obligations on mothers opting for medically justified terminations – Care must be taken to ensure institutional capability for humane termination – Modified directions reflect this balance [Paras 4, 10].

Decision – Appeal Partly Allowed – Single Judge’s order modified – Petitioners permitted to approach Amrita Institute for assessment under Section 3(2-B) – On confirmation of abnormalities, liberty granted to proceed with termination by scientific methods as per guidelines – Writ appeal disposed [Para 10].

Commercial Law - Trademark and Copyright Dispute – Rejection of Plaint – Order 7 Rule 11 CPC – Suit Barred – The plaintiff filed a suit against the defendants alleging infringement of trademark and copyright, and passing off, in respect of the mark ‘PADAN’ – The Court held that the plaintiff, Coromandel Indag Products India Ltd., had no locus standi to institute the suit since all alleged use and proprietary rights were with Coromandel Agrico Pvt. Ltd. (CAPL), a distinct corporate entity under insolvency – Held: The plaintiff was not a licensee or owner of the mark or artistic work and could not claim the benefit of CAPL’s rights – The plaint failed to disclose a cause of action and was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC [Paras 11–13, 18, 34, 37–38].

Corporate Personality – Group Company Cannot Espouse Cause – No Legal Standing – The Court reaffirmed that a company cannot represent group entities or subsidiaries in legal proceedings – Each corporate entity is distinct and must assert its own claims – Merely being the parent of CAPL did not entitle the plaintiff to sue on its behalf, especially when CAPL was under insolvency and only its Resolution Professional could sue – Held: The plaintiff’s suit was legally unsustainable on this ground alone [Paras 11–13].

Non-Disclosure of Documents – Deliberate Suppression – Cause of Action Found Illusory – The plaintiff failed to file key documents relied upon in the plaint, including the Distribution and Trademark Agreements, which clearly showed that the rights were vested in CAPL – Held: The plaintiff suppressed material documents to fabricate a false cause of action – Rejection of plaint warranted [Paras 19–25, 37].

Copyright Claim – Assignment Expired – No Right in Plaintiff – The plaintiff claimed copyright ownership in packaging artwork via assignment to CAPL – The Court held that the assignment was in favour of CAPL, and in absence of a defined term, deemed to have expired after five years under Section 19(5) of the Copyright Act – Held: Plaintiff had no subsisting right or claim under copyright law [Paras 26–27].

Passing Off – Use by Licensee Inures to Licensor – No Goodwill Established – The plaintiff failed to show any use of the mark PADAN on its own behalf – All evidence related to use by CAPL – The Court held that as CAPL was a licensee of the defendant, any goodwill accrued to the defendant – The plaintiff’s passing off claim was rejected [Paras 28–34].

Fabricated Evidence – Agreement Claiming Ownership Unsupported – The plaintiff’s reliance on an agreement claiming it was a registered proprietor of PADAN was found false – The Court noted that the defendant was the registered owner, and no proof of registration in plaintiff’s name existed – Held: The document appeared fabricated and could not support the suit [Paras 35–36].

Final Decision – Suit Held to be Vexatious – Plaint Rejected – The Court found that the plaint was based on false assumptions, misleading representations, and failed to disclose any real cause of action – The suit was declared vexatious and the plaint was rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC [Paras 37–38].