Suit Challenging Property Transfer By Guardian During Minority Must Be Filed Within 3 Years Of Attaining Majority: Jharkhand High Court

"Having failed to challenge registered Batwaranama of 1946 within 3 years of attaining majority in the year 1950 the plaintiff’s suit would suffer due to his non filing of suit seeking declaration... the registered Batwaranama of 1946 was a voidable document and not void document," Jharkhand High Court, in a detailed judgment, has held that a suit seeking to set aside a transfer of property made by a guardian during a plaintiff’s minority must be initiated within the three-year limitation period prescribed under Article 60 of the Limitation Act, starting from the date the minor attains majority.

A bench of Justice Anubha Rawat Choudhary observed that if the document executed by the guardian is "voidable" rather than "void ab initio," mere incidental challenges in the body of a plaint filed decades later will not suffice to overcome the bar of limitation.

The case arose from a second appeal involving a dispute over 1.23 acres of land in Giridih district. The plaintiff, Bhakti Mahto, claimed exclusive title as the biological son of the original owner, Ganesh Mahto. He challenged a 1946 partition deed (Batwaranama) executed by his mother, Nirsi Devi, who acted as his guardian during his minority. Through this deed, she had allocated half of the property to her sons from a previous marriage. The plaintiff attained majority in 1950 but filed the suit only in 1980, after the defendants sold the property to third parties in 1973 and 1976.

The primary question before the court was whether the suit was barred by limitation under Article 60 of the Limitation Act for failing to challenge the 1946 deed within three years of the plaintiff attaining majority. The court also examined whether the plea of adverse possession raised by the defendants was maintainable alongside their claim of title through the partition deed, and the impact of the appeal’s abatement against certain deceased respondents.

Guardian's Transfer Of Minor's Property Is Voidable, Not Void

The court meticulously distinguished between transactions that are "void" (nullities from inception) and "voidable" (valid until set aside). Relying on the Supreme Court precedent in Prem Singh v. Birbal (2006), the bench noted that when a guardian transfers a minor’s interest, the transaction is generally voidable. Consequently, the minor has two options upon attaining majority: file a suit within 12 years of the deed’s execution or within three years of attaining majority.

The bench observed that the 1946 Batwaranama was not a non-existent "paper transaction" as alleged by the plaintiff. "Considering the nature of allegation made with respect to registered Batwarnama of 1946 which relates to misrepresentation with respect to the content and also the character of the document, the same was voidable and not void ab initio," the court held. Therefore, the plaintiff was legally obligated to seek its cancellation within the statutory window following his 21st birthday.

Mandatory Requirement To Challenge Instruments Under Article 60

The court highlighted that while Article 65 of the Limitation Act provides a 12-year period for recovery of possession based on title, this period cannot be invoked to bypass Article 60 when an "insuperable obstruction" like a registered deed exists. The bench noted that the plaintiff attained majority in 1950 and was aware of his mother's death in 1949, yet he allowed the 1946 deed to remain unchallenged for thirty years.

Justice Choudhary emphasized that "mere challenging the registered Batwaranama of 1946 in the body of the plaint as void and not binding upon the plaintiff was not sufficient." Since the document was voidable, it required a specific prayer for cancellation or declaration of invalidity within three years of 1950. The failure to do so rendered the subsequent challenge to the 1973 and 1976 sale deeds—which were based on the 1946 deed—consequential and barred.

Pleas Of Title And Adverse Possession Not Always Inconsistent

The court addressed the appellant's argument that the defendants could not simultaneously plead title through the partition deed and adverse possession. The bench clarified that where a party enters into possession under a document that is later found to be illegal or wrong, the possession remains "adverse" to the true owner from the outset.

The court found that the defendants had been in possession since 1946, and even if the deed was considered "wrong," their possession became hostile to the plaintiff's interest. "Even on the basis of a wrong and illegal document if the party came in possession, adverse possession against the real owner will start running," the court observed, affirming the first appellate court's finding that the defendants had acquired indefeasible rights over the property.

Abatement Of Appeal Leads To Conflicting Decrees

A significant procedural holding in the judgment concerned the abatement of the appeal. The court noted that the appeal had abated against the legal heirs of Respondent No. 2 (Mangar Mahto), who was a co-executant of the contested sale deeds. The bench held that if the court were to grant relief to the plaintiff now, it would result in a "conflicting decree" where the 1st appellate court’s judgment remains final for one brother but is reversed for the other.

"The entire appeal has abated on account of non-substitution of defendant no. 2 and technically no relief can be granted to the appellants," the court ruled. The bench underscored that in a suit for declaration of title and recovery of possession, the absence of necessary parties whose interests are inextricably linked with the surviving respondents is fatal to the second appeal.

Date of Decision: 03 June 2026