Statement Under Section 108 Is Substantive Evidence If Voluntary:  Supreme Court Upholds Conviction In Smuggling Case

Supreme Court affirming the conviction of several accused under Section 135(1)(b)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962, while reducing their sentence to the period already undergone. The Court held that statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act are admissible and can form substantive evidence if made voluntarily, and declined to interfere with concurrent findings of guilt recorded by three courts.

The judgment, authored by Justice Sandeep Mehta and concurred by Justice Vikram Nath, balanced the evidentiary sanctity of Section 108 statements with the equities arising from a four-decade-old prosecution.

“Conviction Cannot Be Faulted Merely Because It Relies On Section 108 Statements” – Court Reiterates Evidentiary Value

The case traces back to April 30, 1985, when Customs officers at Mandvi, Gujarat, acting on secret intelligence, recovered two jute sacks concealed in pits near a fisherman’s jetty. The sacks contained 777 foreign-made wrist watches and 879 wrist watch straps of brands such as Seiko, Citizen, and Ricoh, valued at Rs. 2,22,190.

The prosecution alleged that the goods were smuggled into India aboard the vessel Safina-Tul-Firdaus H.M.V. 643 in February 1985. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 were stated to be owners of the ship, Accused No. 3 its captain, and others were alleged to have participated in concealing, transporting, and selling the smuggled goods.

After sanction from the Collector of Customs, a complaint was filed in January 1987 against 21 accused. The Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bhuj, in 2003 convicted Accused Nos. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7 and 11 under Section 135(1)(b)(i) of the Customs Act and sentenced them to three years’ rigorous imprisonment with fine. The appellate court and the Gujarat High Court affirmed the conviction.

The matter reached the Supreme Court by way of special leave.

The principal legal issue was whether the conviction could be sustained primarily on the basis of statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, particularly when allegations were made that such statements were extracted under coercion.

The appellants argued that the conviction rested solely on the confessional statement of one Hussein Mamad Bhadala recorded under Section 108 and that there was no independent corroborative evidence. It was further contended that Bhadala was subjected to custodial torture and later died, with an FIR registered against Customs officials under Sections 330, 302, 323 and 34 IPC.

The Supreme Court noted that the same contention had been examined in detail by the High Court. The High Court had held that statements recorded under Section 108 by duly authorized Customs officers are admissible and do not attract the bar under Sections 24, 30 or 34 of the Evidence Act, provided they are voluntary.

Relying on K.I. Pavunny v. Assistant Collector (HQ), Central Excise Collectorate, Cochin (1997) 3 SCC 721, the High Court had observed that the object of Section 108 is to empower Customs authorities to collect evidence regarding contraventions and that such statements, if voluntary, are “substantive pieces of evidence.”

The Supreme Court affirmed this reasoning. It observed that the appellants had failed to demonstrate that the statements were obtained by coercion, inducement, or threat. In absence of such proof, the statements could not be discarded.

Importantly, the Court recorded that the conviction was not based “merely on confessional statements” but that the statements led to discovery of incriminating material including contraband articles and money, documented through panchnamas and corroborated by testimony of Customs officers. Such discoveries were held to constitute independent and relevant evidence within the meaning of Sections 6, 10 and 11 of the Evidence Act.

The Bench concluded that the concurrent findings of guilt recorded by the trial court, appellate court and High Court “do not suffer from any perversity, illegality, or manifest error” warranting interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.

Quantum of Sentence – “Further Incarceration Would Be Unduly Harsh”

Having affirmed the conviction, the Court turned to the question of sentence.

The recovery related to 1985. The goods were found in an abandoned condition. The Court noted that conscious possession was not directly attributed to the appellants and that several co-accused had been acquitted. Some of the appellants had passed away during pendency of the appeals.

The surviving appellants were of advanced age and had already undergone approximately one year of incarceration during trial and appeal. At the relevant time, Section 135(1)(b)(i) provided a maximum sentence of five years but prescribed a minimum of six months, unless special and adequate reasons were recorded.

The Court observed that the period already undergone was more than the statutory minimum of six months. Considering the lapse of nearly four decades, prolonged pendency, advanced age of the appellants, and the period of incarceration already undergone, the Bench held that directing further imprisonment “would be unduly harsh and would not subserve the ends of justice.”

Accordingly, while affirming the conviction dated March 26, 2003, the Court reduced the sentence to the period already undergone and discharged the bail bonds of the appellants.

The Supreme Court has once again reiterated the evidentiary strength of statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act, provided they are voluntary and supported by corroborative material. The judgment reinforces that such statements are not hit by the bar under the Evidence Act and may form substantive evidence.

At the same time, the Court demonstrated judicial sensitivity by reducing the sentence in light of the extraordinary delay of nearly forty years, the age of the surviving accused, and the custodial period already undergone.

The appeals were partly allowed to the limited extent of modification of sentence.

Date of Decision: February 23, 2026