Mere Unnatural Death Within Seven Months Is Not Dowry Death: Delhi High Court Refuses to Reverse Acquittal in Ruby Hanging Case

In a significant judgment on the scope of appellate interference and the limits of the presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act, the Delhi High Court has dismissed the State’s appeal against acquittal in a dowry death case, holding that “foundational facts” of cruelty “soon before death” were not established.

Division Bench comprising Hon’ble Ms. Justice Prathiba M. Singh and Hon’ble Ms. Justice Madhu Jain affirmed the judgment dated 15.12.2024 of the Trial Court acquitting the accused of offences under Sections 498-A, 304-B and 302 IPC.

The Court held that though the death occurred within seven months of marriage and was by hanging, “mere unnatural death within seven years of marriage is not sufficient” to invoke the presumption of dowry death. The prosecution must prove that the deceased was subjected to cruelty for dowry “soon before her death” — a burden not discharged in the present case.

“If Two Views Are Possible, Acquittal Not to Be Disturbed”

At the outset, the Bench reiterated the settled law governing appeals against acquittal under Section 378 CrPC. Referring to Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, the Court emphasized that though the appellate court has full power to reappreciate evidence, interference is justified only where the Trial Court’s view is “perverse, manifestly illegal or wholly unreasonable.”

The Court observed that an acquittal strengthens the presumption of innocence and if two reasonable views are possible on the evidence, the appellate court ought not to substitute its own view.

Finding the Trial Court’s appreciation of evidence to be “a plausible and legally sustainable view,” the Bench declined to interfere.

Medical Evidence Clear – “It Is Not a Case of Strangulation”

The prosecution had framed an alternative charge under Section 302 IPC. However, the medical evidence was categorical.

Both PW-14 and PW-27, the forensic experts who conducted the post-mortem, opined that the cause of death was “asphyxia as a result of antemortem hanging.” The Court reproduced in detail the forensic distinctions explained by the doctors between hanging and strangulation.

In cross-examination, PW-27 clearly stated: “It is correct that this is not a case of strangulation.”

The ligature mark was oblique and incomplete, situated high on the neck, and the hyoid bone and thyroid cartilage were intact — classical indicators of hanging. The Court held that “there is thus no medical basis to suspect homicidal strangulation,” and the charge under Section 302 IPC was rightly rejected.

“Soon Before Her Death” – Proximity Test Not Satisfied

The heart of the case turned on Section 304-B IPC and Section 113-B of the Evidence Act.

The Court reiterated that the presumption of dowry death arises only after the prosecution establishes foundational facts — namely, that “soon before her death” the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment in connection with dowry demand.

Relying upon Karan Singh v. State of Haryana and M. Srinivasulu v. State of A.P., the Bench emphasized that the expression “soon before” requires a “proximate and live link” between the cruelty and the death. It cannot be remote, stale, or general in nature.

In the present case, the earliest statement of PW-1 (mother) recorded before the SDM on the date of death contained only general allegations and suspicion. It lacked particulars of dates, incidents, or specific acts of cruelty.

Subsequent depositions introduced detailed allegations of beatings, denial of food, payment of Rs. 70,000/- for a motorcycle, and threats. The Court found these to be “material improvements” over the contemporaneous version.

The Bench held that such “progressive embellishment” strikes at the root of credibility, particularly when the improvements go to the core statutory ingredients of Section 304-B IPC.

Alleged Call Three Days Before Death – “Uncorroborated and Absent in Earliest Version”

The prosecution relied heavily on the father’s claim that the deceased telephoned him three days prior to her death, complaining of renewed dowry demands.

The Court noted that this alleged call did not find mention in any contemporaneous record and was absent in the earliest statement before the SDM. Even assuming such a call was made, it lacked independent corroboration and did not establish cruelty of such gravity as to drive the deceased to suicide.

The Court observed that vague and omnibus allegations without particulars cannot satisfy the proximity test required for Section 304-B IPC.

No Contemporaneous Complaint – Silence a Relevant Circumstance

Another significant factor weighed by the Court was the complete absence of any complaint or grievance lodged by the deceased or her family prior to her death.

The Bench observed that where cruelty is of such gravity as to drive a woman to suicide, “some reflection of it would ordinarily surface” through complaint or communication. The silence until after the death was treated as a relevant circumstance supporting the Trial Court’s conclusions.

Past Conduct in Previous Marriage – “Conviction Cannot Rest on Propensity”

The prosecution had also examined the former wife of the accused and her relatives to suggest past dowry harassment.

The Court rejected reliance on such evidence, holding that alleged conduct in a previous marriage “cannot substitute for proof of the statutory ingredients” in relation to the deceased. To convict on such basis would amount to reliance on character or propensity evidence, impermissible in criminal law.

Presumption Under Section 113-B Not Attracted

Summing up, the Court held that although the death occurred within seven months of marriage and was otherwise than under normal circumstances, the prosecution failed to establish the essential requirement that the deceased was subjected to dowry-related cruelty “soon before her death.”

In the absence of such foundational facts, “the statutory presumption under Section 113-B does not arise.”

Appeal Dismissed – Acquittal Affirmed

Finding no perversity in the Trial Court’s judgment, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal and affirmed the acquittal of the respondents under Sections 498-A, 304-B, 302 and 34 IPC.

The judgment reinforces that while dowry death is a grave social evil, conviction cannot rest on suspicion, general allegations, or post-facto embellishments. The statutory presumption under Section 113-B is powerful, but it is not automatic — it is triggered only upon strict proof of cruelty linked closely in time to the death.

Date of Decision: 17/02/2026