Even A Lathi Becomes A Murder Weapon When Repeatedly Aimed At The Head With Bone-Deep Force: Supreme Court Applies The Virsa Singh Test To Demolish The Defence That Lathis Are Not Deadly Weapons

Intention To Kill Need Not Be Proved — It Is Enough That The Accused Intended To Inflict The Specific Injury That Was Sufficient In The Ordinary Course Of Nature To Cause Death: Supreme Court Reaffirms Clause Thirdly Of Section 300 IPC In A Case Of Premeditated Lathi Attack

In a ruling of lasting importance for advocates engaged in criminal trials involving group violence, the Supreme Court of India on February 23, 2026, delivered a comprehensive and authoritative exposition of one of the most frequently contested questions in criminal law — when does a culpable homicide become murder under Clause (3) of Section 300 IPC, and how does a court determine intention when the weapon used is not a firearm or blade but an ordinary lathi?

The bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Sandeep Mehta, restoring life imprisonment after the Madhya Pradesh High Court had reduced it to six years on the ground that lathis are not deadly weapons and death resulted from a single injury, held that the lethality of a weapon and the existence of intention "depends not upon the abstract character of the weapon but upon the manner of its use, the part of the body targeted, and the force employed."

The One Legal Question That Divided The Trial Court And High Court

While the previous reporting on this judgment addressed the High Court's self-contradictory application of Section 149 IPC, this ruling raises an equally profound and separately litigated question — one that goes to the very heart of criminal jurisprudence and arises in virtually every case of mob violence or group assault. That question is this: where multiple accused armed with lathis collectively assault a victim and inflict numerous injuries, of which several are concentrated on the head, how does a court determine whether the offence constitutes murder under Section 302 IPC or culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 Part II IPC?

The trial court at Narsinghpur answered unhesitatingly — it was murder. The High Court disagreed — it said the accused only possessed the knowledge that their acts were likely to cause death, not the intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This distinction — between "knowledge" attracting Section 304 Part II and "intention" attracting Section 300 Clause Thirdly — is one of the most subtle yet consequential distinctions in Indian criminal law, and the Supreme Court has now settled it with finality in the context of lathi attacks causing multiple head injuries.

The Virsa Singh Test: The Lodestar For Every Murder Trial Involving Clause Thirdly

The analytical foundation of the Supreme Court's ruling on this point rests on the celebrated judgment of Justice Vivian Bose in Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab [1958 SCR 1495] — a ruling that has, as the Court itself acknowledged in Daya Nand vs. State of Haryana [(2008) 15 SCC 717], "become locus classicus" and is now "ingrained in our legal system" as part of the rule of law.

The Virsa Singh test for the applicability of Clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC requires the prosecution to establish four elements. First, it must establish objectively that a bodily injury is present. Second, the nature of the injury must be proved. These, as Justice Bose observed, "are purely objective investigations." Third, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury — that it was not accidental or unintentional. Fourth, it must be proved that the injury of the type just described was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death — and this fourth element "is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender."

The most critical — and most frequently misunderstood — element of this test is the third one. As Justice Bose put it in words that have echoed through decades of Indian criminal jurisprudence: "The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness or intended serious consequences, is neither here nor there."

In plain language — and this is the point that defence advocates most frequently overlook — the prosecution does not need to prove that the accused intended to kill, or even that the accused knew the injury would be fatal. It only needs to prove that the accused intended to inflict the specific injury that was in fact inflicted, and that such injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Once those two elements are proved, murder under Clause Thirdly is established — regardless of what was in the accused's subjective mind about the consequences.

"Intention To Cause Death Is Not An Essential Requirement Under Clause Thirdly — Only The Intention To Inflict The Specific Injury That Proves Fatal": The Supreme Court Applies The Test To A Lathi Attack On The Head

The defence in the present case advanced an argument that is heard with great frequency in sessions courts and high courts across the country: that the weapon used was a lathi, which is not per se a deadly weapon; that most injuries were on non-vital parts of the body; and that therefore the accused did not possess the requisite mens rea to attract Section 302 IPC. The High Court had accepted this argument, holding that the accused possessed only the knowledge under Section 304 Part II that their acts were likely to cause death, and not the intention under Section 300 Clause Thirdly to inflict a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning root and branch.

The Court began by firmly dislodging the premise that a lathi cannot be a deadly weapon. "Even though the weapons of offence were lathis, which in the abstract may not always be characterised as a deadly weapon, their lethality depends upon the manner of use, the part of the body targeted, and the force employed." This is a formulation of profound practical importance — it means that the question of whether a weapon is "deadly" for the purposes of a murder charge is never to be answered in the abstract. A lathi aimed once at a person's leg is different in law from a lathi swung repeatedly with full force at the skull of a victim who cannot escape.

The Court then turned to the medical evidence — the admitted post-mortem report (Exh. P/8) — to apply the Virsa Singh test. The post-mortem revealed four bone-deep lacerated wounds specifically on the left parietal and temporal regions of the skull — injury Nos. 24 to 27 — accompanied by a linear fracture of the parietal bone measuring 7 centimetres, extradural haemorrhage, subarachnoid haemorrhage, congestion of the fronto-parietal brain region, and death by coma resulting from the head injury. The total injuries on the deceased numbered 29, and the total injuries inflicted on all victims in the same attack numbered 63.

Applying the Virsa Singh framework to these facts, the Court reasoned with surgical precision. The first element — presence of bodily injury — was indisputably satisfied by the post-mortem report. The second element — nature of the injury — was equally established: four bone-deep wounds on the skull, a parietal fracture, extradural and subarachnoid haemorrhage, coma, and death. The third element — intention to inflict those specific injuries — was established by the deliberate and repeated direction of lathi blows at the head, a vital part of the body, in a planned ambush after the road had been blocked with tube-well pipes. As the Court held: "When repeated blows are inflicted on the parietal and temporal regions with lathis, resulting in bone-deep lacerations causing fractures and brain damage and culminating in coma, it cannot be said that the assailants lacked the intention to inflict such bodily injury as was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death." The fourth element — that the injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death — needed no elaboration given the nature of the injuries proved.

All four elements of the Virsa Singh test were thus satisfied, and the case fell squarely within Clause Thirdly of Section 300 IPC.

Pulicherla Nagaraju Factors: How Courts Must Determine Intention From Cumulative Circumstances When The Accused Does Not Confess

For advocates who regularly argue murder versus culpable homicide cases, the Court's application of the Pulicherla Nagaraju vs. State of A.P. [(2006) 11 SCC 444] framework to the facts of this case provides an invaluable practical guide on how to build — and how to answer — arguments on intention.

The Court in Pulicherla Nagaraju had laid down a non-exhaustive list of circumstances relevant to the determination of intention: the nature of the weapon used; whether the weapon was carried by the accused or picked up from the spot; whether the blow was aimed at a vital part of the body; the amount of force employed; whether the act was in the course of a sudden quarrel or premeditated; whether there was any prior enmity; whether there was any grave and sudden provocation; whether the accused acted in the heat of passion; whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows.

The Supreme Court in the present case applied each of these factors methodically to the proved facts and found every single one of them pointing towards murder. On the nature of weapons — lathis, carried by the accused, not picked up from the spot. On whether blows aimed at vital part — yes, repeatedly, at the head. On force employed — sufficient to cause bone-deep lacerations, skull fracture, and brain haemorrhage. On premeditation — the road was deliberately blocked with tube-well pipes before the attack, the accused were lying in wait armed and prepared. On prior enmity and motive — the deceased had intervened earlier that very day when the sons of accused Vimal Rana were assaulting a third party, giving immediate cause for retaliation. On sudden provocation — none, and no Exception to Section 300 attracted. On single blow versus multiple — 29 injuries on the deceased alone, with four bone-deep head wounds, and 63 injuries inflicted across multiple victims.

Against this cumulative picture, the Court held that the case admitted of no conclusion other than that the accused-respondents, acting in concert, "intended to inflict such bodily injuries to deceased-Bhaggu as were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death." The High Court's contrary conclusion was therefore not merely wrong — it was perverse.

The Distinction That Decides Everything: "Likely To Cause Death" Under Section 304 Part II vs. "Sufficient In The Ordinary Course Of Nature To Cause Death" Under Section 300 Clause Thirdly

This is the distinction that the defence in virtually every mob violence case seeks to exploit, and the Supreme Court in this judgment has clarified it with admirable precision. Quoting from Daya Nand vs. State of Haryana, the Court explained: "The distinction lies between a bodily injury likely to cause death and a bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in miscarriage of justice. The word 'likely' in Clause (b) of Section 299 conveys the sense of probable as distinguished from a mere possibility. The words 'bodily injury…sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death' mean that death will be the 'most probable' result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature."

In practical terms — a bodily injury that might probably cause death attracts Section 304. A bodily injury that will most probably cause death in the ordinary course of nature attracts Section 300 Clause Thirdly and therefore constitutes murder. The question is one of degree of probability, and that degree must be assessed objectively from the nature of the injury — not from what the accused subjectively believed would happen.

When four bone-deep lacerations are inflicted on the skull of a human being with sufficient force to fracture the parietal bone, cause extradural and subarachnoid haemorrhage, and produce coma — there is, as the Supreme Court implicitly held, no room for debate about which side of this line the case falls on. Death, in such circumstances, is the most probable result in the ordinary course of nature. That is Clause Thirdly. That is murder.

A Judgment That Clarifies The Law On Lathis, Intention, And The Virsa Singh Test For A Generation Of Criminal Advocates

The Supreme Court's ruling in Sitaram Kuchhbedia vs. Vimal Rana & Others is, on this point, an essential reference for every advocate who argues or adjudicates cases of group violence. It conclusively establishes that a lathi is not inherently a non-lethal weapon — its character in law depends entirely on how it is used and where. It reaffirms that under the Virsa Singh test, the prosecution does not need to prove an intention to kill — only an intention to inflict the specific injury that proves fatal and that was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It demonstrates through the careful application of the Pulicherla Nagaraju factors how intention is to be gathered from the totality of circumstances — motive, preparation, weapon, situs of injury, number of blows, and absence of provocation all speaking in one voice. And it warns courts that converting a murder conviction to culpable homicide on the ground that "lathis are not deadly weapons" or that "only one injury was fatal," without carefully applying the Virsa Singh test and examining the cumulative medical evidence, is an error that will not survive scrutiny.

Date of Decision: February 23, 2026