-
by sayum
24 February 2026 8:13 AM
"When Repeated Blows Are Inflicted On The Parietal And Temporal Regions With Lathis Resulting In Bone-Deep Lacerations, Fractures And Brain Damage — It Cannot Be Said That The Assailants Lacked Intention": Supreme Court Restores Life Imprisonment In Premeditated Lathi Attack That Left 63 Injuries Across Multiple Victims
In a landmark ruling that every criminal advocate — whether prosecuting or defending — must study with care, the Supreme Court of India on February 23, 2026 sternly reversing the Madhya Pradesh High Court's decision to tone down a murder conviction to culpable homicide not amounting to murder. A bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Sandeep Mehta held that the High Court's reasoning was not merely erroneous but "self-contradictory" and "perverse" — restoring the trial court's conviction of the accused-respondents under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 along with the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life. The accused were directed to surrender within eight weeks.
A Road Blocked With Tube-Well Pipes, A Premeditated Ambush, And A Death That Triggered Four Decades Of Criminal Litigation
The facts of this case read like a textbook illustration of a planned retaliatory mob attack, and for advocates who argue cases involving unlawful assemblies, premeditation, and common object, they deserve to be absorbed in their full detail.
On the evening of July 11, 2003, at around 7:15 p.m., the deceased Bhaggu @ Bhag Chand was returning from Bhatera Ghat after bathing in the river Narmada. He was travelling in a mini-bus when he found the road deliberately obstructed by tube-well pipes placed across it. The moment the vehicle stopped, a group of persons — all armed with lathis — emerged and launched a concerted attack. The deceased was assaulted repeatedly, as were several others travelling with him. The motive was not hard to find: earlier that same day, at around 2:00 p.m., Bhaggu had intervened when the sons of accused Vimal Rana were assaulting one Sharan Dubey. That act of intervention sealed his fate.
Bhaggu was taken to the Government Hospital, Gadarwada, where, while undergoing treatment, he succumbed to his injuries. A Dehati Nalishi (Exh. P/2) was lodged by the informant-appellant at about 9:00 p.m. the same night. A formal FIR — Crime No. 28 of 2003 — was registered for offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 307, 302 of the IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act. During investigation, the accused made disclosure statements under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 leading to recovery of lathis from the places disclosed by them — a bent stick was also recovered from the place disclosed by accused Baddu @ Badda.
After a full trial before the Special Judge (Atrocities), Narsinghpur, 19 of the accused were convicted on April 7, 2006 for offences under Sections 148, 323/149, 325/149, and 302/149 IPC and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life under Section 302/149. In appeal, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, by its judgment dated July 19, 2010, toned down the conviction from Section 302/149 to Section 304 Part II/149 IPC and reduced the sentence to six years' rigorous imprisonment — a decision the Supreme Court has now emphatically reversed.
The Murder vs. Culpable Homicide Distinction Under Section 300 IPC: A Three-Stage Structured Enquiry That Courts Must Follow
Before turning to the specific errors of the High Court, the Supreme Court laid down a detailed and structured analytical framework for distinguishing between murder under Section 302 IPC and culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 IPC — a distinction that, as the Court acknowledged, "has long posed a complex and nuanced challenge before the courts."
Drawing from the foundational ruling in Daya Nand vs. State of Haryana [(2008) 15 SCC 717], the Court reiterated the well-known but frequently misapplied principle that "culpable homicide is genus and murder its species — all murder is culpable homicide but not vice versa." The Court articulated a three-stage structured enquiry that every court must undertake when confronted with this question.
At the first stage, the court must determine whether the accused committed an act causing the death of another — i.e., whether there is a homicide at all. At the second stage, it must determine whether that act constitutes "culpable homicide" within the meaning of Section 299 IPC. At the third and most critical stage, it must determine whether the facts proved bring the case within any of the four clauses of Section 300 IPC, which define murder. Only if the case falls outside all four clauses — or within any of the exceptions to Section 300 — does the offence fall back to culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 IPC.
The Court further referred to the classic test laid down by Justice Vivian Bose in Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab [1958 SCR 1495] for the applicability of Clause (3) of Section 300 — what has become known as "Clause Thirdly." The prosecution must establish four elements: first, that a bodily injury is present; second, the nature of that injury; third, that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury (not accidental); and fourth, that the injury of the type described was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. As the Court reminded, this fourth element "is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender." The question under Clause Thirdly, as Justice Bose famously observed, "is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict a serious injury or a trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present."
For advocates, the significance of this framework cannot be overstated: the test is not whether the accused intended death, but whether the accused intended to inflict the specific injury that was in fact inflicted — and whether that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.
"The Finding That Only One Scalp Injury Was Caused Is Perverse And Recorded In Ignorance Of The Medical Evidence": Supreme Court Demolishes The High Court's Core Finding
The pivot around which the entire High Court judgment rotated was a single finding: that the death of Bhaggu @ Bhag Chand was attributable to "a single head injury" and was not "the cumulative result of all the injuries." It was this finding that led the High Court to conclude that the common object of the unlawful assembly could not be inferred to be the commission of murder, and that the fatal injury appeared to be the individual act of one assailant.
The Supreme Court has now held, in unambiguous terms, that this finding is "perverse and recorded in ignorance of the medical evidence available on record."
The post-mortem report (Exh. P/8) — which the accused-respondents themselves had admitted before the trial court — told a starkly different story. The deceased had sustained no fewer than 29 ante-mortem injuries. Of these, injury Nos. 24 to 27 were four bone-deep lacerated wounds specifically located over the left parietal and temporal regions of the skull — the head, the most vital part of the human body. The medical opinion attributed the cause of death to "coma resulting from ante-mortem head injury," with a "fresh linear fracture measuring 7 cm in length over the left parietal bone, obliquely placed, accompanied by extradural and subarachnoid haemorrhage" and "congestion of the underlying fronto-parietal region."
The Court found it impossible to reconcile the High Court's finding of "a single fatal injury" with the medical evidence showing four separate bone-deep lacerations on the head, a skull fracture, extradural haemorrhage, subarachnoid haemorrhage, and brain congestion. "The situs, depth, and multiplicity of the head injuries clearly establish that multiple blows were directed at a vital region with considerable force," the Court held.
This is a powerful lesson for advocates in murder trials: where the post-mortem report has been admitted by the defence under Section 294 CrPC, every injury noted therein stands proved beyond doubt. Courts cannot selectively choose to treat one injury as the "only" fatal injury while ignoring a constellation of serious injuries on the same vital body part documented in the very same admitted report.
Admission Of Post-Mortem Report Under Section 294 CrPC Makes It Substantive Evidence: Non-Examination Of Doctor Is Not Fatal To Prosecution
One of the more technically interesting arguments advanced by the defence was that since the doctor who conducted the post-mortem examination — Dr. N.K. Bajpai — was not examined in the witness box, the post-mortem report (Exh. P/8) was not properly proved and therefore lacked substantive evidentiary value. This argument, superficially attractive, was firmly rejected by the Supreme Court.
The facts were revealing. Dr. N.K. Bajpai was actually present before the trial court on February 5, 2005. On that date, the counsel representing the accused admitted the post-mortem report, which was accordingly marked as Exh. P/8. In view of this admission, the Public Prosecutor chose not to examine the doctor, and the trial court discharged him. Having secured the admission of the document themselves to avoid cross-examination of the doctor, the accused-respondents then turned around in appeal to argue that the absence of oral testimony of the doctor weakened the prosecution's case.
The Supreme Court rejected this position categorically, relying on its earlier ruling in Akhtar vs. State of Uttaranchal [(2009) 13 SCC 722], which held: "It is settled position of law that if the genuineness of any document filed by a party is not disputed by the opposite party it can be read as substantive evidence under sub-section (3) of Section 294 CrPC. Accordingly, the post-mortem report, if its genuineness is not disputed by the opposite party, the said post-mortem report can be read as substantive evidence to prove the correctness of its contents without the doctor concerned being examined."
For advocates, the lesson is sharp and practical: admitting a document under Section 294 CrPC to avoid the examination of an inconvenient witness is a double-edged sword. Once admitted, the document becomes substantive evidence of its contents and the party who admitted it cannot thereafter complain that the absence of the author renders its contents unproved.
Intention Must Be Gathered From Cumulative Circumstances: Nature Of Weapon, Situs Of Injuries, Prior Motive, Premeditation And Manner Of Assault All Decisive
On the question of intention — the most contested element in every murder vs. culpable homicide debate — the Supreme Court applied the framework laid down in Pulicherla Nagaraju vs. State of A.P. [(2006) 11 SCC 444], which identified the relevant factors for discerning intention: the nature of the weapon used, whether the weapon was carried by the accused or picked up from the spot, whether the blow was aimed at a vital part of the body, the amount of force employed, whether the act was in the course of a sudden quarrel or was premeditated, whether there was any prior enmity, whether there was any grave and sudden provocation, and whether the accused dealt a single blow or several blows.
Applying these factors to the present case, the Supreme Court found all of them pointing decisively towards murder. The weapons — lathis — were not picked up casually at the spot but were carried by the accused, who had come prepared and were "lying in wait." The road had been deliberately obstructed with tube-well pipes to ensure the victims could not escape. The motive was established: earlier that same afternoon, Bhaggu had intervened in an altercation involving the sons of Vimal Rana, giving rise to an immediate retaliatory motive. The attack was not a sudden quarrel — it was a planned ambush. The blows were repeatedly aimed at the head, the most vital part of the body. No fewer than 63 injuries were inflicted across multiple victims in a single concerted attack. And critically, there was no material on record to indicate any grave and sudden provocation that would attract any of the Exceptions to Section 300 IPC.
The Court also gave important weight to the background of caste factionalism. Though the charge under the SC/ST Act was not ultimately sustained, the accused-respondents themselves, in their statements under Section 313 CrPC, had adverted to inter-se caste and political factions — a context the Court held "provides contextual motive for the occurrence and lends further support to the inference that the assault was retaliatory rather than erupting spontaneously or from a sudden quarrel."
"The Reasoning Of The High Court Is Self-Contradictory": Affirming Section 149 IPC While Simultaneously Demanding Proof Of Individual Fatal Blow Destroys The Very Foundation Of Vicarious Liability
This is the legal point on which the Supreme Court's censure of the High Court was most direct and forceful, and it is a point that carries enormous practical significance for advocates dealing with cases of mob violence.
The High Court, while affirming the applicability of Section 149 IPC and finding all the accused guilty as members of an unlawful assembly, had simultaneously reasoned that since "there is nothing on record to indicate who caused the fatal injury to deceased, it would be unsafe to convict all the appellants under Section 302/149 IPC." This reasoning led it to alter the conviction to Section 304 Part II/149 IPC.
The Supreme Court found this reasoning fundamentally and irreconcilably self-contradictory. "A bare perusal of the aforesaid findings makes it evident that the reasoning of the High Court is self-contradictory. While affirming the invocation of Section 149 IPC, it went on to record that the prosecution could not prove the identity of the assailant who caused the fatal injury to the deceased-Bhaggu. This approach runs contrary to the very principle of vicarious liability embodied in Section 149 IPC."
The Court then extensively restated the settled law on Section 149 IPC, drawing on Nitya Nand vs. State of U.P. [(2024) 9 SCC 314], Krishnappa vs. State of Karnataka [(2012) 11 SCC 237], and Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel vs. Rajivbhai Dudabhai Patel [(2018) 7 SCC 743]. The principle, stated clearly: "The factum of causing injury or not causing injury would not be relevant where the accused is sought to be roped in with the aid of Section 149 IPC. The relevant question to be examined by the court is whether the accused was a member of an unlawful assembly and not whether he actually took active part in the crime or not."
Once an unlawful assembly is established and its common object is proved to be murder, every member of that assembly is guilty of murder under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC — regardless of whether the prosecution can prove who specifically delivered the fatal blow. As the Court held in Vinubhai Ranchhodbhai Patel: "It is not necessary that each of the accused should inflict fatal injuries or any injury at all." The purpose of Section 149, as the Court reminded, "is to ensure that criminal liability cannot be evaded on the plea that specific role of the particular accused could not be discerned from the evidence."
The High Court's error was thus at two levels simultaneously: it misread the medical evidence to find a single fatal injury, and even proceeding on its own erroneous premise, it failed to apply the correct legal principle that under Section 149 IPC, identification of the individual who struck the fatal blow is wholly immaterial once the common object of the unlawful assembly is established.
Life Imprisonment Restored — The Supreme Court's Stern Message On Mob Violence, Premeditated Attacks, And The Sanctity Of Section 149 IPC
The Supreme Court's judgment in Sitaram Kuchhbedia vs. Vimal Rana & Others is a landmark ruling on multiple fronts. It reaffirms that when an unlawful assembly blocks a road, arms itself with lathis, lies in wait for its victims, and then inflicts dozens of injuries including repeated bone-deep blows to the head — the law will not permit the softening of murder into culpable homicide on the ground that the individual who struck the fatal blow was not identified. It confirms that an admitted post-mortem report is substantive evidence of its contents and that the defence cannot use its own strategic admission to later undermine the prosecution's medical case. It reiterates the structured three-stage approach to determining whether an act constitutes murder under Section 300 IPC. And it sends an unmistakable message that High Courts which affirm Section 149 IPC while simultaneously demanding individual attribution of the fatal blow are applying self-contradictory and legally unsustainable reasoning.
As the Court held with finality: "The impugned judgment to that extent suffers from perversity and illegality and hence cannot be sustained." The accused-respondents must now surrender to serve out their life sentences.
Date of Decision: February 23, 2026
