Section 106 IEA Cannot Fill the Gaps in a Shaky Prosecution Case: Rajasthan High Court Rebukes Investigative Lapses in Murder Trial

"The prosecution failed to establish foundational facts for invoking Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act. The burden never shifted to the accused" – Rajasthan High Court acquitting a man convicted of murdering his wife, after sharply criticizing the investigative and prosecutorial failures that led to an erroneous conviction.

Division Bench of Justices Vinit Kumar Mathur and Chandra Shekhar Sharma found that the prosecution had not only failed to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but also inappropriately invoked Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act in an attempt to shift the burden onto the accused, despite lacking proof of his presence at the scene.

"Before the burden can shift, the prosecution must first stand on its own legs" – The Court on the Misuse of Section 106 Evidence Act

The Court underlined a critical principle of criminal jurisprudence: Section 106 of the Evidence Act—which allows courts to draw an inference against an accused for failing to explain facts exclusively within his knowledge—can be invoked only after the prosecution proves the foundational facts such as the presence of the accused at the time and place of the offence.

"Section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act does not absolve the prosecution of its primary burden. It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof may lie upon the accused," the Court held, quoting from the Supreme Court’s observations in Gargi v. State of Haryana.

In the case before the High Court, the prosecution had failed to conclusively establish that the accused Soma was present inside the house at the time of the alleged offence, with multiple witnesses—including the accused’s brother, father, and neighbors—stating that he was at a community religious gathering (Ram Rasoda) when the fire broke out. Medical evidence, in turn, supported the defence claim that Soma sustained burns while attempting to save his wife.

“The prosecution cannot merely rely on the ‘last seen’ theory or invoke Section 106 in absence of direct or circumstantial evidence proving the presence of the accused at the scene,” the Court observed. “To do so would amount to reversing the burden of proof in a criminal trial, a move which is fundamentally impermissible.”

"Where the prosecution’s own witnesses negate the presence of the accused at the scene, Section 106 cannot be used as a crutch"

The Court also observed that both the first and second Investigating Officers had failed to collect evidence establishing that the accused was inside the house when the incident occurred. In fact, they conceded during cross-examination that no motive, prior cruelty, or history of alcoholism was established, despite these being central to the prosecution’s theory.

Referring to the evidence of PW-3 Narayan, PW-6 Gautam, PW-7 Dungar, and PW-10 Punji, the Court held:

“Their testimonies consistently establish that at the relevant time the accused Soma was present at a community religious gathering and not inside the house when the incident occurred.”

“In such circumstances, where the prosecution’s own witnesses negate the presence of the accused at the crucial time, no adverse inference can be drawn against him by shifting the burden under Section 106,” the judgment reads.

"Suspicion, However Strong, Cannot Displace Proof"

The High Court emphasized that in criminal law, “it is not enough for the prosecution to raise suspicion—even strong suspicion cannot substitute the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt.”

The Bench cited the Supreme Court’s ruling in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramveer Singh (2025 INSC 952), noting that:

“Where there are two views possible—one pointing to guilt, the other to innocence—the Court must adopt the one favorable to the accused.”

Ultimately, the High Court held that the burden of proof had never shifted onto the accused, and that Section 106 had been wrongly invoked by the prosecution to mask its own failure in establishing a prima facie case.

“In the present case, the foundational facts necessary to attract Section 106 of the Evidence Act are conspicuously absent. The burden to establish the presence and culpability of the accused squarely lay upon the prosecution, which it has failed to discharge,” the Court held while acquitting the appellant.

Date of Decision: 06 February 2026