Special Appeal Maintainable If Single Judge's Order Relates To Authority Acting Without Statutory Appellate Jurisdiction: Allahabad High Court

"A special appeal... would be maintainable if the appeal itself was not provided under the statute but was entertained or decided either way and the power exercised by the appellate authority would not be treated as ‘purported exercise of power’," Allahabad High Court, in a significant ruling, held that a special appeal against a Single Judge's order is maintainable when the underlying proceedings involved an authority exercising appellate powers not conferred by statute.

A bench comprising Chief Justice Arun Bhansali and Justice Kshitij Shailendra observed that such an unauthorized exercise of power cannot be shielded under the "purported exercise of jurisdiction" clause of the High Court Rules.

The case reached the Division Bench through two special appeals challenging an order of a Single Judge. The dispute originated from a composite order passed by the Assistant Registrar, Jhansi, under Section 25(2) and Section 4-B of the Societies Registration Act, 1860. While an appeal was preferred before the Commissioner against this order, the primary legal contention was whether such an appeal was even legally permissible under the Act.

Primary Legal Issues Before The Court

The primary question before the court was whether a special appeal is maintainable under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules when the Single Judge's order arises from an appellate order passed by an authority lacking statutory jurisdiction. The court was also called upon to determine if the Societies Registration Act provides any mechanism for appealing orders passed specifically under Section 25(2) and Section 4-B.

Maintainability Of Special Appeal Under Chapter VIII Rule 5

The court first addressed the preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the special appeal. Under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952, a special appeal is generally barred against a judgment passed by a Single Judge in the exercise of jurisdiction in respect of an order made by a tribunal or statutory authority in the exercise of "appellate or revisional jurisdiction."

Court Distinguishes 'Purported Exercise' Of Jurisdiction

The bench clarified that for the bar under Rule 5 to apply, the appellate or revisional jurisdiction must actually be available to the concerned authority under a U.P. Act or Central Act. The court noted that if an appeal is not provided by the statute itself, an authority cannot clothe itself with the power to decide the matter on merits. Such an act would not fall within the meaning of "exercise or purported exercise of appellate jurisdiction."

The judges relied on the precedent in Sardar Mohammad Ansar Khan vs. State of U.P., noting that where an order is passed without jurisdiction and falls outside the purview of the relevant Act, it cannot be termed a "purported exercise." The bench emphasized that the word "purported" does not cover instances where the authority is a total stranger to the appellate power in question.

No Statutory Appeal Against Section 25(2) Or Section 4-B Orders

In analyzing the Societies Registration Act, 1860, the court observed that there is no provision for an appeal against orders passed under Section 25(2) or Section 4-B. While Section 25(1)(d) allows an appeal to the Commissioner against orders passed under Section 25(1) regarding election disputes, this does not extend to Section 25(2), which deals with the Registrar's power to call meetings for defunct societies.

Jurisdiction Cannot Be Conferred By Consent Or Remand

The Court criticized the Single Judge’s decision to remand the matter to the Commissioner to decide the appeal specifically regarding Section 25(2). The bench held that since the Commissioner lacks inherent statutory jurisdiction to entertain such an appeal, a High Court order cannot confer such jurisdiction. It was noted that jurisdiction—whether pecuniary, territorial, or inherent—is a creation of statute and cannot be created through acquiescence.

Distinction Between Section 4 And Section 4-B Of The Act

Regarding the second appeal, the court examined whether the 2021 Amendment (U.P. Act No. 8 of 2022) provided an appeal against Section 4-B orders. It was argued that Section 4(1-A) provides an appeal against orders made "under this section." The court clarified that this appellate provision is strictly confined to Section 4 (filing of lists of Managing Body) and cannot be stretched to include Section 4-B (registration of General Body members).

The bench reiterated the principle laid down in Abhishek Pandey vs. State of U.P., holding that Section 4-B is a separate and distinct provision. Consequently, an order passed by the Assistant Registrar determining the valid list of members of the General Body under Section 4-B is not appealable before the Commissioner.

The Division Bench allowed the special appeal filed by Dr. Keshbhan Singh and set aside the Single Judge’s order of remand. Simultaneously, it dismissed the defective appeal filed by the Committee of Management, affirming that no appeal lies against Section 4-B orders. The court, however, left it open for the aggrieved parties to challenge the Assistant Registrar's original order dated June 13, 2025, before the appropriate legal forum.

Date of Decision: May 27, 2026