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by Admin
05 December 2025 4:19 PM
In a significant decision reasserting the finality of criminal judgments and the strict limits imposed by Section 362 CrPC (now Section 528 BNSS), the Bombay High Court dismissed a convict’s belated application seeking the insertion of a direction that his sentences for gang rape (Section 376(g) IPC) and criminal intimidation (Section 506 r/w 34 IPC) should run concurrently.
Justice Nivedita P. Mehta, sitting in the Nagpur Bench, held that “once the appellate and Supreme Court judgments have affirmed the conviction and sentence, the High Court becomes functus officio and cannot revisit or modify the operative portion of the judgment”, even under the guise of a “Speaking to the Minutes” application.
The Court ruled that the application was, in effect, a barred request for review/modification of the sentence, and therefore not maintainable under Section 362 CrPC / Section 528 BNSS.
“Speaking to Minutes Cannot Be Used to Insert Substantive Directions or Modify Final Judgment”
The case involved Pintu Girdharilal Yadav, convicted in 2006 for the heinous gang rape of a woman, where her children were held hostage during the assault. He was sentenced to 10 years RI under Section 376(g) IPC and 1 year RI under Section 506 r/w 34 IPC. Neither the Trial Court nor the Appellate Court specified whether these sentences would run concurrently or consecutively.
His criminal appeal was dismissed in 2019, and Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court also failed. In 2025, with the 10-year sentence nearing completion (after remission), the appellant moved an application seeking insertion of a direction for concurrency in the High Court’s 2019 judgment—hoping for immediate release.
Justice Mehta rejected the plea outright:
“This Court cannot issue any new direction with respect to the mode or manner of execution of sentence after the judgment has attained finality. Any such direction now would amount to substantive modification and is barred by Section 362 CrPC / Section 528 BNSS.” [Para 22]
“Concurrent Running of Sentences Not the Default; Requires Express Judicial Discretion Under Section 31 CrPC”
A key question raised in the case was whether, in the absence of an explicit direction, sentences imposed in a single trial for multiple offences run concurrently or consecutively. The High Court, relying on the Supreme Court's ruling in O.M. Cherian v. State of Kerala, (2015) 2 SCC 501, clarified:
“Whether a direction for concurrent running of sentences ought to be issued in a given case would depend upon the nature of the offence or offences committed and the facts and circumstances of the case. The discretion has to be exercised along judicial lines and not mechanically.” [Para 10]
In this case, the trial court refrained from exercising discretion in favour of the accused due to the heinous nature of the offence:
“The accused had committed gang rape upon a married lady, holding her minor children hostage. The trial court rightly refrained from granting concurrency keeping in view the manner and gravity of the offence.” [Para 11]
“Section 362 CrPC Imposes a Complete Bar on Alteration of Judgment After It Is Signed”
The Court emphasised the inviolable bar imposed by Section 362 CrPC, which states:
“No court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.”
Referring to Sunil Kumar v. State of U.P., (2021) 5 SCC 560 and Vikram Bakshi v. R.P. Khosla, 2025 LiveLaw (SC) 844, the Court underscored:
“Once a judgment reaches finality, the court becomes functus officio. Inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC or Section 528 BNSS cannot be invoked to override this explicit bar.” [Paras 20–21]
The Court clarified that while minor corrections can be made under “speaking to minutes,” inserting an entirely new direction about sentencing mode crosses the threshold into substantive modification—which is strictly prohibited.
“Delay in Raising the Plea of Concurrency Demonstrates Abuse of Process”
Justice Mehta also noted that the appellant never raised the issue of concurrent sentencing at any prior stage—not at trial, not during appeal, and not before the Supreme Court.
“The present attempt to seek modification of the operative portion of the judgment is wholly misconceived and devoid of merit. No explanation has been offered for raising this plea for the first time nearly 19 years after conviction.” [Para 24]
The Court agreed with the Additional Public Prosecutor, who argued that the reference in para 1 of the 2019 judgment—that the trial court had directed concurrency—was an inadvertent and incorrect observation, not binding, and certainly not capable of conferring a new right post-facto.
No Inherent Power to Modify Substantive Sentencing After Finality
Rejecting the application, the Court reiterated that:
“The question as to whether sentences are to run concurrently or consecutively is a matter to be decided at the stage of sentencing itself, after hearing the convict as contemplated under Section 235(2) CrPC. Once the judgment and order of conviction have attained finality, the same cannot be revisited under the guise of a ‘speaking to minutes’ application.” [Para 23]
Final Order:
(i) The Criminal Application for Speaking to Minutes read with Section 528 BNSS, 2023 stands rejected.
(ii) No order as to costs.
Justice Mehta also placed on record her appreciation for the assistance rendered by Adv. S.D. Chande for the applicant and APP Mr. Amit Chutke.
Date of Decision: November 12, 2025