Magistrate’s Power Is Limited — Sessions Court May Yet Try the Case: Supreme Court Corrects High Court’s Misconception in ₹6.5 Crore Fraud Bail Order

“Assumption That Case Was Triable by Magistrate Is Premature”, In a crucial clarification on criminal procedure and sentencing powers, the Supreme Court held that the Allahabad High Court erred in proceeding on the premise that the offences were “triable by a Magistrate” while granting bail in a large-scale economic offence case.

The judgment, delivered on 17 February 2026 by Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice K. Vinod Chandran, not only set aside the bail granted to the accused but also addressed a significant procedural misconception regarding the powers of Magistrates under the Code of Criminal Procedure.

High Court’s Key Reason: “Offence Triable by Magistrate”

One of the principal factors weighed by the High Court while granting bail was that the offences alleged were triable by a Magistrate. On that basis, coupled with filing of chargesheet and parity with co-accused, bail was granted.

The Supreme Court found this reasoning fundamentally flawed.

The Bench pointed out that, during investigation, Section 409 IPC (criminal breach of trust by public servant or agent) had been added. The charges also included Section 467 IPC (forgery of valuable security), both of which carry punishment up to life imprisonment or up to ten years.

The Court noted that such serious offences could not be casually treated as routine Magistrate-triable matters without examining sentencing powers under the Code.

“Section 29 CrPC Limits Sentencing Power of Magistrate”

The Court examined Section 29 of the CrPC, observing that a Magistrate of First Class can impose imprisonment up to three years, while a Chief Judicial Magistrate may impose imprisonment up to seven years, but not life imprisonment.

In light of the maximum punishments prescribed under Sections 409 and 467 IPC, the Supreme Court emphasized that it would always be open to a Magistrate to commit the case to the Court of Sessions.

The Bench clarified that under Section 209 CrPC, cases exclusively triable by the Sessions Court must be committed. Further, under Section 323 CrPC, even during trial, if the Magistrate is of the opinion that the case ought to be tried by the Sessions Court, such committal can be made.

Therefore, the Court held that “the assumption of the High Court that the case on hand is triable by a Magistrate is premature.”

Procedural Oversight Vitiated Bail Order

By treating the case as one confined within the sentencing jurisdiction of a Magistrate, the High Court had effectively minimized the gravity of the offences.

The Supreme Court observed that the seriousness of charges punishable with life imprisonment cannot be diluted by procedural assumptions. Bail considerations must take into account the full spectrum of possible punishment and trial trajectory.

The Court’s reasoning underscores that triability and sentencing competence are not static labels but depend upon the nature of the offences disclosed in the chargesheet.

Economic Offences Demand Procedural Vigilance

While the case involved alleged cheating of over ₹6.5 crores using forged documents and multiple fake identities, the Supreme Court’s focus in this aspect of the ruling was procedural integrity.

By correcting the High Court’s understanding of triability, the Court reaffirmed that bail orders must reflect a proper appreciation of statutory provisions, particularly where offences carry severe punishment.

The ruling serves as a reminder that judicial discretion in bail matters cannot rest on incomplete legal assumptions.

Bail Order Set Aside; Trial to Be Expedited

Holding that the impugned bail order “cannot be sustained either on facts or in law,” the Supreme Court set it aside and directed the State to ensure expeditious trial.

The judgment reinforces that procedural misapprehension, especially regarding sentencing jurisdiction and committal powers, can render a bail order legally vulnerable.

Date of Decision: 17 February 2026