Senior Public Servant Liable For Bribes Demanded For Subordinates - PC Act Covers Indirect Corruption: Supreme Court Reverses Quashing Of FIR

"PC Act does not countenance any such straitjacketed formulation limiting to acts of demand and acceptance of bribe by the official himself as explained by expansive provision of Explanation 2. It can be for obtaining the undue advantage 'for another person' also," Supreme Court, in a significant ruling, held that a public servant can be prosecuted under the Prevention of Corruption Act (PC Act) even if they demand a bribe for the benefit of another person rather than themselves.

A bench of Justices Sanjay Karol and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh observed that the High Court cannot usurp the powers of investigating agencies by conducting a "mini-trial" and sifting through evidence at the stage of quashing an FIR.

High Court Erred In Quashing FIR At Nascent Stage

The Court was dealing with an appeal filed by the Karnataka Lokayukta Police against a High Court order that quashed an FIR against a Police Sub-Inspector (PSI). The High Court had reasoned that the ingredients of 'demand and acceptance' were missing since the PSI had not personally received the money. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court traversed beyond the permissible limits of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC.

The bench emphasized that at the threshold stage of considering a petition for quashing an FIR, the Court is not required to examine the merits of the allegations or evaluate evidence that may ultimately be led at trial. The sole inquiry is whether the allegations, taken at face value, prima facie disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. The High Court's detailed examination of trap proceedings and departmental enquiry findings was deemed fundamentally contrary to settled legal principles.

Court Explains Broad Scope Of Section 7(a) PC Act

The Supreme Court undertook a detailed analysis of Section 7(a) of the PC Act and Explanation 2 thereto. The bench noted that the provision punishes not merely the act of obtaining or accepting an undue advantage but expressly includes the "attempt to obtain" such an advantage. The Court clarified that the intention behind the act is what triggers the offence, regardless of whether the advantage was successfully obtained.

"The breadth of Section 7(a) read with Explanation 2 thereto is wide enough to encompass demand made through subordinates or third parties."

Explanation 2 Expands Liability To Indirect Corruption

The Court highlighted that Explanation 2(i) to Section 7 has enlarged the scope of the offence by not restricting the beneficiaries to the public servant alone. The provision explicitly covers cases where a public servant obtains or attempts to obtain an undue advantage "for himself or for another person." This means the public servant remains culpable even if the bribe is intended to benefit subordinates or third parties.

The bench further noted that under Explanation 2(ii), it is entirely immaterial whether the public servant obtains the undue advantage directly or through a third party. This expansive interpretation is designed to prevent senior officials from orchestrating the collection of illegal gratification through subordinates while maintaining personal deniability, thereby defeating the very object of the anti-corruption law.

"The Respondent No. 1’s implicit yet unmistakable direction to the Complainant to provide illegal gratification to his subordinate police officials falls squarely within the scope of 'attempt to obtain' an 'undue advantage' for another person."

Veiled Demands Like "Make Those Boys Happy" Are Actionable

Applying this logic to the facts, the Court observed that the PSI's alleged direction to the complainant to "do something for these boys" or "make those boys happy" constituted a veiled demand for illegal gratification. This instruction was immediately followed by a specific demand for Rs. 5,000 by a Police Constable. The Court found a clear causal nexus between the PSI's instruction and the subordinate's demand.

The bench rejected the High Court’s characterization of this conduct as "insufficiently proximate" to constitute a demand. It held that the High Court incorrectly imported a requirement of a direct and personal demand by the official, ignoring the legislative policy that seeks to curb indirect forms of corruption pervading public services.

Trial Standards Cannot Be Applied To Quashing Petitions

The Supreme Court distinguished several precedents relied upon by the Respondent, including K. Shanthamma v. State of Telangana and Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab. The bench pointed out that those judgments were rendered after a full trial where the standard of "proof beyond reasonable doubt" was applicable. Such standards cannot be transplanted to the pre-trial stage of considering the quashing of an FIR.

"The standards and principles applicable to the evaluation of evidence at the stage of trial are entirely distinct from and cannot be applicable at the threshold stage of considering whether a prima facie case has been made out."

Mala Fide Allegations Are Matters For Trial

Regarding the PSI's contention that the FIR was a retaliatory act motivated by prior hostility, the Court held that the motive of a complainant is a matter to be tested during cross-examination at trial. The mere allegation of pre-existing hostility does not render the FIR allegations inherently improbable or manifestly absurd, especially when electronic recordings of conversations exist as evidence.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment, thereby reviving the FIR and the criminal proceedings against the Respondent. It clarified that these observations are only for the purpose of the quashing petition and should not influence the final determination of guilt or innocence by the trial court.

Date of Decision: May 26, 2026