School Certificate Issued To IO During Probe Is A 'Statement' Under Section 161 CrPC, Hit By Section 162 Bar: Delhi High Court

"A birth certificate issued by the Principal to the I.O. during the course of investigation is nothing but a statement under Section 161 CrPC, although signed. Therefore, it is hit by Section 162 Cr.P.C. and is not admissible in evidence," Delhi High Court, in a significant ruling dated May 22, 2026, held that a school certificate prepared by a Principal and handed over to an Investigating Officer (IO) during a criminal probe constitutes a statement under Section 161 of the CrPC.

A bench of Justice Chandrasekharan Sudha observed that such documents are hit by the bar under Section 162 of the CrPC and cannot be treated as substantive evidence to prove the age of a victim. Consequently, the Court modified the conviction of an appellant from aggravated sexual assault to simpliciter rape, as the prosecution failed to conclusively prove the victim was below 12 years of age.

The appellant, Raman Shukla, was convicted by a Special POCSO Court for the aggravated sexual assault and rape of a 12-year-old girl occurring in May 2020. The Trial Court had sentenced him to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment under Section 6 of the POCSO Act and Section 376AB of the IPC. The appellant challenged this conviction before the High Court, primarily contesting the reliability of the evidence regarding the victim's age and alleging inconsistencies in the prosecutrix's testimony.

The primary question before the court was whether a school certificate issued specifically to an Investigating Officer during a probe is admissible as evidence of age under the Indian Evidence Act. The court was also called upon to determine whether a conviction for a "major" offense under POCSO can be converted to a "minor" offense under the IPC using Section 222 of the CrPC when the foundational fact of age remains unproven.

School Certificate Prepared For IO Inadmissible As Substantive Evidence

The Court meticulously analyzed the nature of the age proof submitted by the prosecution, specifically a certificate (Ext. PW5/B) issued by the school Principal to the IO. The bench noted that while an extract of a birth register or a school admission register is generally admissible, a certificate specifically manufactured for the investigation carries a different legal status.

The bench observed that the prosecution has to produce the actual extract of the birth register or the school admission register to prove the age of the victim. A certificate signed and handed over to the police during the investigation is merely a signed statement of a witness.

"Ext PW5/B is hit by Section 162 of Cr.PC and is not admissible in evidence and hence is liable to be discarded."

Failure To Establish Identity Of Person Who Provided Age Details

The Court further highlighted a critical discrepancy in the school records. The affidavit (Ext. PW5/A) used for the victim's school admission bore the name "Dolly," whereas the mother who testified in court was identified as "Poornima." The prosecution offered no explanation to link these two names.

The bench noted that in the absence of evidence to clarify whether "Dolly" and "Poornima" are the same person, the reliability of the school entry becomes doubtful. Since the entry was based solely on an unverified affidavit from an unidentified source, it could not satisfy the high burden of proof required for aggravated offenses involving victims under 12.

"When the age of the victim is not conclusively proved to be below 12 years, the essential foundational requirement for attracting Section 5(m) read with Section 6 of the PoCSO Act and Section 376AB IPC remains unestablished."

Consistency In Victim’s Testimony Regarding Sexual Act

Despite the failure to prove the victim's specific age, the Court found the testimony of the prosecutrix regarding the act of sexual assault to be consistent and reliable. The Court rejected the defense's argument that slight variations between the FIR, the Section 164 statement, and the medical history recorded in the MLC were fatal to the case.

The bench emphasized that the primary duty of a doctor is to treat the patient, not to record a verbatim legal deposition. It held that non-disclosure of the exact details of the assailant or minor variations in the history provided to medical professionals do not necessarily invalidate the victim's sworn testimony in court.

"The mere fact that there are slight variation(s) in the history narrated by PW1 to the doctor and her subsequent statements is not of much consequence in the light of the other evidence before the Court including the medical evidence."

Conversion Of Conviction Under Section 222 CrPC

The Court then addressed the procedural mechanism for sentencing when the "aggravated" element of an offense is not proven. Invoking Section 222 of the CrPC, the Court explained that an accused can be convicted of a "minor" offense even if not specifically charged with it, provided the ingredients are common.

The bench held that Section 376(1) of the IPC is a "cognate" and "minor" offense compared to Section 6 of the POCSO Act. Since the sexual act was proven but the age of "under 12" was not, the conviction was modified to the general offense of rape under the IPC.

"Only if the two offences are cognate offences, wherein the main ingredients are common, the one punishable among them with a lesser sentence can be regarded as a minor offence."

The High Court partly allowed the appeal, setting aside the conviction under Section 376AB IPC and the aggravated sections of the POCSO Act due to the lack of conclusive age proof. However, maintaining the conviction for the established act of rape, the Court found the appellant guilty under Section 376(1) of the IPC. The sentence was modified from 20 years to the statutory minimum of 10 years of rigorous imprisonment.

Date of Decision: 22 May 2026