Prolonged Trial Itself Becomes Punishment: Punjab & Haryana High Court Reduces Sentence of Youth Convicted in Dacoity Preparation Case

“The right to a speedy and expeditious trial is one of the most valuable and cherished rights guaranteed under the Constitution… The agony of a 16-year-long trial itself serves a punitive purpose.” - Punjab and Haryana High Court upholding the conviction of the appellant under Sections 399 and 402 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959, but modifying the sentence in view of prolonged trial and reformative considerations. Justice H.S. Grewal, while exercising appellate criminal jurisdiction, reduced the seven-year sentence imposed by the trial court to the period already undergone—03 years 01 month and 27 days.

This ruling reiterates that while deterrence is essential in criminal law, the judiciary must weigh it against the reformatory and constitutional imperative of fair and timely trials, especially for youthful offenders.

“Awarding Sentence Is Not A Mere Formality”: Court Stresses Discretion Must Be Balanced With Reformative Justice

The case originated from an FIR registered in 2008, alleging that the appellant Sanju @ Sanjay, then aged 21, along with six others, was involved in preparing to commit dacoity near the Maruti Suzuki premises in Manesar, Haryana. Based on secret information received by Inspector Rajiv Kumar, a police raid was carried out wherein the accused were found armed with country-made pistols, iron rods, and lathis, and allegedly planning to overpower factory guards on the intervening night of Holi.

A pistol with live ammunition was recovered from Sanju, and he was subsequently convicted by the Fast Track Court, Gurgaon in March 2009. The trial court had imposed the following sentences:

• Under Section 399 IPC: 7 years rigorous imprisonment + ₹2000 fine

• Under Section 402 IPC: 5 years rigorous imprisonment + ₹2000 fine

• Under Section 25 Arms Act: 2 years rigorous imprisonment + ₹1000 fine

The sentences were to run concurrently.

On appeal, the appellant did not challenge the conviction on merits but prayed for reduction of the sentence on account of mitigating circumstances including his young age, prolonged pendency of trial, and custodial period already undergone.

Court Recognizes 16-Year Delay as Mitigating Factor: “The Appellant Has Already Suffered the Agony of Protracted Trial”

Justice Grewal’s judgment reflects a nuanced understanding of sentencing jurisprudence, grounded in the doctrine of proportionality. Citing Deo Narain Mandal v. State of UP [(2004) 7 SCC 257], the Court underscored that sentencing is not a mechanical exercise and must involve a careful evaluation of factors such as the gravity of the offence, the age of the accused, and the extent of custody already undergone. The Court stated:

“After assessing all relevant factors, proper sentence should be awarded bearing in mind the principle of proportionality to ensure the sentence is neither excessively harsh nor does it come across as lenient.”

Relying further on Ravada Sasikala v. State of Andhra Pradesh [AIR 2017 SC 1166], the Court noted that sentencing must strike a balance between “efficacy of law” and “chances of reformation.”

Significantly, the Court emphasized that the 16-year pendency of the case since the FIR in 2008 had subjected the appellant to prolonged mental agony, financial hardship, and uncertainty—factors which in themselves served a punitive effect:

“The appellant has already suffered the agony of protracted trial, spanning over a period of more than 16 years and has been in the corridors of the court for this prolonged period… the case deserves to be dealt with leniency.”

Sentence Reduced to Period Undergone; Fine Enhanced with Default Imprisonment Clause

Upholding the trial court’s conviction as legally sound and unassailed on merits, the High Court proceeded to modify the sentence, reducing it to the period of custody already undergone. Justice Grewal, invoking precedents such as Haripada Das v. State of West Bengal [(1998) 9 SCC 678] and Alister Anthony Pareira v. State of Maharashtra [(2012) 2 SCC 648], concluded that further incarceration would serve no additional purpose and that the interest of justice would be met by treating the time already spent in jail as sufficient.

However, the Court took a stricter stance on monetary penalty and enhanced the fine to ₹10,000, with a stern default clause:

“In case of default of payment of fine, he will be liable to be taken into custody and made to undergo rigorous imprisonment for further period of six months.”

Further, it was directed that the amount must be deposited in the trial court within one month of receiving the certified copy of the order.

Balancing Deterrence and Reformation in Criminal Sentencing

This judgment presents a textbook case of how courts can maintain the sanctity of criminal convictions while also recognizing the transformative purpose of sentencing. By invoking both constitutional rights and judicial discretion, the Punjab and Haryana High Court showcased the need to consider not just the crime, but the journey of the accused through the criminal justice system, including the length of trial and scope for reformation.

The ruling also reaffirms the obligation of courts to calibrate punishment not as vengeance, but as a tool for justice—tempered with humanity and grounded in law.

Date of Decision: October 30, 2025