Presumption Under Section 29 of POCSO Act Is Not Absolute; Must Yield When Evidence Rebutted: Madras High Court Acquits Man in Alleged Sexual Assault

“When there is glaring discrepancy between the complaint and the victim’s testimony, and when defence evidence rebuts the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, conviction cannot be sustained” –  In a significant ruling  Madras High Court set aside the conviction of a man accused under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), holding that the presumption of guilt under Section 29 of the Act had been successfully rebutted and that the trial court failed to appreciate glaring inconsistencies and motive-based allegations.

The Court concluded that the appellant was falsely implicated in a politically motivated complaint, which arose out of election enmity between two factions in a village panchayat. The two-day delay in filing the complaint, absence of corroboration, evolving version of the child-victim, and prior assault on the accused’s mother—for which medical records were placed on record—proved decisive in granting acquittal.

“POCSO Presumption Not a Substitute for Proof: Courts Must Scrutinise Evidence Even When Victim Is a Child”

Conviction Based Solely on Inconsistent Testimony Without Corroboration Cannot Be Sustained

The appellant, Arul Doss, had been convicted by the Fast Track Mahila Court, Ariyalur District, on April 25, 2022, under Section 8 of the POCSO Act and Section 354A(2) IPC, for allegedly sexually assaulting a 13-year-old girl. The trial court imposed 3 years’ rigorous imprisonment and ₹10,000 fine, which the High Court has now set aside.

The allegation was that on 5th January 2020, while the minor victim (PW1) was picking up her slippers from a field, the accused hugged and kissed her. She returned home crying and initially told her aunt (PW3) she had "fallen down", only later disclosing the alleged sexual assault to her mother (PW2). The FIR was lodged two days later, on 7th January 2020, at Vikramangalam Police Station, though the police station was merely 10 km away.

However, the High Court found the victim’s version had evolved over time, with inconsistencies in her complaint (Ex.P1), statement under Section 164 CrPC (Ex.C1), and deposition. It observed:

“The evidence of PW1 is inconsistent and has been improvised from time to time... a marked shift and an improvised version of events.” [Para 19]

Defence Evidence of Prior Assault on Accused’s Mother Undermines Prosecution Case

“Accused’s rebuttal of statutory presumption under Section 29 POCSO Act proved effective and trial court failed to consider vital material”

The Court placed significant weight on the defence evidence, especially the testimony of DW1 (accused’s mother) and DW2 (elected panchayat member). It was proved through Ex.D2 (Accident Register) that DW1 had been assaulted on 4th January 2020—one day prior to the alleged assault—by the victim’s father and relatives, apparently due to local election rivalry. The winning candidate had been supported by the accused’s family, while the losing side was supported by the complainant's family.

This political motive was not only raised but also substantiated, with the Court observing:

“When PW5 was facing a situation where his family and also the job is to be protected due to the assault and injury sustained by the accused's mother, the complaint Ex.P1, invoking offences under the POCSO Act probably may be only an afterthought...” [Para 29]

Crucially, the Court held:

“The accused, by examining DW1, DW2 and by producing evidence particularly Ex.D2, has rebutted the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act.” [Para 30]

Delay in FIR Not Just Procedural But Substantive in This Case

The High Court noted that while delay alone is not fatal in sexual offence cases, in the present circumstances it was “significant and suspicious”, especially since the police station was close by and easily accessible.

The Court stated:

“The reasons adduced for the delay that they intended to resolve the issue with the villagers, lacks credibility.” [Para 28]

This delay, coupled with the fact that the accused’s mother was hospitalized the day before, raised serious doubts about the timing and intent of the complaint, particularly given the motive to protect the victim’s father (PW5), a government employee, from criminal consequences.

Trial Court Failed to Apply the Proper Standard While Invoking Section 29

While Section 29 of the POCSO Act permits the court to presume guilt of the accused once foundational facts are established, the High Court cautioned that such presumption is rebuttable and not absolute.

It concluded that the trial court had erred by invoking the statutory presumption mechanically, without properly assessing the credibility of the prosecution evidence or the validity of the defence evidence.

“The trial court has not analysed the evidences in a proper perspective and as such, the conviction and sentence imposed... cannot be sustained.” [Para 30]

Presumption Rebutted, Motive Established, Evidence Inconsistent – Acquittal Granted

Allowing the appeal, the High Court held that the accused was entitled to the benefit of doubt, having rebutted the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act through credible and corroborated defence evidence.

“The appellant is acquitted of all the charges... Fine amount, if any paid by the appellant shall be refunded to him. However, the victim compensation paid to PW1 need not be disturbed.” [Para 31]

This judgment reinforces the principle that criminal conviction, even under special statutes like POCSO, cannot rest on presumption alone, especially where inconsistencies and political motives are apparent, and defence evidence stands unrefuted.

Date of Decision: 30.10.2025