Once You Walk In With a Lawyer, You Can’t Shut the Door on the Other Side: Jharkhand High Court Quashes Labour Court’s Order Debarring Management’s Advocate

Labour Court Cannot Bar Advocates When Implied Consent and Leave Exist Under Section 36(4) ID Act, High Court of Jharkhand set aside an order of the Labour Court, Jamshedpur, which had debarred the Management's legal counsel from appearing in an ongoing industrial dispute. Justice Deepak Roshan held that once a workman himself appears through an advocate, it amounts to waiver of objection and implied consent, and that the Labour Court's act of allowing the advocate to file a vakalatnama and seek adjournment reflects implied leave. This ruling reaffirms the correct interpretation of Section 36(3) and 36(4) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, and shields the rights of fair representation in industrial adjudication.

The Labour Court had earlier, on February 27, 2025, passed an order debarring the advocate of the petitioner-management on the ground that there was no consent from the respondent-workman and no leave granted by the Court. The High Court categorically held the order to be “unsustainable in law and on facts”, and declared that both the requirements under Section 36(4) had been met—albeit impliedly.

"Consent May Be Express or Implied; Leave May Be Express or Inferred From Conduct of Court": High Court Applies Twin Test Under Section 36(4)

The controversy arose from I.D. Case No. 4 of 2024, where the respondent-workman challenged his dismissal under Section 2(A)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. At the preliminary stage, he filed an objection to the appearance of the Management's advocate under Section 36(3) and (4). However, on October 4, 2024, the Labour Court recorded: “Workman file attendance through counsel. Record put up on 12.11.24 for S/R.”

This single entry formed the fulcrum of the Management’s argument before the High Court—that the workman’s appearance through an advocate amounted to implied consent, and that any prior objection stood waived.

Justice Deepak Roshan endorsed this view unequivocally, observing, “Once the workman has appeared through an advocate on one of the dates fixed in the case, he cannot prevent the other side from being represented by an Advocate.” He further added, “This subsequent conduct constitutes waiver of objection and implied consent.”

The Court rejected the workman’s claim that his appearance through advocate had been wrongly recorded, stating, “The Respondent, who appears in person, cannot be permitted to discredit the order recorded in the order sheet dated 04.10.2024 without filing any application for rectification.”

The order-sheet, being the formal judicial record, was held to be conclusive unless rectified under law. The Court emphasised that “Mere assertion in affidavit is insufficient.”

The High Court also concluded that implied leave had been granted by the Labour Court when it permitted the Management’s counsel to file an adjournment application on November 12, 2024 and acted on it. Justice Roshan noted, “Labour Court permitting Management’s counsel to appear and allowing adjournment amounts to implied leave.”

"Section 36(4) Requires Both Consent and Leave, But Neither Needs to Be Express": Jharkhand High Court Reaffirms Law from Paradip Port Trust and Thyssen Krupp Cases

The Court extensively relied on precedents, most notably the Supreme Court's decision in Paradip Port Trust v. Their Workmen, (1977) 2 SCC 339, where it was held:

“Consent of the opposite party is not an idle alternative but a ruling factor in Section 36(4)... the Industrial Disputes Act, being a special law, will override the general right conferred by the Advocates Act.”

Justice Roshan underscored that the special nature and purpose of the Industrial Disputes Act justifies this conditional restriction, but clarified that the statute does not require such consent or leave to always be expressed in writing.

The High Court also relied on the recent ruling of the Supreme Court in Thyssen Krupp Industries India Pvt. Ltd. v. Suresh Maruti Chougule, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1707, where the twin requirements under Section 36(4) were reaffirmed. Justice Roshan drew from these decisions to hold that the Management had fulfilled both legal conditions—consent and leave—through conduct and judicial action, respectively.

The Court also referenced the Patna High Court’s decision in M/s Key’s Brake Hoses v. State of Bihar, CWJC No. 10760 of 1999, which held that “where a party is aware that the opposite side is being represented by an advocate and does not object, implied consent must be held to exist.”

Similarly, the Bombay High Court’s ruling in T.K. Varghese v. Nichimen Corporation, 2001 (4) LLN 187, was invoked to support the proposition that “no party can withhold consent arbitrarily and the Court must consider the bona fides of such refusal.”

Labour Court's Order Set Aside – Legal Representation Allowed – Respondent to Be Offered Legal Aid

The Court ultimately found that the Labour Court had erred in debarring the Management’s advocate and had overlooked the conduct of the workman and its own procedural actions. The order dated February 27, 2025 was accordingly quashed.

Justice Roshan concluded:

“In the above facts and circumstances of the case and on close examination of the applicable law, there was no justification in debarring the Advocate/legal practitioner representing the Management.”

Before parting, the High Court also directed that the Respondent-workman be apprised of his right to legal aid. The judgment recorded:

“The Respondent-workman can also be offered legal assistance through the District Legal Services Authority... The Labour Court shall apprise him of this right before proceeding any further.”

The writ petition was allowed in full, and the Labour Court was further directed to proceed expeditiously in resolving the industrial dispute.

This judgment from the Jharkhand High Court reaffirms the legal position that while representation by lawyers in labour adjudication is not a matter of right, consent and leave under Section 36(4) can be validly implied from the conduct of the parties and the Court. The ruling also reinforces the importance of judicial records like order sheets and the doctrine of waiver through participation.

More importantly, it guards against procedural unfairness arising from tactical objections aimed at disabling the opponent from securing legal representation. The decision stands as a strong precedent in favour of balanced and fair representation in industrial litigation.

Date of Decision: November 4, 2025