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by sayum
09 June 2026 8:30 AM
"In the absence of any specific accusation as against the petitioners that because of the circulation of false propaganda, there occurred rioting, this Court without there being any hesitation comes to a conclusion that an offence under Section 153 of IPC would not attract," High Court of Andhra Pradesh, in a notable judgment, has held that the offence of wantonly giving provocation with intent to cause a riot under Section 153 of the IPC cannot be sustained in the absence of evidence that such provocation led to actual rioting.
A single-judge bench of Justice K. Sreenivasa Reddy observed that to attract the rigors of Section 153 IPC, there must be an illegal act done maliciously or wantonly which infuriates the feelings of others to the point of rioting.
The petitioners, Lagadapati Praveen Kumar and Pavuluri Vamsi Krishna, were accused of circulating a false social media post claiming that the son of a Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) had been arrested with 60 kilograms of Ganja. The respondent-complainant, who is the son of the MLA, alleged that this false propaganda damaged his family’s reputation and was circulated with the intent to promote enmity. Consequently, an FIR was registered under Sections 153, 120B, 505(2) of the IPC and Section 66 of the IT Act, 2000.
The primary question before the court was whether the circulation of a defamatory and false social media post attracts the offence under Section 153 of the IPC regarding provocation to riot. The court was also called upon to determine whether the proceedings under Section 505(2) IPC and Section 66 of the IT Act could be quashed at the FIR stage when specific accusations of promoting enmity were made.
Court Explains Essential Ingredients For Offence Under Section 153 IPC
The Court noted that Section 153 of the IPC specifically deals with wantonly giving provocation with the intent to cause a riot. The bench emphasized that the provision requires an illegal act done maliciously or wantonly, providing provocation to any person, with the knowledge that such provocation will likely cause the offence of rioting.
In the present case, the court found that there was no specific accusation that the circulation of the false news actually resulted in any rioting. The bench observed that in the absence of any such consequence or words specifically intended to trigger a riot, the accusation under Section 153 IPC could not be maintained against the petitioners.
Distinction Between Section 153A And Section 505(2) IPC Regarding Promoting Enmity
Relying on the Supreme Court precedent in Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of Andhra Pradesh (1997), the Court drew a distinction between Section 153A and Section 505(2) of the IPC. The bench noted that while both sections share a common ingredient of promoting feelings of enmity or hatred between different groups, they operate in different spheres of communication and publication.
The Court observed that Section 505(2) IPC deals with statements conducing to public mischief, specifically those creating or promoting enmity between classes through reports containing rumours or alarming news. The bench held that since the FIR contained specific allegations that the petitioners promoted false propaganda to create enmity between groups, the matter required a thorough investigation.
"Under Section 505 (2), promotion of such feeling should have been done by making and publishing or circulating any statement or report containing rumour or alarming news."
Disputed Questions Of Fact Cannot Be Decided At The Quashing Stage
Regarding the charges under Section 120B, 505(2) IPC, and Section 66 of the IT Act, the Court held that whether the petitioners actually committed the alleged acts is a disputed question of fact. The bench stated that such questions must be decided during the course of a police investigation and cannot be adjudicated by the High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482 of the CrPC.
The bench reiterated the settled law that an FIR is not a substantive piece of evidence but is merely the foundation of an investigation. It noted that the FIR is not expected to be a detailed chronicle of every minute detail of an offence, and its primary purpose is to set the investigative machinery in motion to protect the integrity of the legal process.
"It is a settled law that merely the FIR is foundation of investigation, it cannot be replaced for formal evidence in the Court."
Partial Relief Granted To Petitioners
The Court concluded that while the charge under Section 153 IPC was legally unsustainable based on the material on record, the other charges required a factual probe. The bench emphasized that the Investigating Officer must be allowed to cull out material to determine if the offences of conspiracy and public mischief are made out.
As a result, the High Court allowed the petition in part, quashing the proceedings only in relation to Section 153 IPC. The Court dismissed the prayer to quash the proceedings for the remaining offences, allowing the investigation to continue against the petitioners in Crime No. 354 of 2021.
The ruling clarifies that defamatory fake news, while potentially attracting provisions related to public mischief or electronic crimes, does not automatically constitute a provocation to riot under Section 153 IPC unless a direct nexus to rioting is established. The Court affirmed that investigative agencies must be given the latitude to probe allegations of digital misinformation and criminal conspiracy.
Date of Decision: 07 May 2026