No Right Can Be Claimed Just Because a Pathway is Mentioned as a Boundary; Easement Must Be Proven Either by Grant or Necessity: Madras High Court

“Mere Mention of 'Common Battai' as Boundary Doesn’t Confer Easementary Right” – Madras High Court reaffirmed that a mere boundary recital in a sale deed referring to a “common battai” (pathway) does not amount to an easementary right of way, either by grant or necessity, in the absence of clear intention, usage, or legal basis.

Rejecting the second appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Court upheld the concurrent findings of the Trial and First Appellate Courts which dismissed the appellant’s suit for declaration and permanent injunction over the disputed ‘B’ Schedule property.

Justice Dr. R.N. Manjula held that the plaintiff had failed to establish easement of necessity, prescription, or express grant and further noted that physical and legal characteristics of the land were inconsistent with the claim of right of way.

“Easement Cannot Be Presumed Merely from Boundary Description in a Deed”

At the heart of the case was the appellant’s claim that the mention of a “common battai” (pathway) as an eastern boundary in her sale deed dated 09.06.1964 entitled her to a right of passage over the ‘B’ Schedule land.

However, the Court clarified:

“Mere mentioning of the same as the boundary of the first plaintiff's sale deed cannot presume or confer an easementary right over the same in favour of the first plaintiff or his successors in title.” [Para 23]

It further held that such an interpretation without a clear grant or proven necessity would set a dangerous precedent where boundaries become presumptive sources of legal rights, contrary to the Indian Easements Act, 1882 and established legal norms.

“Claim of Easement of Necessity Falls Flat in Light of Alternative Access”

One of the core arguments of the appellant was that she had no other access to her land (A Schedule property) except through the 'B' Schedule pathway, and hence had acquired an easement of necessity or by prescription.

But the Court found otherwise: “Other land owners have formed ridges on their own lands and walked through the same to reach the main road. So, it is possible for the appellant to create ridges on her own property in order to reach the main road.” [Para 19]

The physical characteristics of the land also defeated the claim. The Local Commissioner’s report and sketch (Exs. C1 to C3) revealed that the ‘B’ Schedule land was at a 4-foot elevation compared to the plaintiff’s property, making the claim of necessity impractical.

“The ‘B’ schedule property is situated at 4 feet elevated than the ground level of ‘A’ schedule property… the appellant cannot equate herself with the defendant of the case of Kuppakkal v. Mathan Chettiar.” [Para 16, 19]

“No Prescriptive Easement Without Uninterrupted Use as of Right”

The appellant also pleaded that she had acquired the right by prescription, having used the ‘B’ Schedule path for decades. But here too, the Court found no evidence to support her claim.

“The appellant has not established that she did not have any right of pathway except through 'B' schedule property and the easement of necessity also not proved.” [Para 21]

The Court emphasized the requirements under law: proof of open, continuous, uninterrupted, and “as of right” usage for the statutory period—none of which were satisfied.

Moreover, the Court took note of the defendants’ assertion that the ‘B’ Schedule land was part of their private holdings, and they had sold plots from it to third parties via registered sale deeds (Exs. B1 to B3).

“Private Land Cannot Be Presumed as Public or Common Pathway”

The Court noted that the ‘B’ Schedule property was not poramboke (government land), but a substantial private property of 59 cents, historically used only by the defendants' family, and not shown to be dedicated to public or common usage.

“The appellant has not produced any record to show that 'B' schedule property has been used as a public pathway or her vendors have donated the above land to the village or local administration.” [Para 17]

It rejected the contention that a 19-foot wide strip of private land could, merely by virtue of being called a “battai” in boundaries, be assumed to serve as a public or common passage.

“Precedent in Kuppakkal v. Mathan Chettiar Not Applicable to Private Battai”

The appellant had relied heavily on the decision in Kuppakkal v. Mathan Chettiar [AIR 1924 Mad 834], arguing that description of a street or battai as a boundary conferred access rights.

The High Court distinguished that precedent:

“The Court has rightly distinguished the factual situation… That case involved a public street abutting leased land, whereas here the 'B' schedule land is private property used by family members.” [Para 24]

Thus, the precedent was inapplicable, and the appellant’s attempt to draw an analogy was legally unsustainable.

Boundary Mentions Are Not Implied Grants—Second Appeal Dismissed

The Madras High Court reaffirmed long-settled law: mere mention of a “pathway” as a boundary does not create an easementary right in the absence of an express grant or proven legal necessity.

It concluded:

“The appellant has not established either easement of necessity nor easement of grant, either expressed or implied… the appeal deserves dismissal.” [Paras 22–24]

Accordingly, the Second Appeal was dismissed with no costs, and all connected miscellaneous petitions were also closed.

Date of Decision: 27 October 2025