No Extortion Without Delivery, No Obscenity Without Public Annoyance: Bombay High Court Quashed FIR

In a significant pronouncement delineating the threshold for invoking criminal process, the Bombay High Court ruled that mere demands of money unaccompanied by delivery of property do not constitute extortion under Section 384 of the Indian Penal Code, and that the use of abusive language without proving annoyance to the public or obscene content does not attract Section 294 IPC.

Justice M.M. Nerlikar, allowing the criminal writ petition in part, held that “both the Magistrate and the Revisional Court have failed to consider the basic ingredients of the alleged offences and have issued process without judicial application of mind”, thereby quashing the issuance of process under Sections 384 and 294 IPC, while affirming it under Sections 323 and 448 IPC.

“Unless Property Is Delivered Pursuant to Threat, No Offence of Extortion Is Made Out”

The case arose from a private complaint filed by Puspa Wagh, alleging that the petitioners—members of a cooperative credit society—had forcibly entered her house, abused her, and demanded ₹5,00,000 to withdraw a complaint to the Nagar Parishad, threatening political influence if the money wasn’t paid.

Although the Magistrate issued process under Sections 384 (extortion), 448 (house trespass), 323 (assault), 294 (obscenity), and 506 read with 34 IPC, the High Court found the order legally unsustainable with respect to extortion and obscenity.

Justice Nerlikar relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Isaac Isanga Musumba v. State of Maharashtra and the Bombay High Court’s ruling in Shaikh Mujib v. State of Maharashtra to hold:

“Unless property is delivered to the accused persons pursuant to the threat, no offence of extortion is made out.”

Clarifying the legal requirement under Section 384 IPC, the Court observed:

“The Division Bench of this Court has categorically held that the ingredients of Section 384 are not satisfied unless there is actual delivery of property following a dishonest inducement by putting a person in fear of injury.”

In the present case, though a monetary demand was alleged, there was no actual transfer of money or property, and therefore, the offence of extortion was not complete in the eyes of law.

“Use of Abusive Language, Even If Filthy, Is Not Automatically Obscene”

On the charge under Section 294 IPC, the Court held that no obscene words were specified, nor was there any claim that members of the public were annoyed by the alleged language.

Quoting the Court’s own ruling in Amit Ashok Jagdale v. State of Maharashtra, Justice Nerlikar observed:

“The mere use of abusive, filthy, or unparliamentary language is not sufficient in itself to attract the provisions of Section 294 IPC... There must be a further proof to establish that it was to the annoyance of others and the words must satisfy the test of obscenity.”

Citing the Supreme Court’s definition of obscenity in N.S. Madhanagopal v. K. Lalitha, the Court reinforced that “words must have a tendency to deprave and corrupt those open to immoral influences”—a standard not met in the present case.

Accordingly, the process issued under Section 294 IPC was quashed.

“Judicial Satisfaction Before Issuance of Process Must Be Real, Not Routine”

Justice Nerlikar criticised the Magistrate’s and Revisional Court’s approach, finding that the issuance of process was mechanical and unsupported by a judicial analysis of statutory ingredients:

“Merely reproducing the contents in gist without application of mind would be of no use… It is expected that before issuing process, the Magistrate should see whether the complaint satisfies the ingredients of the offences alleged.”

In failing to do so, both courts committed an error warranting interference under Article 227.

“Prima Facie Case of Assault and House Trespass Is Made Out”

Despite finding no basis for charges of extortion and obscenity, the Court held that the allegations regarding unlawful entry and use of criminal force warranted continuation of the process under Sections 323 and 448 IPC.

“There are prima facie allegations in the complaint… and therefore, issue process order to that extent is proper,” the Court held, refusing to interfere with those charges.Court declared:

“Considering the exposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court as well as this Court, the offence under Section 384 IPC cannot be said to be made out even if the allegations in the complaint are taken at face value. Similarly, in absence of specific words or public annoyance, the offence under Section 294 IPC is not attracted.”

The Court thus quashed the Magistrate’s and Revisional Court’s orders only to the extent they pertained to Sections 384 and 294 IPC, while allowing prosecution to proceed under Sections 323 and 448 IPC.

Date of Decision: 11 November 2025