Mere Threat Not Enough For Criminal Intimidation; Proof Of 'Alarm' To Victim Necessary For Section 506 IPC Conviction: Delhi High Court

"A mere threat by the respondent/accused would not be sufficient to attract the offence of criminal intimidation as contemplated under Section 503 IPC. The testimony of neither PW2 nor PW7 shows that by the alleged threat of the respondent/accused, any alarm was caused to PW7." Delhi High Court, in a judgment dated May 25, 2026, has held that the offence of criminal intimidation under Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) cannot be established by a mere threat alone, as it requires proof that such threat caused actual "alarm" to the person being threatened.

A Single Judge Bench of Justice Chandrasekharan Sudha observed that without evidence of alarm, an essential ingredient of the offence defined under Section 503 IPC remains unfulfilled, justifying an order of acquittal.

The primary question before the court was whether the ingredients of Section 506 IPC (Criminal Intimidation) and Sections 8 and 12 of the POCSO Act were established by the prosecution evidence. The court was also called upon to determine the extent of its appellate powers to interfere with an order of acquittal when a plausible view has been taken by the trial court.

Definition And Ingredients Of Criminal Intimidation

The Court meticulously analyzed Section 503 of the IPC, which defines criminal intimidation, and Section 506, which provides the punishment. The bench noted that the offence requires a person to threaten another with injury to their person, reputation, or property with the specific intent to cause alarm.

Court Explains Requirement Of 'Alarm' Under Section 506 IPC

The bench emphasized that a threat, in isolation, does not constitute criminal intimidation. The prosecution must demonstrate that the threat was intended to cause alarm and that such alarm was indeed caused. In the present case, the Court found that while the prosecutrix (PW2) alleged the accused threatened her brother (PW7) with a stabbing, the testimony did not reflect that any actual alarm was caused to the brother.

"The testimony of neither PW2 nor PW7 shows that by the alleged threat of the respondent/accused, any alarm was caused to PW7. Therefore, one of the essential ingredients of the offence of 506 IPC is also not seen made out," the Court observed.

Discrepancies In Witness Testimony Regarding Threats

The Court further highlighted inconsistencies between the versions provided by the victim and her brother. While PW2 claimed the accused threatened her brother with a knife, PW7 testified that the accused started abusing him and threatened to kill him upon being questioned. The bench found these variations significant enough to doubt the prosecution's narrative regarding the intensity and impact of the threat.

Ingredients Of Sexual Harassment And POCSO Not Met

Moving to the charges under Section 354A IPC and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, the Court examined the definitions of sexual harassment and sexual assault. It noted that Section 354A IPC and Section 11 of the POCSO Act require unwelcome physical contact involving sexual intent or sexual remarks.

Prerequisite Of Sexual Intent In Harassment Cases

The Court held that the testimony of the prosecution witnesses failed to establish the prerequisite of sexual intent. While there were allegations of the accused holding the victim's hand, the Court found that the essential elements of "sexual assault" under Section 7 or "sexual harassment" under Section 11 of the POCSO Act were not clearly made out from the deposition of the prosecutrix.

Limited Scope Of Appellate Interference In Acquittals

The Court extensively discussed the principles governing appeals against acquittal, citing the Supreme Court’s ruling in Chandrappa vs. State of Karnataka (2007). It reiterated that an appellate court must be reluctant to interfere with an acquittal if the trial court’s view is "plausible and reasonable," even if another view is possible.

Presumption Of Innocence Reinforced By Trial Court

The bench noted that the accused enjoys a double presumption of innocence—firstly, the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence, and secondly, the reinforcement of that innocence by the trial court's order of acquittal. Unless the findings are shown to be perverse or manifestly erroneous, the High Court should not disturb the lower court's conclusion.

"If the main grounds on which the trial court has based its order acquitting the accused are reasonable and plausible, and the same cannot entirely and effectively be dislodged or demolished, the High Court should not disturb the order of acquittal," the bench held.

The Court concluded that while an offence of wrongful restraint under Section 341 IPC might have been theoretically plausible, the trial court's overall decision to acquit was a reasonable view based on the material evidence. Finding no perversity or manifest error in the impugned judgment, the High Court dismissed the State's appeal as being without merit.

Date of Decision: 25 May 2026