Liberty to Travel Abroad Is a Fundamental Right, Not a Judicial Concession: Punjab & Haryana High Court Reins in Speculative Flight Risk Fears

“Likelihood to Abscond Must Be Based on Tangible Material, Not Judicial Imagination” — In a significant ruling reiterating the constitutional sanctity of the right to travel, the Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the right to travel abroad is a fundamental component of personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution and cannot be curtailed by courts merely on the basis of speculative fears or presumptive risks.

Justice Sumeet Goel, delivering a 21-page detailed judgment, allowed the petitioner — facing trial in a 2018 FIR under grave economic offences — to travel abroad for business meetings, observing that “any restriction on this liberty must be rooted in procedure that is just, fair and reasonable, not a product of judicial caution divorced from facts.”

“Right to Travel Abroad is Embedded in Article 21; Restriction Must Pass the Triple Test of Fairness, Justice and Reasonableness”

The case involved a businessman, Jonty Chhag, an undertrial in FIR No. 158/2018 for alleged offences under Sections 420, 406, 409, 467, 468, 471, 474, 120-B, 380, and 34 of the Indian Penal Code. While he had earlier been permitted by courts to travel abroad twice — once in November 2023 to Sharjah, and again in June 2024 to Doha — and complied with all conditions, his fresh plea to travel for a revised business itinerary from 15.10.2025 to 03.12.2025 was declined by the SDJM, Gharaunda, citing fear of abscondence.

The High Court disagreed with this line of reasoning and observed:

“To equate ‘likelihood’ of absconding with a mere conceivable possibility is to transform judicial discretion into an iron gate against liberty.”

Justice Goel emphasized that the petitioner’s prior compliance with bail conditions was material and could not be ignored merely because the trial court perceived a risk:

“The adjudicating Court is obliged to arrive at a considered determination regarding the accused-applicant’s propensity for fleeing, which ought to be premised upon some discernible, tangible and cogent material on record.”

“Procedural Formalities Cannot Eclipse Substantive Justice”: Itinerary Mismatch No Ground to Deny Liberty

One of the primary objections raised by both the State and the complainant was that the itinerary now relied upon before the High Court was not produced before the trial court, and that the new invitations were dated after the original plea.

The Court rejected this argument and noted that:

“Procedural provisions are handmaidens of justice and not its mistress.”

Justice Goel clarified that since the earlier itinerary had lapsed with time, it was not practical to remit the matter to the trial court again:

“The law does not contemplate that a citizen be made to suffer the rigours of technical formalities when the ends of justice can be effectuated without compromising procedural propriety.”

“Judicial Discretion Must Balance Liberty and Justice, Not Sacrifice One for the Other”

The Court acknowledged that courts have the discretion to impose conditions under Sections 437, 438, 439 of CrPC and Sections 480, 482, 483 of BNSS, 2023, but clarified that such discretion must be exercised not on instinct or abstract fear, but with measured proportionality:

“No exhaustive set of guidelines can be laid down… such discretion must be exercised in accordance with the principles of justice, equity and good conscience.”

On the balance between public interest and individual liberty, the Court powerfully noted:

“The right of an individual to travel abroad is not an unbridled license, but its restriction must not degenerate into an abuse of process, nor frustrate justice under the guise of caution.”

“Freedom to Go Abroad Is Not a Privilege, It’s a Constitutional Mandate”

Relying heavily on foundational Supreme Court precedents including Satwant Singh Sawhney v. D. Ramarathnam (AIR 1967 SC 1836) and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (AIR 1978 SC 597), the High Court reaffirmed that:

“The right to travel abroad has through the efflux of time and exigencies of modern life become so profoundly entrenched and inextricably interwoven with the daily affairs of an individual that it is now an indispensable facet and an ineluctable corollary of the fundamental right to life and liberty.”

Quoting Justice William O. Douglas (as adopted in Maneka Gandhi), the Court observed:

“Freedom to go abroad has much social value and represents the basic human right of great significance.”

“Modern Judiciary Cannot Operate in an Ivory Tower”: Courts Must Recognize Globalization of Liberty

Taking a modernist view of mobility, commerce and personal agency, Justice Goel asserted that:

“The contemporary world, characterized by accelerating globalization and seamless interconnectedness, has rendered international travel a quotidian necessity rather than a rarefied privilege.”

He cautioned against courts taking a static and insular view of personal liberty, urging them to adjudicate with:

“A discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subordinated to the primordial necessity of order in social life.”

Permission Granted, Liberty Protected with Safeguards

The Court ultimately allowed the petition and permitted the petitioner to travel abroad as per his revised itinerary from 15.10.2025 to 03.12.2025, covering three spells in Dubai, Doha, and Turkey. The Court directed:

“The liberty granted will be subject to such terms and conditions as deemed fit by the learned trial Court, including but not limited to furnishing a bank guarantee in favour of the trial Court to the tune of ₹10 lakh.”

The guarantee is liable to forfeiture in case of violation of any condition or failure to return within the stipulated time.

The Court concluded: “Ergo, the petition in hand ought to be granted, for the scales of justice must tilt in favour of liberty when no demonstrable threat to the judicial process is established.”

Date of Decision: 28 October 2025