Liberty of One Cannot Override the Safety of Many” – Allahabad High Court Denies Bail in Umesh Pal Murder Conspiracy Case

“The brutal killing of three persons, including two police guards, in broad daylight using firearms and explosives, has shaken public confidence and created terror in society… the Court finds no sufficient ground to release the accused on bail” – Justice Shekhar Kumar Yadav

On November 7, 2025, the Allahabad High Court refusing bail to the appellant, a government medical officer and the brother-in-law of the late gangster-politician Atiq Ahmad, in the sensational daylight triple murder of advocate Umesh Pal and two police constables.

The Court held that there existed “strong prima facie material” linking the appellant to the crime and emphasized that “bail jurisprudence must not be reduced to a formulaic entitlement, especially in cases involving public terror and deep-rooted conspiracies.”

“An Accused Who Aids, Finances, or Harbours Killers Cannot Claim Detachment” – Court Highlights Constructive Criminal Liability

The case pertains to the gruesome daylight assassination of Umesh Pal, a key prosecution witness in the 2005 murder of MLA Raju Pal, who was gunned down along with two police guards in Prayagraj on February 24, 2023. The attack, executed using bombs and firearms, was captured on CCTV and triggered widespread public outrage.

Rejecting the appellant’s argument of innocence and alleged false implication, the Court observed that “merely not being present at the crime scene does not absolve one from criminal liability when the common intention is clearly evident.” Citing Krishnan v. State of Kerala, the Court reiterated that “common intention may develop before or during the commission of the offence, and even one who aids or facilitates the crime is equally liable.”

“Facetime Conspiracy, Financial Aid, and Shelter to Killers – Prima Facie Involvement of Accused Established”

The prosecution alleged that the appellant, Akhlakh Ahmad, was not only aware of the conspiracy but was an active participant who provided shelter and financial aid to the prime accused Guddu Muslim. His name emerged during the investigation based on statements of co-accused and was further corroborated by independent witnesses and electronic evidence recovered from his residence.

The Court referred to multiple co-accused statements, including that of Rakesh @ Nakesh @ Lala, a domestic aide of Atiq Ahmad, who said:

“After the incident, Guddu Muslim came to the appellant’s house, was given ₹50,000, and provided shelter.”

Another accused, Kaish, confirmed that Atiq Ahmad had instructed that if funds were needed, “they should approach Akhlakh (the appellant) and his nieces in Meerut.”

Crucially, co-accused Shahrukh stated that the murder plan was “discussed with Akhlakh, Ayesha Noori, and others over FaceTime”, and they had said:

“Finish the work of Umesh Pal quickly, we are ready to help you in every way.”

The Court found these statements not only corroborative of each other but also consistent with independent witness accounts recorded under Section 164 CrPC, which established the existence of a premeditated conspiracy.

“DVR, iPhone, and Digital Trails – Electronic Evidence Can't Be Brushed Aside at Bail Stage”

A Digital Video Recorder (DVR) and a green Apple iPhone were recovered from the appellant’s residence. The DVR allegedly contained CCTV footage showing co-accused Guddu Muslim at the appellant’s house after the crime.

Though the appellant refused to provide the iPhone password, the Court noted that a Section 65-B certificate under the Indian Evidence Act had been produced, making the footage prima facie admissible. Referring to Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer and Arjun Panditrao Khotkar v. Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal, the Court emphasized:

“When the original electronic device is produced before the Court, no certificate under Section 65B is required, as it qualifies as primary evidence.”

Rejecting the appellant’s claim that the DVR could be tampered with, the Court clarified that authenticity and evidentiary value are matters for trial, but at the bail stage, the Court must consider whether the material suggests prima facie involvement, and held:

“The DVR, being the original recording device recovered from the appellant’s residence, cannot be brushed aside altogether at this stage.”

“Bail Jurisprudence Balances Liberty with Justice – Public Interest Must Prevail Over Private Liberty in Heinous Crimes”

While acknowledging the principles of P. Krishna Mohan Reddy v. State of A.P. (2025), where the Supreme Court cautioned against denying bail solely on co-accused statements, the Court held that the present case was materially distinguishable. It observed:

“This is not a case where the co-accused’s statements are the sole material; instead, there exists a network of corroborative independent witness statements, electronic evidence, and recovery of incriminating articles.”

Further, the Court invoked a line of Supreme Court precedents, including Prashanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, and Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., to reiterate that in cases of heinous and barbaric crimes, Courts must be cautious and circumspect in granting bail.

Justice Yadav emphasized:

“The liberty of an individual cannot be prioritized over the interest of society when the crime is heinous and capable of shaking public confidence in the criminal justice system.”

“Not Just a Murder, But an Attack on Rule of Law” – Court Calls Crime an Orchestrated Act of Terror

The judgment describes the murders as “a brutal and premeditated act, executed in public, with firearms and bombs, intended to terrorize and silence a key witness.” The Court held that:

“The present case does not merely involve a personal vendetta, but a systematic attempt to subvert the rule of law by eliminating a witness protected by the State.”

It also took serious note of the fact that several co-accused including the appellant’s wife remain absconding, and added:

“The appellant, being closely related to key conspirators and possessing influence and means, poses a legitimate risk of tampering with witnesses and obstructing justice.”

The Court concluded that there exists “a strong prima facie case of criminal conspiracy and facilitation”, and that the severity of the crime, societal impact, and the weight of material evidence do not justify the grant of bail. The criminal appeal was thus dismissed with the following closing observation:

“Granting bail in such a case would send a wrong signal and undermine the administration of justice… The appeal lacks merit and is hereby rejected.”

Date of Decision: November 7, 2025