Exemption Under Minority Cannot Be Invoked to Justify Delay in Appeal: Supreme Court Reverses Kerala High Court in Fatal Accident Claim

“It is not for the courts to extend the period of limitation on misplaced sympathies” - Supreme Court of India delivered a decisive judgment, setting aside an order of the Kerala High Court that had enhanced compensation in a motor accident fatality claim. The Apex Court ruled that the appeal by the minor children of the deceased was grossly delayed, and provisions under Sections 6 and 7 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could not be invoked to justify the delay.

The Court firmly held: “The intention of the legislature being very clear, it is not for the courts to extend the period of limitation on misplaced sympathies.”

The deceased, a 32-year-old Junior Public Health Nurse, succumbed to injuries sustained as a pillion rider on 07.06.2000 after a road accident. Her husband and two minor children filed a claim under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, and were awarded ₹6,53,000 compensation by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (MACT), Alappuzha on 23.11.2006.

In 2016, after 10 years, the two children (then majors) filed an appeal before the Kerala High Court, which enhanced the compensation to ₹14,95,000 and imposed interest at 7% per annum, directing the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. to pay the amount.

Aggrieved, the insurance company approached the Supreme Court.

The primary legal issue was whether the delay of 10 years in filing the appeal by the children, who had attained majority 8 years prior, could be condoned by applying Section 6 (Legal Disability) of the Limitation Act, 1963.

The Court emphasized: “Section 6… enables a person disabled by reason of minority… to institute a suit or make an application… after the disability has ceased… However, the provision applies only to suits or applications for execution of a decree and not to an appeal.”

In rejecting the High Court’s liberal approach, the Court clarified the distinction in law:

“An appeal, an application, and a suit are hence dealt with differently insofar as the Limitation Act is concerned… Section 6 being applicable to appeals, is not what the legislature intended.”

The Bench referred to the authoritative ruling in Bechi v. Ahsan-Ullah Khan (1890) and reaffirmed: “It is noticeable that Section 7 of the Limitation Act, in extending the period of limitation on account of minority, refers only to suits and applications and makes no mention of appeals.”

Further, the Court dissected the circumstances: the father, as natural guardian, had filed the original claim and later appeared as a respondent in the insurer’s appeal. Yet, he never filed a cross-appeal for enhancement.

The Court observed: “The father who is the natural guardian took a conscious decision not to file an appeal and was satisfied with the award.”

Dismissing claims of abandonment or guardianship lapses, the Court said: “The statements made… that the father had married again; the children were abandoned… are not substantiated… Even if substantiated, the exemption under Section 6… is confined to suits and applications for execution of a decree.”

The Apex Court underscored the principle: “The exemption by reason of a disability applies to the institution of an original proceeding or an application for execution of a final decree, which will not apply in the case of an appeal.”

Upholding the insurer's appeal, the Supreme Court concluded: “On the above reasoning, we set aside the judgment of the learned Single Judge finding the appeal filed to be grossly delayed and hence not maintainable. The appeal stands allowed.”

In its final remarks, the Court highlighted that delay cannot be excused by misplaced compassion, especially when the law draws clear distinctions between suits, applications, and appeals under the Limitation Act.

Date of Decision: 8 April 2025