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by sayum
06 June 2026 6:45 AM
"A constitutional court cannot be restrained from granting bail to an accused on account of restrictive statutory provisions in a penal statute if it finds that the right of the accused under-trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India has been infringed," Punjab and Haryana High Court, in a significant ruling, held that prolonged pre-trial incarceration without prima facie evidence constitutes a grave injustice, even in cases involving the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA).
A division bench comprising Justice Anoop Chitkara and Justice Sukhvinder Kaur observed that while the allegations of terror links are serious, the lack of physical recovery and reliance on co-accused statements warrant the grant of bail. The Court emphasized that statutory restrictions under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA do not override the fundamental right to liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution of India.
The appellant, Amarjeet Singh, was nominated as an accused in an FIR involving allegations of a criminal gang having links with Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) and Pakistan's ISI. The prosecution alleged a conspiracy to target high-profile individuals and procure weapons via drones. The appellant approached the High Court after his bail plea was dismissed by the Special UAPA Court (Additional Sessions Judge), SAS Nagar, in January 2026.
The primary question before the court was whether the bar on bail under Section 43D(5) of the UAPA applies when the evidence against the accused is limited to the statement of a co-accused. The court was also called upon to determine if a "massive" criminal history of eight prior FIRs is sufficient grounds to deny bail when the specific accusations in the present case lack a prima facie foundation.
Evidence Limited To Co-Accused Statements And No Recovery
The Court meticulously examined the evidence collected by the investigating agency against the appellant. It noted that the appellant's involvement was surfaced solely during the interrogation of a co-accused, Sehajpreet Singh. The bench highlighted that there was no recovery of any incriminating material, weapons, or contraband attributed directly to the appellant in the present FIR.
The Court observed that while the prosecution alleged a wider conspiracy involving cross-border smuggling and terrorist activities, the specific evidence linking this appellant to those acts remained thin. The bench noted that the standard for denying bail under UAPA is whether the accusations are "prima facie true," a standard that was not met by mere custodial statements of other accused persons without corroborative recovery.
"Undoubtedly, there are massive criminal antecedents of the applicant, but this Court has to analyze the evidence collected in the present case connecting him with the commission of the offense and the legal admissibility of such evidence."
Balancing Section 43D(5) UAPA With Article 21 Rights
The Bench referred to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence in Sheikh Javed Iqbal v. State of U.P. and Vernon v. State of Maharashtra. It reiterated that constitutional courts are not entirely fettered by the restrictive bail provisions of the UAPA. The Court emphasized that if an undertrial's right to a speedy trial and personal liberty is at stake, the statutory bar must yield to the constitutional mandate.
The Court noted that the appellant had been in pre-trial custody for a significant period. It reasoned that when the standard of "reasonable grounds for believing that the accusation is prima facie true" is not satisfied, the court must fall back on the traditional "tripod test" of bail, involving flight risk, witness tampering, and the risk of re-offending.
Court Explains Primacy Of Constitutional Liberty
The bench pointed out that even in serious crimes involving national security, the court must lean in favor of constitutionalism. It held that the "prima facie" standard under the UAPA is lighter than the satisfaction required for framing charges, but it still requires some material of substance beyond hearsay or uncorroborated statements.
The judges noted that continued incarceration without a clear evidentiary link would transform pre-trial detention into punitive detention. The Court held that the appellant had made out a case for bail, especially given his willingness to accept stringent conditions and his undertaking not to exceed the limits of speech permitted under Article 19.
"A constitutional court has to lean in favour of constitutionalism and the rule of law of which liberty is an intrinsic part... in the given facts of a particular case, a constitutional court may decline to grant bail, but it would be very wrong to say that under a particular statute, bail cannot be granted."
Imposition Of Stringent Conditions To Mitigate Risks
Acknowledging the appellant's criminal history, the Court did not grant a simple release but imposed a comprehensive list of "substantive safeguards." The Court adopted the rigorous conditions laid down by the Supreme Court in the Gulfisha Fatima case. These include restrictions on leaving the National Capital Territory/jurisdiction, surrendering passports, and appearing before the police twice a week.
Furthermore, to address the safety of the public, the Court directed the appellant to surrender all firearms and ammunition. The Court clarified that this restriction on the right to possess arms is a proactive measure to instill confidence in society and prevent any potential witness intimidation or repetition of offenses during the trial period.
"Restricting firearms would instill confidence in society; it would also restrain the accused from influencing the witnesses and repeating the offense."
Conditional Bail And Revocation Mechanism
The Court finalized the order by making the bail strictly conditional. It stated that if the appellant repeats any offense or commits a non-bailable offense punishable with more than three years of imprisonment, the State is at liberty to move for immediate revocation of the bail. This "foundational condition" was set to ensure that the appellant remains law-abiding.
The bench concluded that the stage of the trial and the nature of the specific evidence against the appellant in this FIR, when contrasted with the length of his pre-trial custody, necessitated his release. The impugned order of the Sessions Court was accordingly set aside.
The High Court allowed the appeal and granted regular bail to the appellant, emphasizing that even under stringent laws like the UAPA, the court must perform a balancing act between national security and individual liberty. The ruling underscores that a "massive" criminal record cannot substitute for specific prima facie evidence in a new case where the prosecution relies primarily on co-accused statements.
Date of Decision: 19 May 2026