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by Admin
05 December 2025 4:19 PM
"Section 28-A is a beneficent provision and must be construed liberally to extend benefits rather than restrict them": High Court of Judicature at Allahabad affirming that landowners who did not initially seek a reference under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, are nonetheless entitled to invoke Section 28-A for redetermination of compensation based on later awards made to similarly situated landowners under the same acquisition notification.
This judgment, addressing a batch of connected petitions, not only upheld the order of the Special Land Acquisition Officer (SLAO) dated 17.02.2022 enhancing compensation to ₹108 per square metre but also decisively rejected objections raised by the acquiring body — Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti (KUMS) — on grounds of limitation, maintainability, and financial burden.
"Limitation Runs From the Award Relied Upon, Not From Earlier or Set-Aside Awards": Court Applies Banwari Judgment to Hold Landowners' Claims Timely
The core issue before the Court was whether landowners who had not filed references under Section 18 could validly seek redetermination of compensation under Section 28-A based on a 2016 Reference Court award, and whether their applications made within three months thereof were within the statutory limitation period.
Reaffirming the recent Supreme Court ruling in Banwari & Ors. v. HSIIDC, 2025 AIR (SC) 165, the Allahabad High Court categorically held that the landowners' applications were well within the limitation prescribed under Section 28-A. Consequently, the Court upheld the SLAO's 2022 order awarding enhanced compensation and dismissed the challenge brought by the KUMS.
"The limitation for moving the application under Section 28-A will begin to run only from the date of the award on the basis of which redetermination of compensation is sought," the Court reiterated, quoting Banwari with approval.
A 47-Year Battle for Just Compensation
The dispute arose from acquisition proceedings initiated in 1977 for approximately 48 acres of land in Village Majhola, District Moradabad, for the construction of a market yard by the KUMS. Possession was taken in July 1977, and an award under Section 11 of the Act was passed on 09.08.1982, granting compensation at ₹15.75 per square yard.
Dissatisfied with the award, several landowners filed references under Section 18, some of which were initially rejected in 1989. However, upon review in 1990, compensation was enhanced to ₹64 per square metre. The KUMS appealed, and these awards were ultimately set aside by the High Court in the early 2000s, with directions for fresh adjudication.
In compliance, the Reference Court passed fresh awards in 2016 and 2017, enhancing compensation to ₹108 per square metre. These were upheld by the High Court and the Supreme Court, with the SLP filed by KUMS being dismissed on 26.10.2020.
Subsequently, on 26.04.2016, landowners who had not earlier sought a reference under Section 18 filed applications under Section 28-A, relying on the award dated 30.01.2016. These applications were allowed by the SLAO on 17.02.2022. When KUMS challenged the SLAO’s order in separate writ petitions, the matter ultimately reached the Division Bench after being remanded by the Supreme Court.
Can Non-Referring Landowners Claim Compensation Under Section 28-A Based on Later Awards?
The Court answered this in the affirmative, emphasizing that Section 28-A is beneficent and must be construed liberally.
“Section 28-A being a beneficent legislation must be construed liberally to advance its policy objective of extending benefits rather than adopting a restrictive interpretation,” the Court said, citing Union of India v. Pradeep Kumari, (1995) 2 SCC 736, and Banwari.
The Court rejected the contention that Section 28-A was inapplicable to those who had accepted compensation without protest. It reiterated the position laid down in Hansoli Devi v. Union of India, (2002) 7 SCC 273, that:
“Acceptance of compensation with or without protest does not disqualify a person from being considered ‘aggrieved’ under Section 28-A.”
Whether the Applications Were Time-Barred?
The Court held that the applications filed on 26.04.2016 were within three months of the Reference Court’s award dated 30.01.2016 and were, therefore, not barred by limitation.
It also ruled that the 1990 award could not be used to compute the limitation period as it had been set aside by the High Court and ceased to exist in law. The Court observed:
“An order that has been judicially annulled cannot serve as the foundation for computing limitation for subsequent proceedings.”
Quoting from Banwari, the Court noted that each valid award creates an independent cause of action for filing a Section 28-A application, and the provision permits filing based on any subsequent award granting higher compensation.
Whether the SLAO's Order Was Mechanical or Without Jurisdiction?
Rejecting the KUMS’ allegation that the SLAO acted mechanically, the Court upheld the reasoning and procedure adopted in the SLAO's decision. It noted that:
“The SLAO carefully considered the applications, issued notices to all concerned parties, heard their objections, and applied the correct legal principles.”
The Court affirmed that interest, solatium, and other statutory benefits were integral to the compensation package under the Land Acquisition Act, and the SLAO was well within his jurisdiction to grant them.
“Pradeep Kumari is the Binding Law; Ramsingbhai Is Per Incuriam”: Court Clarifies the Position on Conflicting Precedents
In a significant clarification, the Court echoed the Supreme Court's recent pronouncement that Ramsingbhai Jerambhai v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 16 SCC 445, was decided per incuriam, as it failed to consider the earlier authoritative decision in Pradeep Kumari.
“Pradeep Kumari, being earlier in point of time and having elaborately considered the relevant statutory provisions… would constitute the binding precedent,” the Court held.
Doctrine of Equal Treatment and Article 31 – The Constitutional Angle
The Court emphasized that landowners whose properties are acquired under the same notification must receive similar treatment in terms of compensation. Citing Narendra v. State of U.P., (2017) 9 SCC 426, the Court said:
“Failing to give similar compensation to similarly situated persons would amount to discrimination and violate the doctrine of equal treatment.”
It further invoked Article 31 of the Constitution, reiterating the acquiring body's constitutional obligation to pay just compensation, irrespective of its financial burden.
The Court issued the following directions:
The landowners' leading writ petition (WRIT-C No. 35876 of 2022) was allowed.
The connected writ petitions filed by the Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti (WRIT-C Nos. 36490/2022 to 36541/2022) were dismissed.
The Court directed the KUMS to deposit the enhanced compensation with statutory benefits (₹108/sq. mtr. with solatium and interest) within six weeks.
In the event of non-compliance, the amount shall carry 12% interest per annum from the date of default.
The Court declared that the landowners are entitled to all statutory benefits—30% solatium, 12% additional compensation, and interest as per law.
"Justice Delayed, But Not Denied": A Stern Reminder on Beneficial Legislation
Before concluding, the Division Bench expressed its dismay over the prolonged litigation that deprived the landowners of fair compensation for nearly five decades. It remarked:
“The compensation awarded is not a largesse but a legal entitlement that has been long overdue.”
The Court also urged authorities to implement the judgment “in letter and spirit, ensuring that the landowners receive their due compensation without further delay or harassment.”
Date of Decision: 23 September 2025
