Court Has Inherent Power to Revoke Pardon If Approver and Prosecution Mislead It: Calcutta High Court Upheld Revocation of Approver Status Without Section 308 CrPC Certificate

“If Pardon Is Procured Through Deceit, Court Can Undo It Without Prosecutor’s Nod”— In a significant ruling on 12th November 2025, the Calcutta High Court, through Justice Ajay Kumar Gupta, upheld the Trial Court's rare and assertive decision to revoke the pardon granted to accused Shyamal Dutta, who had turned approver in a major corruption and fraud case. The Court ruled that a Public Prosecutor’s certificate under Section 308 CrPC is not a necessary prerequisite when both the accused and the prosecution have misled the Court to obtain the pardon. The order also confirmed the summoning of co-accused Smt. Kaveri Dutta under Section 319 CrPC, observing that the trial court acted well within its powers.

The case arose out of a complex investigation by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) into fraudulent disbursal of housing loans, bribery of bank officials, and attempted diversion of public funds using a fraudulent Safe Keeping Receipt (SKR) for ₹100.86 crores, allegedly orchestrated by Shyamal Dutta, then Managing Director of M/s Anuskha Construction Pvt. Ltd., in collusion with United Bank of India officials.

“The Pardon Was Procured Through Fraud—It Is the Court’s Duty to Undo the Wrong”

The Court took the view that once it was established that the approver and the prosecution acted in concert to mislead the Trial Court, the procedural safeguards under Section 308 CrPC—which require a Public Prosecutor’s certificate for revocation—cannot shield a fraud on the judicial process.

Justice Ajay Kumar Gupta observed:

“There is no requirement to file certificate by the Public Prosecutor… as the facts and circumstances of this instant case are wholly different and the Trial Court forfeited the pardon granted to the accused, Shri Shyamal Dutta, on the ground that the accused, as well as the prosecution, misled and misrepresented before the Court.”

The Court underlined that judicial powers are not mechanical, and the Trial Court was justified in exercising its inherent powers to revoke the pardon:

“If the Court finds that the pardon was granted on false premises or was abused, it must act to uphold the sanctity of justice. To do otherwise would be to permit fraud upon the court itself.”

“CBI Misled the Trial Court Despite Having Documentary Evidence—Grant of Pardon Was a Misuse of Process”

The judgment delivered a stern rebuke to the CBI for its dubious conduct in facilitating pardon to Dutta despite having overwhelming evidence of his involvement. The High Court concurred with the Trial Court’s finding that the CBI submitted a misleading affidavit claiming that Dutta was “not the principal beneficiary,” even though it had seized bank records, car purchase documents, loan agreements, and correspondence that directly implicated him.

The Court noted with concern:

“The CBI, a premier investigating agency of this country, made misleading statements before the court of law… This Court does not find an object or purpose of allowing pardon to A-3. It is apparent from the record that the CBI misled the Trial Court… and aided him to become an approver.”

The case against Dutta, the Court found, was “wholly based on documentary evidence” including two housing loans in his and his wife’s name, illegal payments made to bank officers as bribes, and an international loan syndication agreement to leverage a fake SKR.

“The petitioner attempted to siphon off ₹100,86,50,000/- of public money… despite such incriminating materials, the CBI sought to offer pardon to the accused, contrary to its duty to prosecute.”

“Approver's Testimony Has No Bearing When Evidence Is Documentary—Expunging His Statement Does Not Weaken Prosecution Case”

The High Court rejected the contention raised by Dutta’s counsel, and surprisingly even supported by the CBI, that the revocation of pardon without following Section 308 CrPC would collapse the prosecution’s case. The Court held that the case was built on solid documentary evidence, and Dutta’s statement as PW-13 had little bearing on the merits.

The judgment emphasized:

“The Trial Court rightly observed that the present case rests substantially on documentary evidence, and that the oral evidence of the approver has little bearing on the proof of the offences alleged.”

“Therefore, by no stretch of imagination can it be said that the prosecution’s case depends solely on the testimony of the Petitioner as an approver.”

Accordingly, the Trial Court’s decision to expunge the statement of the approver was affirmed.

“Joint Account Holder, Co-Loanee, Signatory—Smt. Kaveri Dutta Cannot Claim Ignorance”

The Court also rejected the plea by Smt. Kaveri Dutta, wife of Shyamal Dutta, who challenged her summoning as an accused under Section 319 CrPC. She contended that she was merely a joint account holder and was unaware of any fraudulent transactions.

However, the High Court, relying on the depositions of prosecution witnesses and bank records, held:

“She was well aware of the transactions made from the joint account. The loan amounts were sanctioned in her name. Her role is not ancillary but central.”

The Court upheld the Trial Court’s finding that a prima facie case was made out, noting that she was a co-loanee, signatory to account withdrawals, and had been mentioned by PW-3, PW-4 and PW-12.

“The Trial Court has rightly passed an order for issuing summon upon her under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. Such order calls for no interference by this court.”

“Judicial Power Must Rise to Correct Abuse of Law—Section 308 CrPC Cannot Be a Cloak for Misconduct”

Addressing the legal issue head-on, the Court clarified that Section 308 CrPC, though mandatory in the ordinary course, cannot override the court’s inherent powers under exceptional circumstances.

The judgment explains:

“The legal position is that once an accomplice is granted pardon, he becomes a prosecution witness. But if the pardon is later withdrawn or forfeited due to misrepresentation, and the Court is satisfied that it was misused, the evidence of such approver must be ignored in toto.”

It noted that the Supreme Court's rulings in Abu Salem, Jagjit Singh, and A.J. Peiris all emphasized the need for fairness and truthfulness in accepting pardon, and nothing in those judgments prohibited the court from revoking pardon where fraud is evident, even in the absence of a formal certificate by the prosecutor.

The High Court thus distinguished the current case from prior rulings:

“This is not a case where the approver turned hostile after trial began. This is a case where the grant of pardon itself was improperly secured. That fundamental difference empowers the court to act.”

Upholding the Sanctity of Justice Over Procedural Formalities

Dismissing all three revision petitions—by Shyamal Dutta, Smt. Kaveri Dutta, and the CBI itself—Justice Ajay Kumar Gupta upheld the Trial Court’s decision to revoke the pardon, expunge the evidence of the approver, and summon a new accused under Section 319 CrPC.

The ruling affirms that fraudulent pardons cannot be shielded behind technicalities, and where prosecutorial misconduct compromises justice, the court must step in:

“This Court is fully satisfied that all three revisional applications are devoid of merit… There is no error, illegality, or perversity in the impugned order. It deserves no interference.”

The judgment sends a clear message to investigative agencies and accused alike: Courts will not be passive when the process of law is abused, and even procedural lapses can be set aside in the interest of justice.

Date of Decision: 12th November 2025