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by Admin
07 May 2024 2:49 AM
A Weak Chain of Circumstantial Evidence Cannot Sustain a Murder Conviction - Delhi High Court overturned the conviction and life sentence of Sushil Kumar alias Raju, who was accused of murdering his wife by setting her on fire. The Court ruled that “a conviction cannot be sustained on a weak chain of circumstantial evidence, especially when the prosecution fails to establish a direct link between the accused and the crime.”
The prosecution had relied primarily on the dying declaration of the victim, Anita Rani, recorded a day after the incident. However, the High Court found significant inconsistencies in the declaration, procedural lapses in its recording, and a complete lack of direct evidence. Citing established legal principles, the Court observed that “suspicion, no matter how strong, can never substitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.”
"Dying Declarations Must Inspire Confidence—This One Does Not"
The prosecution’s case hinged on a statement allegedly made by Anita Rani to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate (SDM) on July 6, 1998, in which she accused her husband of setting her ablaze. The High Court scrutinized the reliability of this declaration and found multiple red flags.
“Though a dying declaration is an important piece of evidence, it must be free from any suspicion of tutoring, coercion, or influence. In this case, the statement was recorded nearly 24 hours after the incident, and the circumstances surrounding its recording raise serious doubts about its voluntariness and truthfulness,” the Court observed.
It noted that Anita Rani did not make an immediate statement against her husband when she was first taken to the hospital, nor did she inform the neighbors who had extinguished the flames. The statement was recorded only after her parents reached the hospital, which, according to the Court, created a strong possibility of external influence.
"A Murder Conviction Requires a Complete Chain of Evidence—Not a Series of Loose Ends"
The Court reiterated that a conviction in a case based on circumstantial evidence must rest on an unbroken chain of events that leads only to the guilt of the accused, ruling out all other possibilities.
“When a case relies solely on circumstantial evidence, every link in the chain must be unshakable. If a single link is broken or an alternative hypothesis is plausible, the benefit of doubt must go to the accused,” the Court held, relying on Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab (2024) 3 SCC 164.
In this case, several crucial gaps in the prosecution’s story raised serious doubts about the accused’s involvement:
No witness saw the accused pouring kerosene or setting his wife on fire.
The prosecution claimed he fled through the back door, but site plans showed no rear exit.
Forensic evidence was inconclusive and did not directly link the accused to the act.
The Court ruled that these inconsistencies fatally weakened the prosecution’s case, making it impossible to hold the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
"Delayed Death Due to Septicaemia—Can It Still Be Murder?"
One of the most critical aspects of the case was the cause of death. The victim did not die immediately after the incident but succumbed to septicaemia nearly 49 days later, on August 24, 1998.
The post-mortem report established that Anita Rani suffered 35-40% burns, was initially treated and discharged in stable condition on July 9, 1998, and was only re-admitted on August 19, 1998 due to infection-related complications.
“The law is clear—when death is caused by a medical complication long after the injury, it cannot automatically be presumed that the original injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death,” the Court held, citing Sanjay v. State of U.P. (2016) 3 SCC 62.
The Court also relied on Prem Devi v. State (2017 SCC OnLine Del 8057), which held that if a victim recovers initially but later dies due to medical negligence or lack of care, the accused cannot be held liable for murder under Section 302 IPC.
"Defense Witnesses Discredit the Prosecution’s Version"
The Court placed significant reliance on the testimonies of defense witnesses, which contradicted the prosecution’s claims and pointed towards the possibility that the victim had set herself on fire.
The accused’s 7-year-old daughter testified that her mother poured kerosene on herself and asked her to call the neighbors.
Two neighbors who witnessed the incident stated that they saw the victim engulfed in flames but did not see the accused at the scene.
A vegetable vendor testified that the accused was at the market when the incident took place.
The Court noted, “The defense witnesses had no apparent reason to lie. Their testimonies create substantial doubt about the prosecution’s version of events.”
"A Flawed Investigation Cannot Form the Basis of a Conviction"
The High Court strongly criticized the police investigation, calling it "careless, incomplete, and riddled with inconsistencies."
“In a case of this nature, where the evidence is largely circumstantial, the investigating agency must ensure a meticulous and unbiased probe. Instead, the investigation in this case was conducted with alarming negligence,” the Court observed.
The police failed to:
• Examine crucial neighbors who could have provided independent accounts.
• Interview the victim’s minor children to corroborate or refute the dying declaration.
• Seize direct forensic evidence linking the accused to the crime.
• Explain why the alleged kerosene bottles—small lamps with wicks—could have been used to pour fuel.
The Court observed, “Such investigative lapses weaken the prosecution’s case to the extent that a conviction cannot be sustained.”
In light of the unreliable dying declaration, serious gaps in the circumstantial evidence, and the fact that the victim’s death resulted from delayed medical complications rather than an immediate fatal injury, the Court held that the conviction under Section 302 IPC could not stand.
“In cases where the prosecution’s evidence is riddled with inconsistencies and fails to conclusively establish guilt, the only legal course is to grant the benefit of doubt to the accused,” the Court ruled, acquitting the appellant and ordering his immediate release.
Date of Decision: 12 March 2025