Contract For Personal Services Between Doctor And Hospital Is Determinable And Not Specifically Enforceable: Calcutta High Court

"A contract of the nature pleaded by the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 is determinable by its very nature, thus coming within the ambit of Section 14(d) of the 1963 Act, which provides that such contracts are not specifically enforceable." Calcutta High Court, in a significant ruling dated 29 September 2026, held that a contract for professional medical services rendered by a doctor to a hospital is, by its very nature, determinable and cannot be enforced through an injunction.

A division bench of Justice Sabyasachi Bhattacharyya and Justice Sandip Kumar De observed that since such agreements are dependent on personal skills and involve continuous duties, they are hit by the bars contained under Section 14 and Section 41(e) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

The appeal arose from a suit filed by a neurosurgeon against a hospital, seeking specific performance of an alleged oral agreement of November 2005. The plaintiff challenged a termination notice dated May 18, 2026, and sought an injunction to prevent the hospital from acting upon a purported written agreement dated April 2, 2025. The trial court had initially granted an ex parte ad interim injunction, restraining the hospital from giving effect to the termination and directing that the doctor be permitted to continue his services.

The primary legal issue before the Court was whether a contract for professional medical services between a doctor and a hospital is specifically enforceable, and whether the trial court was justified in granting an ad interim injunction against the termination of such a contract.

Court Explains Statutory Bar Under Specific Relief Act

The Court held that the relief sought in the suit is ex facie barred by Section 41(e), read with clauses (b), (c), and (d) of Section 14 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. The Bench noted that a contract for rendering professional services is inherently transient and cannot be perpetuated for an indefinite period. Because the services are dependent on the personal skills of the professional and the preferences of the institution, they fall under the category of contracts which are not specifically enforceable.

"The law does not contemplate, even in respect of employment agreements, that such contracts can be in perpetuity."

The Court further emphasized that the nature of the service requires continuous supervision, which the Court cannot perform. Additionally, the Court observed that the doctor, being an independent professional, was not an integral part of the hospital administration, and the institution must retain the discretion to decide which professionals it continues to engage for patient care.

Plaintiff's Conduct And Lack Of Equity

Regarding the plaintiff's challenge to the termination notice, the Court highlighted that the doctor had, in a prior e-mail, acknowledged the receipt of the termination notice and requested three months to transition his patients. The Court remarked that the plaintiff's conduct contradicted his current stance.

"By his very conduct, the plaintiff/respondent no. 1 acceded to the termination letter and sought a further period of three months, in consonance with the period stipulated in the pre-closure/termination communication, conceding in principle to the fact that the contract was terminable in nature."

The Bench observed that as a court of equity, it must look at whether the plaintiff approached the court with clean hands. Having accepted the termination in principle and sought a reasonable notice period, the plaintiff could not later claim the termination was invalid. Furthermore, the Court noted that a three-month notice period for a senior surgeon to shift his practice was prima facie reasonable.

Scope Of Appeal In Ex Parte Injunctions

On the procedural aspect, the Court addressed the limitation of appellate interference. It reaffirmed the principle that an appellate court should generally restrict itself to the pleadings and materials that were available before the trial court at the time the impugned order was passed. It declined to consider new documents presented by the appellant, noting that such evidence should be brought before the trial court under Order XXXIX Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Ultimately, the Court allowed the appeal and set aside the injunction order, noting that the trial court failed to consider the maintainability of the suit before granting the interim relief. The Bench clarified that while its findings were tentative, the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case for an injunction, and the balance of convenience clearly favored the hospital, as the hospital must be free to manage its medical staff to ensure proper patient care. The parties were directed to proceed with the trial court proceedings, with the hospital instructed to file its written objections by October 15, 2026.

Date of Decision: 29 September 2026