Continuous Readiness and Willingness Must Be Strictly Proved in Specific Performance Suits: Punjab and Haryana High Court

"Plaintiff’s Bare Assertion Without Evidence Cannot Substitute Mandatory Compliance Under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act" - Punjab and Haryana High Court at Chandigarh, in the case of Veena Rani vs. Suraj Bansal, reaffirmed a vital principle of specific performance law by declaring that the plaintiff must prove continuous readiness and willingness to perform the contract throughout. Justice Pankaj Jain, restoring the Trial Court's dismissal of specific performance, observed that mere affidavits and delayed notices could not cure the substantive deficiency in plaintiff’s evidence.

The dispute arose from an agreement to sell dated 03.02.2006, wherein the plaintiff agreed to purchase a residential house for ₹30 lakh. Only ₹7 lakh was paid initially. The plaintiff claimed she was ready and present before the Sub-Registrar on the due date of 03.05.2006 but failed to produce credible proof apart from an affidavit. The defendant, on the other hand, contended that she too was present and willing, but the plaintiff defaulted, causing her hardship and compelling her to seek an alternate property purchase.

Justice Pankaj Jain emphasized the rigour demanded under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963. Referring to established law, the Court stated, "Readiness and willingness are not empty or formal words; they require substantive proof on record." Citing J.P. Builders v. A. Ramadas Rao and Saradamani Kandappan v. S. Rajalakshmi, the Court warned against casually granting specific performance without strict adherence to equity principles.

The Court pointedly noted, "The plaintiff was at least required to prove on record that she had the financial capacity to pay the balance amount of more than ₹23 lakh on the due date. No such evidence is forthcoming except self-serving assertions."

Rejecting the Lower Appellate Court’s decree in favor of the plaintiff, Justice Jain observed, "The Lower Appellate Court completely lost sight of the cardinal principle that it is the plaintiff who has to discharge the onus to prove continuous readiness and willingness, not the defendant." It was further observed that "the plaintiff’s issuance of legal notice after a delay of more than two years destroys any claim of genuine willingness."

Regarding the question whether time was the essence of the contract, the Court cited rising property prices and the small advance paid to hold that "where the buyer has paid only a fraction of the sale price and there is no delivery of possession, time must be deemed the essence in today’s commercial realities."

Concluding that the plaintiff had failed to discharge her burden and that the grant of specific performance would cause undue hardship to the defendant, the Court set aside the Appellate Court’s decree and restored the Trial Court’s verdict granting only return of earnest money with interest.

The judgment thus sends a strong message that suits for specific performance demand strict and continuous compliance with statutory requirements, and that delay, indolence, or strategic silence by plaintiffs will not be condoned.

Date of Decision: 8 April 2025