Conspirator Liable For All 'Reasonably Foreseeable' Crimes Committed By Others In Furtherance Of Conspiracy: Supreme Court

"One who enters into a conspiratorial relationship is liable for every reasonable foreseeable crime committed by every other member of the conspiracy in furtherance of its objectives, whether or not he knew of the crimes or aided in their commission," Supreme Court, in a significant judgment has affirmed that a member of a criminal conspiracy is legally responsible for all "reasonably foreseeable" crimes committed by co-conspirators in pursuit of their common goal.

A bench of Justice Manoj Misra and Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha observed that when a group conspires to seize property by force, the resulting murder of the victims is a foreseeable event, rendering all participants liable even if they did not personally strike the fatal blow.

The case pertains to a 1984 incident where five individuals conspired to steal a truck by hiring it under false pretences. During the execution of the plan, the driver and the cleaner were murdered at separate locations. The appellant, Gopi Chand, was part of the group and maintained vigil at one of the trucks while his associates killed the victims. He was convicted under Sections 302, 396, 201, and 120-B of the IPC based primarily on the testimony of an accomplice who turned approver.

The primary questions before the court were whether the testimony of an approver could form the sole basis of conviction without material corroboration and whether a conspirator can be held liable for murder under Section 120-B IPC if they did not directly participate in the killing. The court also considered whether the appellant's sentence could be commuted to the period already undergone.

The Court first addressed the reliability of the approver, PW-1, examining the interplay between Section 133 and Section 114, Illustration (b) of the Evidence Act. It noted that while Section 133 makes an accomplice a competent witness, the rule of prudence dictates that it is unsafe to convict based on uncorroborated testimony.

Corroboration Of Approver Testimony A Rule Of Prudence, Not Absolute Law

The bench explained that the requirement for corroboration is not a mandated rule of law but a necessary caution. It held that the court may convict an accused on the uncorroborated testimony of an approver provided it records reasons for its satisfaction that the testimony is safe to rely upon.

The Court highlighted that corroboration need not be independent confirmation of every material circumstance. It is sufficient if there is additional evidence that renders the accomplice's story probable and connects the accused to the crime.

"The evidence of an accomplice must point to the involvement of a particular accused. It would, no doubt, be sufficient, if his testimony in conjunction with other relevant evidence unmistakably makes out the case for convicting an accused."

Approver's Testimony Not Discarded Merely For Being Self-Exculpatory

The appellant argued that PW-1’s testimony was self-exculpatory and thus unreliable. Rejecting this, the Court noted that PW-1 admitted to holding the legs of a victim to facilitate the crime. The bench held that as long as the statement is not entirely exculpatory and shows participation in the events leading to the murder, it remains valid evidence.

The Court observed that an approver cannot be discarded merely because they claim to have acted under the persuasion or threat of others, provided their participation in the crime is established.

Doctrine Of Reasonable Foreseeability In Criminal Conspiracy

Turning to the liability for murder under Section 120-B IPC, the Court delved into the essence of criminal conspiracy. It noted that once a meeting of minds is established for an illegal act, each member becomes an agent for the others.

"Thus, one who enters into a conspiratorial relationship is liable for every reasonable foreseeable crime committed by every other member of the conspiracy in furtherance of its objectives, whether or not he knew of the crimes or aided in their commission."

Murder Is A Foreseeable Event When Property Is Seized By Force

The bench dismissed the appellant’s contention that he was only aware of the plan to steal the truck and not the plan to kill. It held that when property is taken not clandestinely (as in theft) but by force, the use of violence and resulting death is a foregone conclusion.

The Court found that the planned manner in which the driver and cleaner were separated and killed left no doubt that the appellant was in cahoots with the others. It affirmed that causing injury or murder is a foreseeable event when partners in crime join hands to take possession of property by force.

Sentencing And Commutation To Period Undergone

While upholding the conviction, the Court considered the "fervent appeal" for a reduction in sentence. It noted that the appellant had served over 18 years of his life sentence and that the incident dated back to 1984.

Court Modifies Life Imprisonment To Period Already Undergone

Citing Munna Moyuddin Shaikh v. State of Gujarat and Union of India v. V. Sriharan, the Court held that it is permissible to modify a life sentence to a fixed term already undergone, provided the period served exceeds 14 years.

The bench took into account that co-convicts had already received remissions from the State. Consequently, while maintaining the conviction, the Supreme Court modified the sentence to the period already served and ordered the appellant’s immediate release.

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Gopi Chand for criminal conspiracy to commit murder, emphasizing that a conspirator’s liability extends to all foreseeable consequences of the common design. However, given the 18 years of incarceration already served, the Court partly allowed the appeals by limiting the sentence to the period undergone.

Date of Decision: May 29, 2026