Allahabad HC Converts Murder Conviction To Culpable Homicide For Man Who Threw Children Into Well, Says Act Was Done Without Premeditated Intent

"In these circumstances, though it may be said that he had thrown the children in the Well with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without intention to kill, therefore, it cannot be said to be a per-medidated murder," Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court, in a significant ruling, modified the conviction of a man from Section 302 (Murder) to Section 304 Part II (Culpable Homicide not amounting to murder) of the IPC.

A division bench comprising Justice Rajnish Kumar and Justice Zafeer Ahmad observed that while the accused acted with the knowledge that throwing children into a well would likely cause death, the prosecution failed to establish a premeditated intention to kill. The court noted that the incident occurred in the heat of passion following the frustration of the accused's "bad intentions" toward the children's mother.

The case arose from an incident in April 2015 when the appellant, Jag Prasad Yadav alias Jaggu, entered the house of the complainant’s niece (PW-2) while she was sleeping with her two children under a thatched shed. After PW-2 resisted his advances, the appellant kicked her and subsequently threw her three-and-a-half-year-old son and one-year-old daughter into a nearby well. While the daughter survived with eye injuries, the son was declared dead upon being rescued, leading to the appellant's conviction for murder and life imprisonment by a Special Court in Faizabad.

The primary question before the court was whether the act of throwing children into a well, in the absence of a proven motive to kill them, attracted the rigours of Section 302 IPC or fell under the exceptions of Section 300 IPC. The court was also called upon to determine if the knowledge of the consequences of an act could be equated with the specific intention to commit murder under the facts and circumstances of the case.

Court Affirms Credibility of Injured Mother’s Testimony

The court began by examining the evidence of the mother (PW-2), who was both an eye-witness and an injured witness. The bench noted that her testimony was consistent and convincing, particularly regarding how the appellant assaulted her before taking the children. The court emphasized that a related witness, especially a mother who has lost her child, would not typically implicate an innocent person while allowing the real culprit to go free.

Natures of Injuries Corroborated by Medical Evidence

The bench observed that the medical reports of the injured mother showed contusions on her leg, which directly corroborated her statement that the appellant had kicked her. Furthermore, the post-mortem report of the deceased child showed approximately 50 ml of blackish liquid in the stomach, which the court held was consistent with death by drowning in a well.

"The prompt lodging of the F.I.R. guarantees the truthfulness of the prosecution version, as chances of consultation, concoction and embellishments are very remote or less."

Absence of Premeditated Motive to Kill Children

A critical aspect of the court's reasoning focused on the motive behind the crime. The bench found that the appellant did not go to the house with the intent to kill the infants but rather with "bad intentions" toward PW-2. The court reasoned that the act of throwing the children was a spontaneous reaction to the frustration of those intentions rather than a planned murder.

Distinction Between Knowledge and Specific Intent

The court delved into the nuances of Sections 299 and 300 of the IPC, citing the landmark precedent of Virsa Singh vs. State of Punjab. The bench explained that for a conviction under Section 300 (Thirdly), the prosecution must prove a specific intention to inflict a particular bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. In this case, the court found that while the appellant had the "knowledge" that his act was imminently dangerous, the "subjective intention" to kill was missing.

"If the motive and intention to kill is not proved then it is required to be considered as to whether the offence would fall under the category of murder or not, if not, then it may be a case of culpable homicide not amounting to murder."

Application of Section 304 Part II IPC

The bench observed that the appellant acted in a "heat of passion" following the confrontation with the mother. It held that the act, though horrific, lacked the premeditation required for a murder conviction. Consequently, the court determined that the offense properly fell under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which deals with acts done with knowledge but without the specific intention to cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death.

Conviction for Attempted Murder and Hurt Upheld

While modifying the murder charge, the High Court maintained the trial court's conviction of the appellant under Section 307 IPC (Attempt to murder) for throwing the one-year-old daughter into the well and Section 323 IPC (Voluntary causing hurt) for the assault on the mother. The bench noted that the daughter suffered permanent damage to her eye due to the fall, justifying the conviction under these sections.

The High Court modified the life imprisonment sentence to 10 years of rigorous imprisonment under Section 304 Part II IPC. It also imposed a fine of Rs. 50,000, directing that the amount be disbursed to the mother (PW-2) upon deposit. Since the appellant had been in jail since April 2015, the court noted he had likely completed his term and ordered his release subject to the payment of the fine and requirements of Section 437-A CrPC.

The High Court concluded that the lack of prior enmity and the spontaneous nature of the act necessitated the conversion of the charge from murder to culpable homicide. The ruling reaffirms the judicial principle that "knowledge" of a likely fatal outcome, when divorced from "premeditated intent" in a sudden heat of passion, attracts a lesser penalty than murder under the Indian Penal Code.

Date of Decision: 27 May 2026