Maintenance for Children Restored from Date of Petition, Residence Order Limited to Pre-Divorce Period: Kerala High Court

Maintenance for children must date back to the application date to ensure financial sustenance, and residence orders under the Domestic Violence Act post-divorce cannot be sustained. Kerala High Court delivered a split ruling addressing maintenance for children, residence orders for a divorced woman, and the scope of judicial intervention in domestic violence cases. Justice K. Babu restored the maintenance for minor children from the date of the application and limited the residence order under Section 19 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, to the period before the dissolution of the marriage.
The rulings address the intersection of domestic violence law, post-divorce rights, and the legal framework for revisional jurisdiction.
“Maintenance Must Date Back to the Application Date”
The Court held that maintenance for children under Section 20(1)(d) of the Domestic Violence Act (DV Act) must be awarded from the date of the application and not the date of the order. It cited Rajnesh v. Neha [(2021) 2 SCC 324], which emphasized uniformity in maintenance awards to support financial sustenance during proceedings.
"The right to claim maintenance must date back to the date of filing the application, as the delay in proceedings is not within the control of the applicant." 
The Sessions Court order, which restricted maintenance from the date of the order, was set aside, and the Trial Court’s order directing maintenance from 18.12.2008 was restored.
“Post-Divorce Residence Orders Cannot Be Sustained”
The Court ruled that a divorced woman cannot claim residence rights under Section 19 of the DV Act unless she resides in a shared household. Post-divorce, the marital relationship ceases, and the legal basis for residence orders under the DV Act is lost. The Court relied on Ramachandra Warrior v. Jayasree [(2021) 2 KHC 504], which clarified the rights of divorced women under the DV Act.
"A divorced wife would not be entitled to the right of residence under Section 17 of the DV Act unless she resides in a shared household. Relief under Section 19 is not available post-divorce if the woman is not in the shared household." 
The residence order directing the husband to provide alternate accommodation was quashed from 08.04.2014, the date of divorce.
The petitioner-wife filed a case under the DV Act seeking a protection order, residence order, and maintenance for herself and her children. She alleged physical, verbal, emotional, and economic abuse by her husband and in-laws, including demands for dowry and harassment during her pregnancy.

The Trial Court partially allowed her petition, granting:
A protection order under Section 18.
A residence order under Section 19, directing the husband to provide alternate accommodation or pay Rs. 5,000/month as rent.
Maintenance of Rs. 2,500/month per child from the date of the application.
On appeal, the Sessions Court modified the order, restricting maintenance and rent from the date of its judgment, leading to the present revision petitions.
The Court emphasized that maintenance serves to ensure financial security and sustenance for dependents. It relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Rajnesh v. Neha, which mandates that maintenance be awarded from the date of application to prevent undue financial hardship during prolonged litigation. Accordingly, the Sessions Court’s restriction on maintenance was set aside.
The Court addressed the evolving nature of the marital relationship and the impact of divorce on residence rights. It held that once the marriage is dissolved, a woman ceases to have a domestic relationship with her former husband and cannot claim residence benefits under Section 19 of the DV Act unless she continues to reside in the shared household.
The Court applied the principles from Ramachandra Warrior v. Jayasree, which clarified that:
Residence rights under the DV Act are available only if the woman resides in the shared household.
A divorced woman cannot claim possession or residence in a household she vacated long ago.
The Court also observed that subsequent developments, like the divorce, can be considered in revisional jurisdiction to avoid redundant orders, citing Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. Motor and General Traders [(1975) 1 SCC 770].
The Court clarified that while protection orders (Section 18) may be issued on a prima facie basis, residence orders (Section 19) require satisfaction that domestic violence occurred. The standard of proof, however, remains preponderance of probabilities, and evidence need not meet the strict requirements of proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court upheld the findings of both the Trial Court and Sessions Court that the husband committed domestic violence based on the credible testimony of the petitioner and documentary evidence.
The Court reiterated the limited scope of revisional powers under Sections 397 to 401 CrPC, emphasizing that interference is warranted only in cases of jurisdictional errors, perverse findings, or glaring irregularities. It refused to disturb the lower courts’ findings, except to modify the residence order post-divorce.
Crl. R.P. No. 1577/2013 (By Wife): Allowed in part. Maintenance for minor children restored from the date of the application (18.12.2008) as per the Trial Court’s order.
Crl. R.P. No. 1173/2013 (By Husband): Allowed in part. The residence order under Section 19 of the DV Act was quashed from 08.04.2014, the date of divorce.
The Court upheld the protection order under Section 18 and clarified that procedural fairness and evidence were duly considered by the lower courts.
This judgment reinforces key principles under the DV Act:
Maintenance for children should begin from the date of the application to ensure financial security during litigation.
Residence orders post-divorce must align with the legal framework, ensuring they are not extended beyond the period of a valid domestic relationship.
The limited scope of revisional jurisdiction ensures that lower court findings are not disturbed without compelling reasons, promoting judicial efficiency.
 

Decision Date: January 13, 2025