Facts:

The appellant, director of a company, issued post-dated cheques for loan repayment, described as "security" in the loan agreement. The cheques were dishonored, leading to complaints by the respondent.

Issues:

Whether dishonor of post-dated cheques, given as "security" for loan repayment, falls under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Held:

The Court held that the dishonor of post-dated cheques, given as security for loan repayment, falls under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The Court emphasized that the nature of the transaction determines whether the cheque represents discharge of an existing enforceable debt or liability. In this case, the loan was disbursed before the date of the cheques, and the installments had fallen due as per the agreement, establishing an existing liability. The appellant failed to rebut the presumption of a legally enforceable debt. The Court distinguished this case from previous judgments where cheques were issued towards advance payment and not for the discharge of an existing liability. The appeal was dismissed, and the appellant was given liberty to contest the matter in the trial court.

Facts:

Defendants 1 to 6 entered into a sale agreement with the plaintiff, concealing the property's mortgage and another heir's rights.

Plaintiff filed a suit for specific performance, while the sister and her husband filed a separate suit for declaration and injunction.

Plaintiff redeemed the mortgage to avert a distress sale.

During inventory proceedings, the sister and her husband obtained the suit property without disclosing the pending suit .

Issues:

Whether the defendants acted in good faith and complied with the terms of the sale agreement.

Whether the plaintiff's rights were infringed upon due to the defendants' actions.

Held:

The Court found that Defendants 1 to 6 had made deliberate misrepresentations and failed to complete the sale despite clear title.

Defendants 7 and 8 neglected their obligations and did not exercise their rights to preempt the sale.

The defendants failed to disclose the pending litigation during inventory proceedings.

The Court concluded that specific performance was warranted in this case, given the unique nature of the property and the plaintiff's willingness to fulfill its obligations.

Monetary compensation was deemed inadequate.

The Court upheld the decree in favor of the plaintiff to the extent of the share of Defendant Nos. 1 to 6.

Decision: The Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the decree in favor of the plaintiff. No substantial injustice was found to have been caused to the defendants, particularly Defendant No. 9, who knowingly purchased the disputed property.

Facts:

The case involves an appeal by J.K. Lakshmi Cement Ltd. against the Commercial Tax Officer, Pali, concerning the interpretation of various notifications and circulars under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

Issues:

The eligibility of the appellant for simultaneous exemption or benefits under multiple notifications, particularly those dated May 6, 1986, March 7, 1994, January 21, 2000, and April 16, 2001.

Held:

The court ruled that the language of the notification dated January 21, 2000, was clear and unambiguous. According to clause 3 of this notification, a dealer cannot claim benefits under both the January 21, 2000, notification and the May 6, 1986, notification simultaneously.

The circular dated April 16, 2001, withdrew the earlier circular dated April 15, 1994. Therefore, the appellant could not claim benefits based on the withdrawn circular for the period after April 16, 2001.

The doctrine of contemporanea exposition, which suggests interpreting laws in the context of the time they were enacted, was considered inapplicable in this case because the language of the relevant notification was clear and unambiguous.

Decision: The court dismissed the appeals, affirming that the appellant could not claim simultaneous benefits under both the May 6, 1986, notification and the January 21, 2000, notification. Additionally, the withdrawal of the circular dated April 15, 1994, meant that the appellant could not claim benefits based on it.

Facts:

Shasun Chemicals and Drugs Ltd., the appellant, engaged in the business of manufacture and sale of bulk drugs and intermediates, incurred expenses related to a public issue of shares to raise funds for expansion.

The expenses were claimed to be amortized under Section 35D of the Income Tax Act.

The appellant also claimed a deduction for payment of bonus to its employees under Section 36 of the Income Tax Act.

Issues:

Whether expenditure incurred on the issue of shares is eligible to be amortized under Section 35D of the Act?

Whether deduction on account of payment of bonus to the employees of the appellant is not eligible under Section 36 of the Act, as it is hit by Section 40A(9) of the Act?

Held:Amortization of Expenditure under Section 35D: The Supreme Court held that once the claim was allowed for the first two assessment years, it should continue for the entire block period of ten years, as per Section 35D. The High Court was deemed to be wrong in disallowing the claim, considering the provisions of Section 35D. (Para. 13, 14)

Deduction for Payment of Bonus to Employees: The Supreme Court disagreed with the disallowance of the deduction for bonus payment under Section 36, stating that Section 40A(9) did not apply as the payment of bonus was not covered under the clauses mentioned in Section 36(1) of the Act. Additionally, the Court noted that Section 43B, which mandates deductions only on actual payment, did not apply to bonus payments. Therefore, the High Court's decision to disallow the deduction for bonus payment was overturned. (Para. 17, 18)

Facts:

The respondent, an employee of a Public Sector Bank, was accused of embezzlement dating back to May 2006. A criminal complaint was filed in 2006, followed by a charge-sheet in 2007. However, the criminal trial faced significant delays, with minimal progress made over the years.

Issues:

Whether the pendency of a criminal trial for an extended period justified the indefinite suspension of disciplinary proceedings against the respondent.

Held:

The court established that there exists no fixed formula for conducting disciplinary proceedings and criminal trials simultaneously. Each case must be evaluated individually based on its specific circumstances.

Despite the lengthy pendency of the criminal trial, the court emphasized that it couldn't be the sole reason to indefinitely suspend disciplinary proceedings against the respondent.

The court examined Clause 4 of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 10th April 2002. It concluded that this clause doesn't preclude the continuation of disciplinary proceedings, particularly when the criminal trial has been unduly prolonged.

Notably, the first part of Clause 4 was deemed applicable in the present case, indicating that the respondent had been put on trial after one year from the commission of the offense.

In light of the prolonged delay in the disciplinary proceedings, the court directed that the criminal case against the respondent be concluded expeditiously, setting a deadline of one year from the date of the court's order. If the trial isn't completed within this timeframe, the disciplinary proceedings would immediately resume afterward.

Decision: The court partly allowed the appeal, emphasizing the need for a balanced approach that considers the interests of justice and the specific circumstances of the case.

Facts:

The appellant, Tattu Lodhi @ Pancham Lodhi, was charged with offenses under various sections of the Indian Penal Code, including murder, kidnapping, attempted rape, and destruction of evidence. He was tried by the Twelfth Additional Sessions Judge, Jabalpur, and convicted. The High Court of Madhya Pradesh affirmed the conviction and upheld the death sentence awarded by the trial court.

Issues:

Whether the chain of circumstantial evidence was sufficient to prove the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Whether the death penalty was warranted in this case.

Whether the sentence of imprisonment for life with a specified term could be imposed.

Held:

The Supreme Court confirmed the appellant's conviction based on the evidence presented during the trial, which included circumstantial evidence establishing his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (Para. 3).

However, the Court expressed disapproval of the trial court's failure to convict the appellant for rape despite findings in the post-mortem report indicating sexual assault (Para. 4).

Regarding the imposition of the death penalty, the Court determined that the case did not meet the threshold of being the "rarest of rare" to warrant such a sentence (Para. 9).

Instead, the Court adopted a judicial innovation discussed in previous judgments, allowing for life imprisonment with a specified term. The appellant was sentenced to life imprisonment with a direction that he should not be released until he completes an actual period of 25 years of imprisonment (Para. 10).

Facts:

The case involved a dispute over the eligibility of a joint venture to bid for a contract related to the Nagpur Metro Rail Project.

Issues:

Whether the joint venture met the eligibility criteria specified in the tender conditions, particularly regarding experience in metro civil construction work and completion of a viaduct of at least 5 km in length.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the joint venture did not meet the eligibility criteria as it lacked experience in metro civil construction work, despite its completion of a viaduct for an intercity high-speed railway project. The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to tender conditions and deferred to the interpretation of the documents by the project owner. It also highlighted the limited grounds for interference with administrative decisions by constitutional courts. The Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the High Court's judgment and reinstating the project owner's decision to disqualify the joint venture from the tender process.

Facts:

The appellant was convicted under various sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) including murder and rape for assaulting a woman in a train compartment.

Witnesses reported hearing the victim's cries for help but were dissuaded from taking action by a middle-aged man who claimed the victim had jumped from the train.

The victim sustained severe injuries, ultimately leading to her death in the hospital.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's actions constituted murder, rape, and theft as charged by the prosecution.

Held:

The court overturned the conviction under Section 302 IPC (murder) due to insufficient evidence linking the appellant to the victim's fatal injuries.

The appellant was instead convicted under Section 325 IPC (causing grievous hurt) for the injuries inflicted during the assault.

The appellant's sentence was reduced to seven years of rigorous imprisonment, to be served concurrently with the sentences for other offenses.

The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The respondent cooperative society engaged an agency to acquire lands from the State Government for house site formation. The agency acted as a middleman between the State Government and the cooperative society. Meanwhile, some landowners challenged the acquisition through writ petitions, and during the proceedings, lands were transferred by the landowners to others. Additionally, the middleman executed sale deeds for the lands in favor of his relatives shortly after a judgment favoring the landowners.

Issues:

Whether the acquisition proceedings were conducted for a public purpose.

Whether the scheme was formulated and approved as required by law.

Whether the transfers of land were fraudulent.

Whether the State Government exercised its power lawfully.

Held:

The acquisition proceedings lacked public purpose as defined under the Land Acquisition Act, especially since no scheme was formulated and approved before initiation. Hiring middlemen for such acquisitions was against public policy. (Para 29, 33, 34, 37)

The absence of a scheme formulated and approved by the State Government rendered the acquisition illegal. The notifications issued were quashed due to legal maladies and malice. (Para 29, 33, 34, 37)

The transfers of land were deemed fraudulent, as they occurred during the pendency of writ petitions and were executed by the middleman for his relatives. These transactions were declared void ab initio. (Para 43, 44)

The State Government's actions in acquiring lands at the behest of a middleman, without proper consideration of objections and legal requirements, constituted a malafide exercise of power. This was a serious violation of the law and principles laid down by the Supreme Court. (Para 36)