Facts:

Jagdev Singh, the respondent, was appointed as a Civil Judge and later promoted to Additional Civil Judge.

A pay scale revision was implemented under the Haryana Civil Service (Judicial Branch) and Haryana Superior Judicial Service Revised Pay Rules 2001, requiring officers to submit an undertaking for the refund of any excess payment.

The respondent was placed under suspension in 2002 and compulsorily retired in 2003.

Pay scales were revised again in 2003, leading to the identification of an excess payment made to the respondent.

A recovery notice was served in 2004, prompting the respondent to challenge the action in writ proceedings under Article 226.

Issues:

Whether excess payments made to the respondent, prior to his retirement, could be recovered without evidence of fraud or misrepresentation.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the respondent, by furnishing an undertaking at the time of opting for the revised pay scale, was bound to refund any excess payment. The recovery action was deemed permissible. The Court referenced the precedent (State of Punjab & Ors v. Rafiq Masih) and outlined situations where recovery by the employer is impermissible, but clarified that those situations did not apply to the present case. The judgment of the High Court, setting aside the action for recovery, was deemed unsustainable. The Court directed that the recovery be made in reasonable monthly instalments over a period of two years.

Facts:

FIR registered in 2012 against the appellants for alleged offenses related to demanding money to refrain from telecasting programs.

Appellants arrested on 27 November 2012.

Investigating officer sought consent for obtaining voice samples for comparison with a recorded conversation from a sting operation.

Appellants consented but objected to reading inculpatory material during the voice sample collection.

ACMM issued a direction for a fair process in preparing a text with sentences from the questioned text for voice sample identification.

Issues:

Fairness of the process for drawing voice samples.

Appellants' objection to reading inculpatory material during the collection.

Held:

The Supreme Court, considering the right of the appellants under Article 21 of the Constitution, emphasized the need for a fair and reasonable process in drawing voice samples. The Court directed the investigating officer to file transcripts of the disputed conversations and a proposed passage of a written text for voice sample collection in sealed covers. After verifying the contents of the sealed covers, the Court concluded that the Investigating officer had complied with the directions. The High Court's order was modified and substituted with these directions.

Facts:

ACC Ltd. entered into an agreement with Cochin Cement Limited for the supply of cement clinker.

Dispute arose regarding the classification of the sale under Section 5(2) of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963.

ACC Ltd. claimed that Cochin Cement Limited should be treated as a brand name holder, and its sale should be considered the first sale.

Assessing Officer disagreed, asserting that Cochin Cement Limited was merely a manufacturer and the sale should be treated as the second sale by ACC Ltd.

The agreement's clauses related to supply rate, quality assurance, marketing, and the use of the brand name "ACC" were examined.

Issues:

Whether Cochin Cement Limited qualifies as a brand name holder or trademark holder under Section 5(2) of the Act.

Held:

The Court rejected ACC Ltd.'s claim that Cochin Cement Limited was a brand name holder based on the terms of the agreement. It emphasized the legislative intent in Section 5(2) to treat the sale by the brand name holder or trademark holder as the first sale. The Court held that the impugned transaction falls under Section 5(2) of the Act, treating ACC Ltd.'s second sale as the first sale for tax purposes. The appeals were dismissed as devoid of merit.

Facts:

The appellant filed 21 complaints seeking compensation for the alleged shortage of AAAC wire.

The insurance company appointed a surveyor, and later an investigator, without valid reasons.

The insurance claim was repudiated based on the investigation report.

The District Forum and State Commission had differing views on the case.

Issues:

Non-joinder of necessary parties

Allegation of theft not proved

Whether the delay in reporting the loss affected the claim

Interpretation of the insurance policy's duration clause (Clause 5)

Conduct of the insurer and waiver of rights

Held:

The National Commission initially allowed the appeals but later reversed the decision based on the delay in reporting the loss.

The Supreme Court held that the insurer had waived the right to rely on the duration clause due to its actions, including appointing a surveyor.

The letter of repudiation did not mention the delay or the duration clause, and therefore, the insurer could not rely on it later.

The State Commission's findings regarding the loss were acknowledged and supported.

The appeals were allowed, and the judgment of the National Commission was set aside.

The insurance company was directed to pay the balance amount along with interest within four months.

Facts:

The respondent filed OS No.1712 of 2007 for recovery of possession and damages.

The appellant repeatedly sought adjournments through interlocutory applications, causing substantial delays in the proceedings.

The trial court, despite granting adjournments, observed the defendant's persistent efforts to protract the litigation.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's actions constituted an abuse of the court's process.

Whether the repeated requests for adjournments were justified under the provisions of Order 18 Rule 17 of CPC.

Held:

The court held that the appellant's conduct amounted to a colossal insult to justice and the concept of speedy disposal of civil litigation. The virus of seeking adjournment needed to be controlled. The special leave petition was dismissed with costs amounting to Rs. 50,000, to be paid to the State Legal Services Authority, Karnataka, within eight weeks. If the costs were not deposited within the specified time, the appellant's right to examine witnesses in defense would stand foreclosed.

Facts:

A land dispute existed between the deceased (Devi Prasad) and the appellant (Devraj) and his brother Dinda.

On June 26, 2006, Devi Prasad was intercepted, beaten, and killed by the appellant and others.

The body of the deceased, along with the motorcycle, was thrown below Rakhet Pulia.

The appellant appealed against the High Court's judgment that convicted him under Section 302 IPC.

Issues:

Validity of relying on hostile witnesses.

Sufficiency of injuries caused by the appellant for the death of the deceased.

Whether the evidence supports the theory of an accident.

Held:

The Court reiterated principles from Bhagwan Singh v. State of Haryana and Khujji v. State of M.P. regarding the admissibility of evidence given by hostile witnesses.

The Court found that even though witnesses were declared hostile, their evidence regarding the assault by the appellant remained unshaken and reliable.

The Court rejected the theory of an accident, citing evidence about injuries, the position of the motorcycle, and the manner in which the body was found below Rakhet Pulia.

The Court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the appellant was responsible for the homicidal death of the deceased.

The Court dismissed the appeal, stating that the findings of the lower courts were neither perverse nor contained any illegality that rendered them unreliable.

Facts:

ETOILE CREATIONS, a proprietorship firm, and SARL DANSET DECO had a business relationship since 2000.

A 'Buyers Agreement' was executed on 18.10.2012, governing the supply of home furnishing and upholstery products.

Disputes arose, including non-payment of outstanding amounts, order cancellations, and violations of agreement clauses.

Legal notices and arbitration proceedings were initiated by ETOILE CREATIONS.

Issues:

Whether disputes arising from the 'Buyers Agreement' fall within the scope of the arbitration clause (Clause 14).

Whether the appointment of a sole arbitrator is warranted under Section 11(5) read with Section 11(9) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Held:

The Court, after considering the facts and the existence of an arbitration agreement in Clause 14 of the 'Buyers Agreement,' allowed the petition under Section 11(5) read with Section 11(9) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Mr. Justice Kailash Gambhir, a Former Judge of the Delhi High Court, was appointed as the sole arbitrator to adjudicate the disputes. The arbitrator was given the authority to consider claims, counterclaims, and other contentions, and to determine his own fee. Each party was directed to bear its own costs. The petition, is accordingly, allowed.

Facts:

Sukh Ram, a Gram Sewak, was accused of forging signatures and thumb impressions on loan applications under a government scheme.

Loans were meant for poor individuals for livestock and small businesses.

Villagers denied their signatures on loan documents.

Charges included offenses under Sections 468 and 471 IPC.

Handwriting expert's opinion favored the prosecution.

Issues:

Validity of signatures and thumb impressions on loan applications.

Competency of the Executive Magistrate to take specimen signatures during investigation.

High Court's reliance on oral evidence and handwriting expert opinion.

Held:

The Court, after considering the facts and circumstances, upheld Sukh Ram's guilt under Sections 468 and 471 IPC. The High Court's decision to reverse the acquittal was justified. Despite objections based on legal technicalities, the Court considered the opinion of the handwriting expert and oral evidence from villagers denying their signatures.

Dismissed of all appeals. Cancellation of bail, and direction for Sukh Ram to serve the remaining sentence.

Facts:

The appellants challenged the final order of the Gauhati High Court in an Arbitration Petition under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The order appointed a former Judge as the arbitrator, alleging that the appellants forfeited their right to appoint railway officers as arbitrators under clause 64(3)(a)(ii) of the agreement.

Issues:

Whether the Judge correctly interpreted clause 64(3)(a)(ii) of the agreement?

Whether the Section 11 application was premature?

Whether the appointment of a former judge as arbitrator was warranted?

Held:

The Court found in favor of the appellants, setting aside the impugned order. The respondent contractor was given the option to serve a fresh notice for arbitration within a month. If the contractor served the notice, the Railways were directed to send a panel of names within 60 days for the constitution of an Arbitral Tribunal as per the agreement. The contractor was granted the liberty to pursue further remedies if the Railways failed to send the panel within the stipulated time.

The Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the impugned order.