Registration Of FIR Is Mandatory If Information Ex Facie Discloses Commission Of  Cognizable Offence: Supreme Court

"Rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the Cr.PC cannot curtail or extinguish the independent statutory obligation cast upon the Police under Section 154 of the Cr.PC." Supreme Court, in a significant ruling dated August 19, 2026, held that the dismissal of an application under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) does not curtail or extinguish the statutory obligation of the police to register a First Information Report (FIR) under Section 154 of the CrPC when a cognizable offence is disclosed.

A bench comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice N.V. Anjaria reiterated that the mandatory duty to register an FIR laid down by the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh continues to operate with full force, as a Magistrate's rejection under Section 156(3) CrPC does not constitute a final adjudication on merits and cannot attract the doctrine of res judicata.

The appellant approached the Supreme Court challenging an Allahabad High Court judgment that refused to quash an FIR registered against him for cheating, forgery, and criminal intimidation in an alleged job scam. Prior to the lodging of the FIR, the complainant's application under Section 156(3) of the CrPC seeking identical relief had been rejected by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate after perusing a police report, an order subsequently affirmed in revision by the Sessions Court.

The primary questions before the Supreme Court were whether the rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the CrPC bars the subsequent registration of an FIR on the same allegations under the doctrine of res judicata, and whether the mandatory duty of police to register an FIR under Section 154 of the CrPC survives such judicial refusal.

Statutory Scheme Behind Sections 154, 156(3), And 190 CrPC

Tracing the statutory framework governing criminal investigations, the bench observed that Sections 154, 156(3), and 190 of the CrPC establish a graded statutory scheme. The primary recourse of an informant lies with the police under Section 154 of the CrPC, while Section 156(3) operates as a judicial safeguard to check police inaction or refusal to register a case.

The bench emphasized that an order passed under Section 156(3) of the CrPC is merely a judicial direction requiring the police to exercise their plenary powers of investigation under Chapter XII of the Code. At this stage, the Magistrate neither embarks upon the inquiry procedure under Chapter XV nor takes cognizance under Section 190(1)(a) of the CrPC.

The court noted that while Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat clarified that the Magistrate's power to ensure proper investigation under Section 156(3) continues until the commencement of trial, it does not alter the essential character of the provision, which is confined to regulating the commencement of an investigation.

Rejection Under Section 156(3) Does Not Attract Res Judicata

Addressing the appellant's contention that the subsequent FIR was barred by res judicata, the court relied extensively on its recent ruling in S.C. Garg v. State of Uttar Pradesh. The bench clarified that the applicability of res judicata in criminal proceedings turns on whether the prior proceeding culminated in a final adjudication on merits.

The bench noted that while earlier three-judge bench decisions in Pritam Singh v. State of Punjab, Bhagat Ram v. State of Rajasthan, and State of Rajasthan v. Tarachand Jain applied res judicata following full-fledged acquittals, decisions like Devendra v. State of U.P. and Muskan Enterprises v. State of Punjab rightly held it inapplicable to interlocutory or non-merit orders.

The court authoritatively held that an order under Section 156(3) of the CrPC is rendered at the threshold without any trial or determination of rights and liabilities. Consequently, its rejection lacks the character of a final adjudication and cannot operate as res judicata against subsequent criminal proceedings.

Lalita Kumari Mandate Unaffected By Section 156(3) Dismissal

Highlighting the independent statutory power of the police, the court held that the duty to register an FIR under Section 154 of the CrPC does not depend on a direction from a Magistrate. The obligation flows directly from the statute and the authoritative mandate of the Constitution Bench in Lalita Kumari.

The bench reaffirmed that under Lalita Kumari, registration of an FIR is mandatory if the information ex facie discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. Police officers cannot avoid this statutory duty, as issues regarding the credibility or truthfulness of allegations pertain exclusively to the stage of investigation.

Reinforcing this principle through the precedent in Mahendri v. State of U.P., the court held that declining a prayer under Section 156(3) neither touches the merits of the controversy nor reflects upon the truthfulness of the allegations subsequently made before the police.

Distinction Drawn With Successive 156(3) Applications

The court distinguished the recent decision in Mohan Karthik v. State of Tamil Nadu, where a second application before the Magistrate under Section 156(3) of the CrPC was held impermissible. The bench noted that Mohan Karthik dealt with an attempt to review a judicial order through repeated applications before the same forum, which is fundamentally distinct from the police independently discharging their duty under Section 154 of the CrPC.

The bench added that when an informant furnishes fresh or previously unconsidered material—such as digital recordings, bank statements, or forged documents—the police remain legally competent to register an FIR irrespective of any earlier rejection by a Magistrate.

High Court Rightly Refused To Quash FIR Under Section 482 CrPC

Turning to the merits of the quashing petition, the Supreme Court held that the High Court committed no error in refusing to quash the FIR. Referring to State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal and Neeharika Infrastructure (P) Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, the bench reiterated that at the threshold stage under Section 482 of the CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution, courts cannot evaluate the probative value or reliability of evidence.

The allegations in the FIR prima facie disclosed cognizable offences under Sections 406, 419, 420, 467, 468, 471, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, including the fraudulent collection of money under false promises of securing public employment. The court also took note of the fact that the appellant was arraigned in five other FIRs containing similar accusations.

The bench concluded that the appellant's defence regarding prior commercial land dealings and the police report obtained in the earlier Section 156(3) proceedings were matters to be appreciated during trial and could not justify quashing the investigation at its inception.

Dismissing the appeal, the Supreme Court held that the rejection of an application under Section 156(3) of the CrPC does not bar the registration of an FIR under Section 154 of the CrPC. The ruling cements the principle that the police's mandatory duty to investigate cognizable offences under Lalita Kumari remains sovereign and unimpaired by prior threshold refusals of judicial magistrates.

Date of Decision: August 19, 2026