Land Acquisition – Notice and Opportunity to Object – examined the compliance of statutory notice requirements under the U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad Adhiniyam, 1965, in the context of land acquisition. The court addressed the issue of whether the absence of individual notice to certain tenure-holders vitiated the acquisition process. [Para 1-6, 16-17]

Application of 1965 Act Provisions – The Court scrutinized the provisions of the 1965 Act, focusing on the obligation to issue a pre-acquisition notice and the entitlement of affected parties to object to the acquisition. The judgment emphasized the importance of adhering to procedural requirements for a valid acquisition. [Para 4-6, 16]

Invalidity of Acquisition Process – The Court held that the absence of public or individual notice proposing to acquire certain lands rendered the acquisition process invalid. This lack of notice denied the respondents an effective opportunity to object, leading to the quashing of the acquisition of specific plots. [Para 16-17]

Assessment of Compensation under 2013 Act – Considering the repeal of the Land Acquisition Act 1894, the Court directed that compensation for acquired land should be assessed in accordance with the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. This decision aligns the process with contemporary standards of fair compensation. [Para 18-19]

Directions for Future Action – The Court directed the appropriate government to dispense with certain procedures under the 2013 Act for practical reasons and ordered the determination of compensation in compliance with the Act. It also provided guidelines for dealing with the compensation amount amid a title dispute and maintaining the status quo regarding the land. [Para 20-22]

Conclusion – The appeal was disposed of with specific directions, emphasizing the adherence to procedural requirements in land acquisition and the assessment of fair compensation under the 2013 Act. [Para 23-24]

Applicability of Interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993 - In contracts between buyer and supplier, the buyer must make payments within a timeframe, not exceeding 120 days from the day of acceptance or deemed acceptance - Interest chargeable after this period as per Sections 3 and 4 of the Act - Proviso to Section 3 limits payment date to a maximum of 120 days regardless of the contract terms. [Paras 3, 6-8, 14]

Definition of 'appointed day', 'buyer', and 'supplier' under the 1993 Act - Explanation of these terms critical for determining the start date for calculating interest on delayed payments - Amendments to include National Small Industries Corporation and State Industrial Development Corporations under 'supplier' definition. [Para 4, 5]

Arbitral award dated 30.06.2003 set aside by High Court - Sections 3 to 5 of the 1993 Act require ascertaining the appointed day, acceptance day, or deemed acceptance day for interest calculations - Further proceedings to determine these facts and the consequent interest payable under the Act. [Paras 13, 14]

Consideration of compound interest under Section 5 of the Act - Compound interest treated separately from the principal amount - Need for clarification on whether compounded interest is to be considered as principal for future calculations. [Para 15]

Restitution and enforcement of security by MSSIDCL - MSSIDCL entitled to enforce security or seek restitution under Section 144 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for payments made to SSPL. [Para 16]

Appeal dismissed without costs - Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. [Para 17]

Transaction in Securities and Attachment of Property – Appellant's appeals against Special Court's order for recovery of funds under the Act of 1992 – Involvement of appellant with benami companies and alleged failure to repay borrowed funds – Act focused on handling irregularities in transactions in securities, and provisions for attachment of properties of notified persons – [Paras 3-11, 32-33, 35-38].

Interpretation of the Special Court (Trial of Offences relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 – examined – the Court analyzed the provisions of the Act of 1992, especially focusing on the appointment of custodians, the attachment of properties, and the role of the Special Court in dealing with offences and recovery of assets related to securities transactions. [Para 3-11, 34-35]

Burden of Proof and Evidence – discussed – the Court considered the principles of burden of proof and the adequacy of evidence presented. It delved into whether the appellants successfully discharged their onus of proving that loans taken from respondent companies were repaid, and whether the Custodian provided sufficient evidence to establish outstanding debts. [Para 22-24, 26-27, 36-38]

Decision – Reversal of Special Court's Judgment – The Supreme Court reversed the Special Court's decision, finding that the judgments against the appellants were not substantiated by sufficient evidence and were contrary to legal principles. The Court emphasized the importance of reliable documentary evidence and proper legal procedure in such financial cases. [Para 39-41]

Reimbursement Ordered – The Court directed the reimbursement of amounts deposited by the appellants in compliance with a previous order, underscoring the significance of just and fair legal processes in financial litigations. [Para 42]

Disposition – The appeals were allowed, and the judgments of the Special Court were quashed. Any pending applications related to the case were disposed of. [Para 41-43]

Conviction Based on Dying Declaration - Validity Upheld for One Accused - Victim’s declaration deemed cogent, trustworthy, and reliable - Conviction of Pappi @ Mashkoor (accused No.1) upheld based on victim's dying declaration stating he set her ablaze - Dying declaration held as the sole basis of conviction without independent corroboration - Court satisfied with victim’s mental fitness and voluntariness in giving statement [Paras 6-11, 13-14].

Role of Co-Accused in the Offence - Benefit of Doubt to Two Accused - Accused No. 2 (Naeema) and Accused No. 3 (Naeem) acquitted due to lack of specific evidence on their roles in aiding the primary accused - Dying declaration not specifying their explicit involvement in the crime [Para 15].

Dying Declaration – Credibility and Legitimacy – Held – emphasized the necessity for the court to ensure that the dying declaration is true, voluntary, and made by a person in a fit state of mind, not influenced by tutoring, prompting, or imagination. The court observed that a dying declaration, if found reliable, can form the sole basis for conviction without corroboration. [Para 7, 10, 11]

Decision – Acquittal of Co-accused – Supreme Court allowed the appeals of Naeem and Naeema, leading to their acquittal due to insufficient evidence against them in the dying declaration, whereas the appeal of Pappi @ Mashkoor was dismissed, maintaining his conviction. [Para 16]

Quashing of Criminal Proceedings – Suicide of Data Ram – Alleged abetment by Prabhat Kumar Mishra – Mishra challenged the charges under Section 306 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act – Based on suicide note of Data Ram alleging pressure and humiliation – High Court rejected Mishra's application under Section 482 CrPC – Appeal to Supreme Court. [Paras 2-10]

Non-Constituent of Offences – Supreme Court observed prosecution under Section 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act to be illegal – No evidence of offence committed on caste basis – Parameters of abetment under Section 306 IPC not met – Relying on similar judgments including Netai Dutta v. State of W.B. and M. Mohan v. State. [Paras 16-21]

Ineffectiveness of Suicide Note – Suicide note did not exhibit acts or omissions by Mishra constituting abetment – Indicated frustration and pressure unrelated to Mishra – Initial closure report by investigating agency supported non-prosecution. [Paras 22-24]

Decision – Supreme Court quashed High Court order and all proceedings against Mishra under Section 306 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) SC/ST Act – Appeal allowed. [Paras 25-27]

Agricultural Produce – Livestock Products – Inclusion of Ghee – The Supreme Court evaluated whether 'ghee' falls under the category of a 'product of livestock' according to The Andhra Pradesh (Agricultural Produce and Livestock) Markets Act, 1966. The Court also examined the validity of the Government notification, G.O. Ms. No.286 dated 05.07.1994, which declared 'ghee' as a livestock product. [Para 1-2, 10]

Compliance with Legislative Procedure - Validity of 1994 Notification - The Court affirmed the validity of the 1994 Government notification under Section 4, not Section 3, of the Act, negating the need for a draft notification and public objections process - This notification was for the declaration of a 'notified market area' for "ghee" [Para 11].

Obligation to Pay Market Fees - Appellants Liable for Market Fees - The Court held that appellants must pay market fees from 1994 to 2009, rejecting their argument for exemption - They are allowed to pay the accumulated fee over two years in four equal installments [Para 13].

Dismissal of Appeals - Court dismissed the appeals, upholding the majority decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and lifting interim orders that had restrained collection of market fees [Para 14].

Consumer Law - Contract Law – Terms and Conditions – Loan Agreement Interpretation – adjudicated on the validity of the interest rate revisions by Housing Development Finance Corporation Limited (HDFC) under a loan agreement. The primary dispute involved the interpretation of terms related to the Adjustable Rate of Interest in the agreement. The appellant, Rajesh Monga, contended that the interest rate should only be revised based on changes in the Prime Lending Rate by the RBI, as allegedly assured by HDFC representatives. [Para 1-4, 6, 11-12]

Pre-Contractual Representations – Reliance on Email Communication – The appellant relied on an email dated 05.10.2005, claiming it was assurance from HDFC about interest rates being pegged to the RBI's Prime Lending Rate. The court examined whether pre-contractual communications could override the explicit terms of the agreement. [Para 6-7, 9, 13]

Interpretation of Agreements – Binding Nature – the terms agreed upon in the loan agreement are binding on the parties. It was noted that prior email exchanges cannot supersede the policy decisions of the lending institution (HDFC) encapsulated in the signed agreement. The Court highlighted that an agreement's terms take precedence over pre-contractual communications. [Para 10, 13-14]

Unfair Trade Practices – Allegation and Evidence – The appellant's claim of being misled into signing the agreement, alleging it to be an unfair trade practice by HDFC, was not substantiated with evidence. The Court required demonstrable proof that the appellant had a better alternative or was indeed lured by HDFC into a disadvantageous agreement. [Para 15]

Decision – Dismissal of Appeal – upholding the NCDRC's order. It concluded that the increase in interest rates by HDFC was consistent with the terms of the loan agreement and that the pre-contractual email did not alter the agreement's terms. The Court found no evidence of unfair trade practices by HDFC. [Para 16-17]

Criminal Procedure – Complaint under Section 200 of CrPC – Dismissal of Complaint – The Supreme Court analyzed the validity of the dismissal of a complaint filed under Section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) in a dispute involving land and allegations of trespass and threats by officers of the Special Armed Forces (SAF). [Para 1-4, 11-12]

Criminal Procedure – Sanction for Prosecution under Section 197 CrPC – Considered – The necessity of sanction for prosecution under Section 197 CrPC for alleged offenses committed by SAF officers was a focal point. The Court scrutinized whether the acts were performed as part of official duties, thereby requiring sanction for prosecution. [Para 4, 6, 10-11]

Criminal Procedure – Abuse of Process of Law – Held – Court found that the continuation of prosecution based on the complaint constituted an abuse of the process of law, especially considering the overlap with a previously dismissed Contempt Petition and lack of disclosure of relevant facts in the complaint. [Para 9-11]

Decision – Quashing of Complaint and Orders – The Supreme Court quashed the impugned orders of the High Court and the Magistrate and dismissed the complaint filed by the first respondent, citing abuse of the process of law and lack of necessity for sanction under Section 197 CrPC. [Para 12-13]

Suspension and Cancellation under PC&PNDT Act - Interpretation of Sections 20(1), (2), and (3) - The appeal focuses on the powers for cancellation, suspension, or suspension in public interest under the PC&PNDT Act - Concerns the case of suspension of registration of "Dev Hospital," Ahmedabad, without notice or hearing, deemed contrary to the provisions of the Act [Paras 2, 3, 5, 10-12, 17-18]

Administrative Action – Principles of Natural Justice – Emphasized the need for following principles of natural justice, such as issuing a show cause notice and providing an opportunity of hearing, before suspending or cancelling medical registration under the PC&PNDT Act. [Para 5, 13, 17]

Interpretation of Section 20(3) of PC&PNDT Act – Clarified – Held that the power under Section 20(3) for suspension in public interest is distinct and can be exercised independently of Sections 20(1) & (2). However, this power should be exercised sparingly and for interim periods, not indefinitely, and requires explicit reasoning demonstrating the necessity or expediency in public interest. [Para 11, 16, 17]

Decision – Upholding High Court's Judgment – The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the High Court of Gujarat, which had set aside the suspension orders of the hospital's registration by the appropriate authority under the PC&PNDT Act, finding procedural impropriety and lack of adherence to principles of natural justice. [Para 13, 18]

Directive – No Additional Orders Required – Since the hospital in question is operational and the challenged suspension orders were implemented, no further orders were deemed necessary for reviving the registration. [Para 18]