Facts:

The respondents, engaged in the process of bottling Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) Cylinders, claimed benefit under Sections 80HH, 80-I, and 80-IA of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

The Assessing Officers disallowed the deduction, contending that bottling LPG did not constitute "production" or "manufacture."

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) overturned the Assessing Officers' decision, considering the complexity of LPG bottling process.

Issues:

Whether bottling of LPG qualifies as "production" or "manufacture" under relevant sections of the Income Tax Act.

Whether the respondents are eligible for deduction under the said provisions.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the process of bottling LPG constitutes "production" for the purposes of Sections 80HH, 80-I, and 80-IA of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The court noted that the definition of "manufacture of gas" under the Gas Cylinders Rules, 2004 includes bottling of compressed gas, supporting the conclusion that bottling LPG amounts to production.

Furthermore, previous High Court judgments have consistently upheld this view, and the department did not challenge those decisions. The Court distinguished previous cases cited by the Revenue, emphasizing the broader scope of "production" compared to "manufacture." Consequently, the appeals of the Revenue were dismissed.

Facts:

Hyundai Corporation submitted tenders for offshore oil exploration platforms in response to a tender floated by Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. in 1982.

The Indian government extended the Income Tax Act to cover income from offshore activities with effect from April 1, 1983.

Disputes arose regarding taxation under Section 44BB of the Income Tax Act, 1961, arising from subcontracting and reimbursement obligations under the contracts.

Arbitration proceedings ensued, resulting in differing opinions from arbitrators and an award that was based on an issue not referred to the umpire.

Issues:

Interpretation of contractual clauses regarding indemnification for increased costs due to changes in law (Clause 17.3) and obligations regarding subcontractors and vendors (Clause 13.2.8).

Determination of whether Clause 13.2.8 applies to negate the application of Clause 17.3 in the context of tax liabilities under Section 44BB.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to an appointed arbitrator, Justice Aftab Alam, to decide the specific issue of whether Clause 13.2.8 would apply to negate the application of Clause 17.3.

The Court directed the arbitrator to expedite the process, and the decision would not be subject to appeal before the High Court, returning directly to the Supreme Court for further adjudication. This decision was based on the fact that the umpire's award was rendered on an issue not referred to him and lacked independent reasoning or conclusion regarding the applicability of Clause 13.2.8. Therefore, a fresh determination by the appointed arbitrator was necessary to resolve the remaining dispute.

Facts:

The appellant, Nagar Nigam of Allahabad, appealed against a judgment of the Allahabad High Court regarding the levy of license fees on the respondent, Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC). The High Court held that LIC was not covered under the expression "insurance company" in a notification issued by the appellant.

Issues:

Whether LIC falls under the category of "insurance company" for the purpose of levy of license fees.

Interpretation of Section 438 of the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1959.

Held:

The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the judgment of the Allahabad High Court. The decision was based on the interpretation of Section 438 of the Act, which pertains to license fees for activities related to premises where goods or animals are kept for sale or manufacturing takes place. Since insurance business, including life insurance, did not fall within the scope of activities covered by Section 438, license fees could not be levied on LIC.

Facts:

The appellant, Rustom Kerawalla Foundation, operates a school, the fee structure of which is regulated by the Maharashtra Educational Institutions (Prohibition of Capitation Fee) Act, 1987.

The appellant holds a lease for the school premises, obtained through a discretionary quota of the State Government, not through normal competitive channels.

Issues:

Whether the entirety of lease rent should be considered while approving the fee structure under the Act?

Held:

The allocation of the school premises was made through a discretionary quota of the State Government, not through normal competitive channels.

The Act prohibits the demand or collection of any capitation fee and regulates fee structures for educational institutions.

The interpretation of Section 4(2)(b) is crucial, particularly regarding the exclusion of expenditure on lands and buildings.

The State Government's discretion in excluding certain expenditures must balance the institution's need for a just fee structure with the legislative objective of curbing capitation fees.

Public assets or funds granted to an institution must be taken into account while determining fee structures.

The computation of fees should be based purely on the expenditure on land and buildings, ensuring a reasonable return on investment.

Decision: The matter is remanded to the State Government for fresh consideration, directing that the computation of fees should be based purely on the expenditure on land and buildings, ensuring a reasonable return on investment.

Facts:

Ravindra Kale was fatally assaulted by the appellants and others on 31-01-2008 following a longstanding dispute.

Witnesses, including Anil Kale (PW-5), Sunil Raosaheb Kale (PW-8), and Shaila Kale (PW-12), provided testimonies regarding the incident, describing how the appellants arrived armed with weapons and attacked the deceased.

Medical evidence corroborated the nature of injuries inflicted, indicating a homicidal attack.

Issues:

Credibility of witness testimonies.

Discrepancy regarding the absence of food particles in the deceased's stomach during post-mortem examination.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the conviction and sentence of the appellants, affirming the decision of the High Court. The court found the prosecution's evidence credible and trustworthy, despite minor discrepancies in witness testimonies. The absence of food particles in the deceased's stomach did not conclusively determine the time of death, and other factors needed consideration.

The prosecution has examined material witnesses, viz., PW-5, PW-8 and PW-12 who are the eye-witnesses to the alleged incident. In our opinion, the High Court was not right in discarding the testimony of PW-5 and PW-12 taking into consideration the role played by the appellants herein.

In view of the foregoing discussion, we do not find any infirmity in the orders passed by the High Court with regard to the conviction and sentence of the appellants-accused. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, Neera Yadav, held the position of Chairperson and Chief Executive Officer (CCEO) of NOIDA (New Okhla Industrial Development Authority). The prosecution alleged that she abused her position by engaging in grave irregularities related to allotments and conversions of land in NOIDA. This included manipulating allotment procedures, making irregular changes in site plans, and securing benefits for herself and her relatives.

Issues:

Whether Neera Yadav abused her position as a public servant for personal gain, as alleged by the prosecution.

Held:

The prosecution successfully proved that Neera Yadav abused her position as a public servant to benefit herself and her relatives.

Specific instances of misconduct included submitting incomplete and ante-dated applications for plot allotments, manipulating layout plans to enlarge her plot, and securing allotments for her daughters through irregular means.

Nepotism, as a form of corruption, was deprecated by the Court.

The court upheld the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court based on proper appraisal of facts and evidence.

Considering the discretionary power under Section 427 of the CrPC, the court deemed it inappropriate to order concurrent sentences for multiple convictions, given the nature of Yadav's offenses and legislative policy favoring consecutive sentences.

Decision: The court partly allowed the appeal, upholding Yadav's conviction under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The court reduced her sentence to two years of rigorous imprisonment. It declined to order concurrent sentences for her multiple convictions.

Facts:

The appellants, who held positions as Deputy Chief Executive Officer and Chairperson/Chief Executive Officer, were accused of criminal misconduct by abusing their positions as public servants. They allegedly conspired to procure pecuniary advantage by allotting a government guest house plot to the Deputy CEO after converting it against regulations.

Issues:

Whether the appellants were guilty of conspiracy and corruption under the relevant sections of the Prevention of Corruption Act and the Penal Code.

Held:

The evidence presented in the case established a prior concert of minds between the appellants in converting the guest house plot to residential and allotting it to the Deputy CEO. Various actions, such as converting plots in violation of rules, securing allotments at lower rates, and frequent alterations of plots, demonstrated a concerted effort to gain pecuniary advantage (Para 46).

The role of the co-accused Chairperson/CEO was found to be complicit in aiding the Deputy CEO to obtain the plot at a lower premium. Their involvement in various stages of the irregularities indicated their involvement in the conspiracy (Para 47).

On review of the evidence and materials on record, the trial court and the High Court both concluded that the appellants had abused their positions to convert the plot improperly and allot it to the Deputy CEO for personal gain. The concurrent findings of the lower courts were upheld (Para 48).

Initially, the appellants were sentenced to three years' imprisonment and fined under Section 120-B IPC and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act (Para 50).

Considering the time elapsed since the offense, the surrender of the plot, and the impact on the appellants' employment and retirement benefits, the sentence was reduced to two years for both appellants (Para 52).

Decision: The appeals were partly allowed, and the sentence was reduced to two years for both appellants.

Facts:

A claim petition was filed seeking compensation for a road accident death.

The Madras High Court ordered an investigation into the allegation of false claims.

The CBI filed a charge sheet against several accused.

The respondent, an advocate, was implicated for misrepresentation and producing false evidence.

Issues:

Whether the bar under Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the CrPC applies when the High Court directs an investigation into a specified offence.

Held:

The interpretation of the bar under Section 195(1)(a)(i) of the CrPC. It emphasizes that the purpose of the bar is to protect against frivolous complaints by private individuals and that the expression "the public servant or his administrative superior" includes the High Court.

The Court reasoned that when the High Court directs an investigation into a specified offence, it is equivalent to the direction of an administrative superior public servant to file a complaint in writing, thus overriding the statutory bar. Therefore, the protection intended by Section 195 against frivolous complaints is already addressed when the High Court finds it necessary to investigate a matter in the public interest.

The Court allowed the appeals, setting aside the impugned order, and directed that proceedings be concluded within six months due to the prolonged duration of the case.

Facts:

The petitioners, medical colleges, sought permissions to establish new medical colleges and admit students for the academic year 2016-17. Inspections by the Medical Council of India (MCI) highlighted deficiencies, leading to the Central Government disapproving the schemes for the academic year 2016-17. Subsequently, the Oversight Committee granted conditional approval subject to specified conditions. However, the MCI recommended debarment of colleges for the academic years 2017-18 and 2018-19, leading to a series of hearings and communications.

Issues:

Whether the decision to cancel conditional permissions lacked proper reasoning and adherence to principles of natural justice.

Whether the petitioners were afforded a reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing as mandated by law.

Whether the recommendations/views of oversight bodies, including the Oversight Committee, were adequately considered.

Held:

The court held that the decision to cancel permissions lacked proper reasoning and procedural fairness. It emphasized the importance of providing a reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing before disapproving a scheme for establishing a medical college, as mandated by Section 10A(4) of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956.

The court ordered the Central Government to reconsider the matter afresh, taking into account all relevant recommendations and views, and afford the petitioner colleges a fair opportunity of hearing. This process was directed to be completed within a period of 10 days.

The decision underscores the obligation of decision-making authorities to adhere to principles of natural justice and provide a fair opportunity for hearing before taking adverse actions against educational institutions.