Facts:

The victim, allegedly raped by the accused 'P', was subjected to an acid attack during the pendency of the rape case. Despite her plight, there was a delay in filing the First Information Report (FIR). The High Court acquitted the accused on technical grounds, citing the delay in filing the FIR.

Issues:

Whether the delay in filing the FIR was justified given the victim's circumstances.

Whether the medical evidence supported the cause of death due to the acid attack.

Whether the failure to record a formal dying declaration affected the prosecution's case.

Whether the conduct of the treating doctor was professional and ethical.

Whether the trial court's conviction and sentencing were appropriate.

Held:

The Supreme Court criticized the High Court's focus on the delay in filing the FIR, emphasizing the victim's helpless situation and justifying the delay .

The medical evidence, including statements from treating doctors, corroborated the cause of death as burn injuries due to the acid attack .

While no formal dying declaration was recorded, the victim's statement in the FIR should have been treated as such, especially considering the circumstances .

The conduct of the treating doctor was deemed unprofessional for not allowing the recording of a dying declaration and inadequate maintenance of case history.

The Supreme Court overturned the High Court's acquittal, upholding the conviction of 'P'. However, the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment considering various factors .

Decision: The conviction of 'P' was upheld, and the death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. The court emphasized the need for a fair trial, proper evaluation of evidence, and professionalism among medical practitioners.

Facts:

The case involved the promotion entitlements of ministerial cadre staff in the BSF.

Previous decisions regarding the creation of posts for ministerial cadre staff were not implemented.

A cadre review in 2003 led to the creation of posts for Assistant Commandants but not Deputy Commandants for the ministerial cadre.

Issues:

Whether the decision of 28.08.2000/31.08.2000 regarding promotion entitlements was superseded by the cadre review of 28.11.2003.

Whether the cadre review adequately addressed the promotion avenues for ministerial cadre staff.

Held:

The court held that the decision of 28.08.2000/31.08.2000 was superseded by the cadre review of 28.11.2003.

The court emphasized that it cannot interfere with the employer's decision regarding promotion avenues unless it's arbitrary or perverse.

The cadre review decision provided sufficient avenues for promotion for ministerial cadre staff up to the level of Assistant Commandant.

Consequently, the appeal by the Union of India was allowed, the judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the writ petition filed by the private respondents was dismissed.

Facts:

Section 260A was inserted into the Income Tax Act, 1961 in 1998, providing for statutory appeal against orders of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal.

Initially, court fees for such appeals were fixed at Rs. 2,000, but this provision was later omitted, and court fees became payable as per the Kerala Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1959.

Section 52A was inserted into the 1959 Act in 2003, specifying the rates for court fees on such appeals.

The High Court held that appeals filed on or after October 26, 2002, would be governed by Section 52A of the 1959 Act.

Issues:

The determination of court fees payable on appeals filed under Section 260A of the IT Act.

Held:

The Supreme Court emphasized the substantive nature of the right to appeal, which accrues at the commencement of proceedings, and cannot be impaired by subsequent legislation unless expressly provided.

It held that Section 52A of the 1959 Act cannot be applied retrospectively to appeals filed before its enactment in 2003.

The court fees payable on appeals under Section 260A of the IT Act would be determined based on the law in force at the time of the assessment order or the decision of the appellate authority, as the case may be.

The appeals were allowed accordingly.

Facts:

Thirty-seven Assistant Sub-Inspectors, belonging to the Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe community, were appointed by the Government of Kerala during 1988.

These appointees were required to pass a special test conducted by the Kerala Public Service Commission for declaration of probation, but the test was not conducted for over twelve years.

The Government, recognizing the situation, passed an order invoking Rule 39 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Services Rules, 1958, exempting these Assistant Sub-Inspectors from passing the test.

Issues:

The appellants challenged the Government Order before the High Court of Kerala, contending that under Rule 13AA, no exemption can be granted to members of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes from passing tests prescribed for promotion in the Police Department.

They also argued that a Government Order dated 05.02.2000 specifically ruled out test exemption for certain categories of employees.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the Government Order granting exemption under Rule 39, emphasizing the importance of equity and justice in administrative decisions. The Court clarified that Rule 39 operates notwithstanding anything contained in the Rules or Special Rules, and it is an exception to the exemption under Rule 13AA. The Court cited previous decisions highlighting the importance of equity and justice in such matters, affirming the validity of the Government Order dated 17.11.2000.

Conclusion: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the validity of the Government Order. The Court clarified that the judgment only addressed the issue of the validity of the Government Order, and any other grievances of the appellants should be pursued through appropriate proceedings before the appropriate forum.

Facts:

Agreement to sell property entered into between P. Savitri (Respondent) and B. Vijaya Bharathi (Appellant).

Partial payment made, but respondent backed out of executing General Power of Attorney (GPA).

Property subsequently sold to other parties, leading to Defendant No. 3 acquiring it.

Appellant filed suit for specific performance after being unable to obtain the property.

Issues:

Whether the appellant demonstrated readiness and willingness to perform their part of the agreement.

Whether the subsequent sale deeds executed by the respondent needed to be canceled for specific performance.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision to dismiss the suit for specific performance due to the appellant's failure to demonstrate readiness and willingness and the absence of steps to cancel subsequent sale deeds. The court held that:

The appellant's inaction for nearly two years after the respondent's repudiation of the agreement indicated a lack of readiness and willingness .

The appellant's failure to seek cancellation of subsequent sale deeds executed by the respondent was necessary for specific performance .

Decision: The appeal was dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment.

Facts:

The original plaintiff initiated a suit alleging the nullity of various sale deeds pertaining to a property and sought a permanent injunction against the defendants.

Issues:

The determination of the applicable court fees in the suit.

Held:

The Supreme Court ruled that when the plaintiff, who is a party to the transaction, seeks to invalidate sale deeds, it effectively amounts to seeking cancellation of the deeds, regardless of how the relief is framed (Para 24).

Consequently, the proper court fee payable was under Section 40 of the Tamil Nadu Court Fees and Suit Valuation Act, 1955, and not under Section 25(d) as held by the High Court (Para 24).

The orders of both the trial court and the High Court were set aside, and the trial court was directed to grant three months' time to the plaintiff to pay the requisite court fee (Para 28).

Facts:

The appellant received a show cause notice in August 2007 for non-payment of service tax on commission paid to overseas agents.

The Joint Commissioner confirmed the demand for service tax in August 2008.

The appellant did not challenge this decision promptly and filed a writ petition in the High Court in March 2012, four years later.

The appellant cited organizational changes and a belief that service tax was not applicable during the relevant period as reasons for the delay.

Issues:

Whether the delay in approaching the court was justified.

Applicability of the circular issued by the Ministry of Finance regarding service tax.

Held:

The Supreme Court found that the appellant's delay in challenging the demand for service tax was not adequately justified. The court emphasized that delay and laches in seeking legal remedies can bar relief. The court clarified that the circular issued by the Ministry of Finance applied only to pending disputes and would not cover cases like the appellant's, where the demand had already been confirmed.

However, considering the peculiar circumstances of the case, the court decided to balance the equities by setting aside the demand for interest and penalty. While the appellant may not be entitled to a refund of the service tax already paid, they should not be required to pay interest and penalty on a tax that was not payable according to law.

Therefore, the court partly allowed the appeal, setting aside the demand for interest and penalty, and directed that no costs be imposed.

Facts:

The respondent, an airman in the Indian Air Force, was charged with overstaying his casual leave period without sufficient cause. He was found guilty and initially sentenced to four months' rigorous imprisonment, dismissal from service, and reduction in rank. The period of rigorous imprisonment was later reduced to three months. The respondent sought reinstatement, which was rejected, leading him to approach the Armed Forces Tribunal.

Issues:

Whether the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority was disproportionate.

Whether the Tribunal's decision to reinstate the respondent was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal's decision to reinstate the respondent was unjustified. Despite being his first offence, the respondent's action of overstaying leave for nearly a year without informing superiors constituted serious misconduct, impacting discipline within the armed forces. The Court noted that the Tribunal had misapplied Regulation 754(C), which suggests lighter punishment for first offences, as the offence in question was not trivial. Therefore, the Court set aside the Tribunal's decision to reinstate the respondent.

However, considering the respondent had already undergone the sentence period and to provide some relief, the Court modified the order of dismissal to one of discharge from service simpliciter. This would allow the respondent to seek employment elsewhere without being disqualified.

The appeal partly succeeded, with the dismissal from service modified to discharge from service, and no costs were awarded.

Facts:

The deceased, Shri Ravi Shekhar Joshi, was employed as an engineer by Dynemech Systems Pvt. Ltd.

He and a co-worker were deputed to test a filter at Hero Honda Factory in Haryana.

While returning from the factory, they met with a road accident, resulting in the death of Shri Ravi Shekhar Joshi.

The appellant filed for compensation under the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923, which was dismissed by the Commissioner and upheld by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the accident of the deceased occurred during the course of and out of employment?

Whether the deceased falls under the definition of workman under the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923?

If so, whether the claimant is entitled to compensation as per the claim application?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the accident did arise out of and in the course of employment, emphasizing the need for a causal connection between the accident and the employment. The deceased was on the road as part of his duties as a sales engineer, which made it necessary for him to be there. The Court cited various judgments, both from English and Indian courts, to support its conclusion.

The Court disposed of the appeal, directing the matter back to the Commissioner to decide the remaining issues framed in the case. The Court clarified that the accident fell within the ambit of Section 3(1) of the Employees' Compensation Act, 1923.