Facts:

The State of Uttar Pradesh issued a Molasses Policy for the year 2015-16, which reserved 25% of the molasses produced for supply to country liquor manufacturers.

Mawana Sugars Limited, a sugar company in Uttar Pradesh, challenged the interpretation of this policy, asserting that the reservation should apply only to the balance stock of molasses left over after its captive consumption, as per a previous court decision.

The High Court upheld Mawana Sugars Limited's interpretation, basing its decision on a previous Supreme Court judgment concerning a different case.

Issues:

Whether the reservation of 25% of molasses under the Uttar Pradesh Sheera Niyantran Adhiniyam, 1964 applies to the total production or only to the balance stock left after captive consumption.

Interpretation of the Molasses Policy for the year 2015-16 in light of previous court decisions.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the reservation of 25% of molasses under the Uttar Pradesh Sheera Niyantran Adhiniyam, 1964 applies to the total production and not just the balance stock left after captive consumption. The Court reasoned that the language of the Molasses Policy for the year 2015-16 clearly indicated reservation based on total production. The Court rejected the interpretation based on a previous court decision, stating that the two policies had different textual and contextual foundations. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the reservation was intended to ensure adequate supply to country liquor manufacturers without affecting the captive consumption needs of sugar mills. Therefore, the High Court's interpretation was found to be erroneous and unsustainable.

In arriving at this decision, the Court referred to paragraph 20 of the judgment in Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. v. State of U.P., which defined "balance stock" as the excess stock of molasses not used for captive consumption. The Court also cited paragraphs 53 and 54 of the same judgment, which clarified that reservation requirements did not apply if a sugar mill had no balance stock available for supply.

Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the operative directions of the High Court were annulled. The appellants were instructed to ensure implementation of the Policy in its letter and spirit, with cooperation expected from the respondent. No costs were awarded in the case.

Referred Cases

Dhampur Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. State of U.P., (2007) 8 SCC 338

SIEL Limited Vs. Union of India, (1998) 7 SCC 26

Facts:

The appropriate Government issued a notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for acquiring land in the area.

Notices were issued to all interested persons whose lands were acquired.

The Land Acquisition Officer passed an award fixing compensation rates.

The appellants, legal representatives of the deceased landowner, were unaware of the proceedings and received compensation almost 18 years later.

They applied under Section 18 for reference to the Civil Court for re-determination of compensation, which was dismissed as barred by time.

Issues:

Whether the dismissal of the reference application under Section 18 due to delay amounts to not filing an application under Section 28-A.

Whether a person who received compensation without protest pursuant to the collector's award, and did not file an application under Section 18, is a person aggrieved under Section 28-A.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that despite the dismissal of the reference application under Section 18 as barred by limitation, the appellants were entitled to apply under Section 28-A for re-determination of compensation. This entitlement was affirmed based on the judgment in Union of India v. Hansoli Devi.

The Court acknowledged the appellants' circumstances, including the death of the breadwinner, the illiteracy of the appellants, and their unawareness of legal proceedings. Consequently, the Court allowed the appellants to make an application under Section 28-A within three months, without entitlement to any interest due to their delay. This indulgence was granted under Article 142 of the Constitution to ensure complete and substantial justice.

The Collector was directed to entertain the application and hold an inquiry for determining compensation. The appeal was disposed of with no order as to costs.

Facts:

The respondent, TRAVANCORE COCHIN UDYOGA MANDAL, was allotted land by the State Government in 1965 for setting up a factory.

The State Government fixed the lease rent for the land on 25.06.1988.

The respondent objected to the lease rent fixed and sought a reduction, which was rejected by the State Government on 07.11.1991.

In their Income Tax Return for the Assessment Year 1992-93, the respondent claimed deduction of accumulated lease rent.

The Assessing Officer disallowed the deduction, stating it should have been claimed in the Assessment Year 1989-90.

The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) upheld the disallowance.

The Tribunal allowed the respondent's appeal, stating the deduction could be claimed in the Assessment Year 1992-93.

The High Court affirmed the Tribunal's decision.

Issues:

Whether the deduction of lease rent should have been claimed in the Assessment Year 1989-90 or in the Assessment Year 1992-93.

Held:

The Supreme Court refrained from expressing any opinion on the merits of the case and decided to remand the case to the Tribunal for further adjudication. The Court noted that the question of whether the fixation of rent and its payment is statutory or contractual is a mixed question of law and fact. Since this issue was neither decided by any of the authorities below nor by the Tribunal or the High Court, the Court found it appropriate to remand the case to the Tribunal for proper adjudication. The Court directed the Tribunal to decide the appeal afresh on merits in accordance with the law. Both parties were granted the opportunity to file relevant documents in support of their submissions before the Tribunal. The Court directed the Tribunal to decide the appeal within six months from the date of appearance of the parties. (Para. 13-19)

Facts:

Krishna Budha Gawde was detained under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA).

The property owned by Krishna Budha Gawde was subjected to forfeiture proceedings under the Smugglers and Foreign Exchange Manipulators (Forfeiture of Property) Act, 1976 (SAFEMA).

The appellants, claiming to be bona fide tenants of the property, challenged the forfeiture order, stating that their tenancy rights should not be affected.

Issues:

Whether tenancy rights in a property subjected to forfeiture under SAFEMA survive the forfeiture, and whether the appellants, as bona fide tenants, are entitled to protection from the forfeiture.

Held:

The Court held in favor of the appellants, ruling that their tenancy rights should not automatically terminate due to property forfeiture under SAFEMA. The matter was remitted to the competent authority for further proceedings to independently determine the status of the appellants' tenancy.

This decision was based on the principle that forfeiture under SAFEMA should not extinguish the rights of bona fide tenants unless there is a proven nexus between the property and its illegal acquisition by the person subjected to the Act. Accordingly, we allow this appeal.

Facts:

Mohit Chaudhary, an Advocate-on-Record since 2009, made mentioning before the Court in an aggressive manner, alleging collusion between the Supreme Court Registry and the opposite litigant to hastily list the matter with the aim of "Bench hunting."

Issues:

Whether his allegations were true,

Whether his behavior amounted to contempt of court.

Held:

The Court found that Chaudhary, being an experienced Advocate-on-Record, should have been aware that benches are constituted by the Chief Justice, not the Registry. Thus, his allegations indirectly impugned the Chief Justice himself, though masked as an attack on the Registry.

The allegations made by Chaudhary were found to be false. The matter had been listed based on judicial direction, not determined by the Registry. This led to a prima facie satisfaction of contempt in the face of the Court.

Chaudhary's conduct was considered unbecoming of an advocate, especially one practicing in the Supreme Court. He was accused of assisting the petitioner in scandalizing the Court and the Registry under the pretext of representing the petitioner's interests.

Despite the responsibilities of advocating for a client, Chaudhary's actions were deemed an abuse of the privilege of being an Advocate-on-Record. His behavior was calculated and aimed at bench shifting, which failed. Consequently, he was barred from practicing as an Advocate-on-Record for one month.

Facts:

The appellant, a mentally retarded destitute woman suffering from HIV, alleged rape and sought termination of her 18-week-old pregnancy. Hospital authorities initially denied the termination, prompting the appellant to file a writ petition seeking direction for termination of pregnancy.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, being a rape victim suffering from mild mental retardation, was competent to consent to termination under the law?

Whether there was negligence on the part of the hospital authorities in denying the termination?

What relief is the appellant entitled to under the law?

Held:

The Court held that the appellant, despite suffering from mild mental retardation, was competent to consent to termination under the law.

The medical board's report did not establish that termination was risky to the appellant's life, and there was negligence on the part of the authorities.

Consequently, the Court ordered compensation for the appellant and directed the State to ensure proper treatment and nutrition for the child to be born.

The Court emphasized the need for sensitivity in handling matters of termination of pregnancy, respecting women's rights, bodily integrity, and personal autonomy.

The Court highlighted India's international obligations under conventions such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

The Court underscored the importance of timely decisions in pregnancy-related cases and criticized the delay caused by the hospital authorities.

The Court rejected the State's argument invoking the principle of "actus curiae neminem gravabit," stating that compensation was warranted due to hospital negligence.

Facts:

Various electric supply and generation companies in Telangana issued advertisements inviting applications for the posts of Assistant Engineer (Electrical) and Assistant Engineer (Civil).

The selection process was based solely on a written examination, and candidates who performed well found themselves in the select list of more than one corporation.

The government issued a clarification allowing the corporations to fill up the leftover vacancies by operating the merit list downwards for each category.

Issues:

Interpretation of G.O.Ms. No. 81 dated 22.02.1997, which prohibited waiting lists for vacancies.

Validity of the government's clarification allowing the corporations to fill up leftover vacancies by operating the merit list downwards.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the purpose of G.O.Ms. No. 81 was to ensure that vacancies arising from selected candidates not joining would be filled through subsequent selection processes, not through waiting lists.

The Court interpreted the G.O.Ms. to apply only after the issuance of appointment letters. The Court acknowledged the government's decision as justified in the larger public interest, considering the large number of vacancies that would remain unfilled otherwise.

Therefore, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the judgments of the Division Bench and learned Single Judge of the High Court, and dismissed the writ petitions. It directed the corporations to fill up the posts as per the government's clarification and the interpretation of G.O.Ms. No. 81 provided by the Court.

Facts:

Smt. Bharati Reddy was elected as a member of Zilla Panchayat, Bellary, from a constituency reserved for General (Women) category.

The State Government subsequently reserved the post of Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat, Bellary, for Backward Class-B (Woman).

The election of Smt. Bharati Reddy as Adhyaksha was challenged by respondents alleging her caste and use of a false caste certificate.

The writ petition challenging her election was initially dismissed by a learned Single Judge on grounds of maintainability due to a constitutional bar.

Issues:

Whether the writ petition filed by the respondents challenging the election was maintainable under Article 226/227 of the Constitution despite the bar under Article 243-O.

Whether voters, even if not members of the Zilla Panchayat, have the right to challenge the election through judicial review.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that while the Constitution provides for the exclusive jurisdiction of election petitions, the power of judicial review under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution cannot be excluded.

The Court emphasized that the power of judicial review is an integral part of the Constitution's basic structure and cannot be eroded.

Therefore, the writ petition filed by the respondents challenging the election was deemed maintainable under Articles 226/227.

The Court directed the learned Single Judge to expedite the disposal of the writ petition and allowed the appellant to continue functioning as Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat, Bellary, pending the outcome of the writ petition.

Facts:

The dispute concerns the ownership of land in Survey No. 129/45/D in Jubilee Hills, Hyderabad. The appellant claims ownership based on a compromise decree and subsequent sale deed. The respondent, the Government of Andhra Pradesh, contests this claim.

Issues:

The rightful ownership of the land in Survey No. 129/45/D and clarifying any association between the appellant and a separate land dispute in Survey No. 403.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after careful examination of the arguments presented by both parties and the relevant legal provisions, concludes that the appellant's title to Survey No. 129/45/D is valid.

The Court finds no connection between the disputed land in Survey No. 129/45/D and the land dispute in Survey No. 403. Consequently, the Court sets aside the Division Bench's order and reinstates the directions given by the single Judge in favor of the appellant.