Facts:

The case involves a dispute over a Gift Deed regarding ancestral immovable property, originally filed by the appellant seeking to declare the gift deed void. After disposal of the initial suit through compromise, the appellant filed a fresh suit for possession. The respondents contested, claiming the suit was barred by limitation.

Issues:

The interpretation of the limitation period under the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920 and the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in this context.

Held:

The Court interpreted the provisions of the Punjab Limitation (Custom) Act, 1920, specifically Art.2(b) of the Schedule, which determines the limitation period for suits relating to ancestral immovable property.

The term "obtained" in Art.2(b) was defined to include the drawing up or preparation of the decree, not merely the passing of judgment.

It was established that the right to sue for possession arose only after certain conditions, such as the death of 'U', were met.

Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963, was deemed applicable, allowing exclusion of time spent in execution proceedings.

The Court affirmed the lower courts' rulings, holding that the suit for possession was not barred by limitation.

Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the Court ruled in favor of the original appellant, rejecting the objection regarding the suit being barred by limitation.

Facts:

The appellant-accused was sentenced to life imprisonment by the trial court. During the pendency of his appeal before the High Court, he was denied bail, despite being in custody for more than 10 years.

Issues:

Whether the denial of bail during the pendency of the appeal violated the appellant's fundamental right to speedy justice under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that access to speedy justice is an integral part of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

The Court observed the significant challenge posed by long-pending cases, especially those older than five years, in the High Courts.

It emphasized the need to explore alternative fora for handling criminal appeals to ensure timely disposal and enforcement of the right to speedy justice.

The Court recommended the timely filling of judicial vacancies and the establishment of a central selection mechanism for expediting appointments based on merit.

It highlighted the importance of improving the functioning of the collegium system for judicial appointments.

The judgment addressed the issue of strikes by legal professionals, stating that frequent strikes obstruct access to justice and contribute to the pendency of cases.

The Court called for mechanisms to enforce laws against strikes that disrupt judicial proceedings, including potential sanctions against office bearers of bar associations involved in organizing strikes.

Facts:

Between 2002 and 2007, vacancies were not determined, leading to neither promotees nor direct recruits being appointed despite vacancies being available.

After the amendment of the Rules in 2007, recruitment processes were initiated, and vacancies were determined. Both promotees and direct recruits were appointed.

A dispute arose regarding seniority, with direct recruits claiming seniority as per the Rota system laid down under the Rules, and promotees claiming seniority from the date of vacancy accrual without having passed the suitability test, which was retrospectively prescribed after the 2007 Rules amendment.

Issues:

Whether the promotees recruited in the year 2008/2009 are entitled to seniority prior to their selection on the ground that no suitability test was required prior to 9th January 2007 and retrospective effect to such requirement was illegal.

Whether the Quota-Rota rule can be applied in the absence of determination of vacancies and the impracticality of enforcing it due to continuous litigation over determining vacancies.

Held:

The High Court was correct in holding that the suitability test was required as per the judgment of this Court in All India Judges’ case and under the retrospectively amended Rules. Thus, the promotees couldn't be given promotion or claim seniority without passing this test (Para 29).

The Quota-Rota rule, although mandatory, cannot be applied in the absence of determination of vacancies and in situations where enforcing it becomes impractical due to continuous litigation over determining vacancies. Therefore, a pragmatic interpretation of the Rules is necessary (Para 30).

Decision: The Court affirmed that promotees were rightly given seniority from their appointments and rejected the direct recruits' claim based on the Rota system due to the impracticality of applying it in the given circumstances.

Facts:

Harita Sunil Parab filed Transfer Petition (Crl.) Nos. 254-255 of 2017 seeking the transfer of two FIRs filed against respondents nos. 2 to 4.

The FIRs were registered at Tilak Marg Police Station, New Delhi, and Indirapuram Police Station, District Ghaziabad (Uttar Pradesh).

The petitioner, a resident of Mumbai and a practicing Advocate before the Mumbai High Court, expressed concerns about the fairness of the investigation and her safety.

The respondent opposed the transfer petitions, emphasizing that the accused and prosecution witnesses were situated in Delhi, and the respondent, also an advocate practicing at Delhi, would face similar hindrances in professional engagements if the cases were transferred to Mumbai.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner's concerns regarding the fairness of the investigation and her safety warrant the transfer of the cases to Mumbai.

Whether the inconvenience faced by the petitioner in pursuing her professional engagements in Mumbai outweighs other considerations such as the availability of witnesses and the progress of the trial.

Held:

The Supreme Court rejected the transfer petitions. It was reasoned that the petitioner's apprehensions regarding possible harm to her in Delhi were too nebulous a ground for transfer. The court noted that the petitioner had been traveling between Mumbai and Delhi for professional reasons and emphasized that convenience alone could not override other considerations such as the availability of witnesses and the progress of the trial. The court referred to precedents emphasizing that the comparative inconvenience of the litigant parties was not the sole criterion for transferring cases between states but also included the inconvenience and hardships likely to be caused to the witnesses and the burden on the state exchequer.

Facts:

Mahatma Gandhi was assassinated on January 30, 1948, and several individuals were tried for the conspiracy and murder. Nathuram Godse and Narayan Apte were convicted, among others. The petitioner, Dr. Pankaj Kumudchandra Phadnis, sought to reopen the investigation into Gandhi's assassination, raising concerns about the circumstances of the assassination and the findings of the Kapur Commission Report.

Issues:

Whether the Supreme Court should entertain the petition to reopen the investigation into Gandhi's assassination after such a significant delay.

Whether the findings of the Kapur Commission Report should be reviewed.

Held:

The court emphasized the gross delay in raising the issue by the petitioner and stated that new research into a concluded matter does not justify reopening criminal investigations.

It further highlighted the substantial evidence presented during the trial, including eyewitness testimonies, the recovery of the murder weapon, and the findings of the investigation reports, all pointing to the involvement of Nathuram Godse as the sole assailant. The court refused to engage in reviewing the findings of the Kapur Commission Report, emphasizing the limited authority of such commissions and the need to avoid contentious issues.

It dismissed the petitioner's attempt to reopen the controversy surrounding Gandhi's assassination, considering it an exercise in futility. Therefore, the Special Leave Petition (SLP) was dismissed.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of Section 19(3)(c) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (PC Act), concerning the jurisdiction of High Courts and the power to grant stays in criminal matters. The appellants challenged the framing of charges against them under the PC Act.

Issues:

Whether an order framing charges under the provisions of the PC Act constitutes an interlocutory order, thereby invoking Section 19(3)(c) and barring the revisional power of the High Court under Section 397(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC).

Whether the bar on revision under Section 19(3)(c) also extends to the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 of the CrPC or Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.

Held:

The order framing charges may not be purely interlocutory but can, in certain circumstances, be interfered with under Section 397(2) of the CrPC, Section 482 of the CrPC, or Article 227 of the Constitution. Such interference, however, should be limited to exceptional situations. [(Para 26, 27)]

The intention of the legislature in cases under the PC Act is the expeditious conclusion of trials without impediment through stays of proceedings. The High Court's jurisdiction to entertain challenges against orders framing charges and to grant stays should be exercised sparingly and only in rare and extreme circumstances, considering the societal interest and the accused's rights. [(Para 28, 29)]

Challenges to orders framing charges should be entertained only to correct a patent error of jurisdiction, and decisions on such challenges should be expedited. Stays, if granted, should be conditional and not of indefinite duration. Matters should be decided on a day-to-day basis, and the duration of stay should not exceed two to three months. If proceedings remain pending longer, the stay should automatically lapse after six months, unless extended by a speaking order. [(Para 30-32)]

The law declares that the order framing charges is neither purely interlocutory nor final. The jurisdiction of the High Court is not barred, but its exercise should align with the legislative policy for expeditious trial disposal. Stays should not operate for an unduly long period, and the mandate of speedy justice applies to cases under the PC Act and other civil or criminal cases. [(Para 36, 37)]

Facts:

Mackintosh Burn Limited, a public company majority-owned by the Government of West Bengal, refused to register the transfer of 100 shares purchased by Sarkar and Chowdhury Enterprises Private Limited.

The dispute arose when the respondent sought registration of shares, which would increase its holding to 39.77%.

The appellant argued that the respondent was controlled by a competitor and thus refused registration.

Issues:

Whether the Company Law Board's decision to direct registration of shares was justified.

Whether the High Court properly addressed the legal questions raised in the appeal.

Whether the Supreme Court should uphold the decisions of the lower courts or remit the case for fresh consideration.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court and the Company Law Board erred in their interpretations of the law and application of principles. The Court set aside all previous orders and remitted the case to the Company Law Board (now the National Company Law Tribunal) for fresh consideration. The Court directed the Tribunal to decide the appeal without being influenced by previous findings and observations. Additionally, the Tribunal was instructed to expedite the process due to the case's age.

The Supreme Court emphasized that refusal of registration of shares on sufficient cause is a question of law, and the Company Law Board must consider all relevant factors, including potential competition issues. The Court highlighted that the appellant had raised various legal questions beyond the issue of limitation in the appeal, which the High Court failed to adequately address. Therefore, a fresh consideration by the Tribunal was deemed necessary.

This decision was made to ensure fair and impartial judgment in accordance with the Companies Act and relevant regulations.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute arising from the marriage between Muthulakshmi (Accused No. 4) and Murugan. Due to strained relations between the families, the accused attacked Murugan, resulting in his death, and later attacked Poomari, leading to her death as well.

Issues:

The defense argued that the witnesses, who were family members of the deceased, were interested witnesses and their testimonies should not be given undue weight.

Additionally, the defense presented evidence to challenge the presence of one witness at the school during the time of the incident.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that being related to the deceased does not automatically make a witness interested. It emphasized that related witnesses cannot per se be discarded and that their evidence should be evaluated carefully. The court found that the testimonies of the family members provided consistent and credible evidence, which was corroborated by medical evidence (Paragraphs 9-15).

The court also considered the defense evidence but found it unconvincing, noting discrepancies in the attendance records presented. Therefore, the High Court's judgment was upheld, and the appeals were dismissed, thereby confirming the conviction and sentence of the appellants (Paragraphs 16-18).

Facts:

B.N. Firos, proprietor of Comtech IT Solutions, challenged a notification declaring certain computer systems as "protected systems" under the Information Technology Act, 2000.

Firos developed software for the "FRIENDS" project initiated by the State of Kerala.

Disputes arose over the ownership of copyright for the software developed for the project.

Issues:

The ownership of copyright in the software developed for the government project.

The validity of the notification under the Information Technology Act, 2000, was also questioned.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, affirming that Firos did not have valid copyright ownership in the software developed for the government project.

The court held that Firos, by virtue of his agreement with Microsoft, did not own the copyright, as Microsoft was the first owner under Section 17(a) of the Copyright Act, having paid Firos for the software development.

Additionally, the Memorandum of Understanding stated that intellectual property rights in software developed for government projects vested in the government, further supporting the rejection of Firos's copyright claim.

The court dismissed Firos's appeal, directing each party to bear its own costs.