Facts:

The petitioners, Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors., filed a writ petition seeking the issuance of appropriate directions to enable female devotees aged 10 to 50 to enter the Lord Ayyappa Temple at Sabarimala, Kerala. They challenged the exclusion of women based on certain customs and usage, and also contested the constitutionality of clause (b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965.

Issues:

Whether the practice of excluding women based on biological factors amounts to "discrimination," thereby violating Articles 14, 15, 17, and not protected by 'morality' as used in Articles 25, 26.

Whether such exclusion constitutes an "essential religious practice" under Article 25 and whether the religious institution can assert such a claim under the right to manage its own affairs in the matter of religion.

Whether the Ayyappa Temple has a denominational character and if so, whether it is permissible for a religious denomination managed by a statutory board and financed out of the Consolidated Fund of Kerala and Tamil Nadu to indulge in practices violating constitutional principles/morality.

Whether clause (b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965 permits 'religious denomination' to ban the entry of women between the ages of 10 to 50 years and if it violates Articles 14, 15(3) of the Constitution by restricting entry of women on the ground of sex.

Whether clause (b) of the Rules, 1965 is ultra vires the Act, 1965 and if treated to be intra vires, whether it will be violative of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution.

Held:

The court, considering the significant issues involved, referred the matter to the Chief Justice to constitute an appropriate larger bench to address the aforementioned issues.

Facts:

The appellant, Bharat Deep Sethi, contested an interim order by the High Court directing him to pay Rs. 1,25,000/- per month to the respondent-landlord, Sonia Takkar. The appellant was a tenant under an unregistered lease deed occupying a shop in Delhi. The respondent claimed ownership of the property and filed a suit for eviction, which the Rent Controller initially ruled in her favor.

Issues:

The amount of rent to be paid by the appellant-tenant, with both parties disputing the appropriate sum.

The appellant sought leave to defend against eviction, contesting the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship.

Held:

The Supreme Court modified the interim order, directing the appellant to pay Rs. 40,000/- per month from June 2017 towards use and occupation, with arrears to be paid within four weeks. The matter was remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration, allowing the appellant an opportunity to raise all contentions/issues.

The High Court was requested to expedite the proceedings and dispose of the matter preferably within three months. No coercive steps were to be taken by the respondent-landlord until the matter was finally disposed of by the High Court.

Facts:

The respondent, Karnataka Soaps & Detergents Ltd., manufactures agarbathi perfumes (odoriferous compounds) in its Bangalore unit, which are then transferred to its Mysore unit for application to agarbathis.

The respondent ceased paying excise duty on the perfumery compound after a circular was issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs (the Board) clarifying non-excisability of certain odoriferous compounds.

The Revenue issued show-cause notices demanding excise duty, penalty, and interest for the period 2001-2002 to 2006-2007, contending that the circular did not exempt the respondent from paying excise duty on the perfumery compound.

The respondent contested the notices, relying on the Board's circular and arguing that the compound was not marketable as per the circular's criteria.

Issues:

Whether the Board's circular exempts the respondent from paying excise duty on the perfumery compound.

Whether actual marketing of the perfumery compound is necessary for the levy of excise duty.

Held:

The Court held that the Board's circular did not exempt the perfumery compound manufactured by the respondent from excise duty, as it applied to a different category of compounds.

Actual marketing of the perfumery compound is not necessary for the levy of excise duty. Marketability is the decisive test for dutiability, and the compound's capability of being sold in the open market suffices. The compound was found to be marketable, as evidenced by its sale to M/s. Tibetan Handicrafts Centre Bylkuppe, Mysore District.

Facts:

The respondent filed a civil suit against the appellant seeking eviction from a commercial premises and recovery of unpaid rent.

The appellant argued that the disputes should be resolved through arbitration as per the terms of the lease deed, which contained an arbitration clause.

The Trial Court and the High Court ruled in favor of the respondent, stating that the civil suit was maintainable despite the existence of an arbitration clause in the lease deed.

Issues:

Whether disputes arising from a lease deed with an arbitration clause are subject to arbitration or can be adjudicated in civil courts.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts, stating that the civil suit was maintainable. The Court emphasized that even if certain premises were exempted from the Delhi Rent Act, it didn't automatically make them subject to arbitration. The rights of the parties would still be governed by the Transfer of Property Act, and civil suits would be triable by civil courts. The appeal was dismissed, and the civil court was directed to proceed with the trial of the suit expeditiously.

This conclusion is supported by the rulings in Natraj Studios (P) Ltd. v. Navrang Studios & Another, 1981(1) SCC 523 and Booz Allen & Hamilton Inc. v. SBI Home Finance Ltd. & Ors., (2011) 5 SCC 532, which affirmed the jurisdiction of civil courts in disputes involving lease agreements, despite the presence of arbitration clauses.

Facts:

Ms. Indira Jaising filed a writ petition challenging the practice of designating Senior Advocates, alleging it to be arbitrary and violative of constitutional provisions.

Issues:

Whether the practice of designating Senior Advocates is arbitrary and unconstitutional.

Held:

The court held that while the practice of designating Senior Advocates is constitutional, it must be based on reasonable parameters. [Para 23]

The court outlined criteria such as ability, standing at the bar, and special knowledge or experience in law for designation as a Senior Advocate. [Para 23]

More transparency and uniform guidelines in the designation process were deemed necessary. [Para 23]

Norms and guidelines for the designation of Senior Advocates by the Supreme Court and all High Courts were laid down, including the establishment of a Permanent Committee for designation and scrutiny of credentials. [Para 35]

The court emphasized adherence to established norms and cautioned against actions that could bring the designation process into disrepute. [Para 28]

It sought to ensure that the designation of Senior Advocates is based on merit, fairness, and transparency, with periodic review and potential modifications to the guidelines based on experience. [Para 36]

Facts:

The appellant, an employee of the respondent Transport Corporation, was dismissed from service due to his involvement in a murder case.

He was subsequently acquitted by the High Court and sought reinstatement with back wages for the period of his dismissal.

The High Court, both in a single judge's decision and a division bench's decision, declined to award back wages to the appellant.

The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court challenging the denial of back wages.

Issues:

Whether the appellant is entitled to claim back wages for the period of his dismissal from service?

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the appellant was not entitled to claim back wages for the period of his dismissal. The Court emphasized that an employee is not automatically entitled to back wages upon reinstatement unless specifically directed by the order of reinstatement. The appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence to demonstrate his unemployment during the period of dismissal, and the issue regarding back wages was not raised before an Industrial or Labour Tribunal where evidence could be adduced. Consequently, the Court upheld the decisions of the lower courts, dismissing the appeal and affirming the denial of back wages to the appellant.

Facts:

Employees previously employed under the Coal Mines Welfare Organisation were transferred to Eastern Coalfields Ltd. (ECL).

Dispute arose regarding the fixation of salary upon absorption into ECL.

Terms and conditions of absorption included assurances that total emoluments would not be reduced.

Issues:

Whether the basic salary of the employees could be reduced upon absorption into ECL.

Interpretation of the terms and conditions of absorption and the protection of total emoluments.

Held:

The Division Bench upheld the decision of the Single Bench, setting aside the communication that reduced the basic salary of the employees upon absorption into ECL. The court emphasized that the protection of total emoluments, including basic salary and other allowances, was integral to the terms and conditions of absorption.

The court found that the reduction of basic pay was arbitrary and in violation of previous court orders and terms of absorption.

Thus, the appeal was dismissed, and the benefits were directed to be extended to all affected employees, including retirees and legal representatives of deceased employees, within a specified time frame.

Facts:

The case pertained to the interpretation of Exception 2 to Section 375 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and its implications for the rape of a girl child between 15 and 18 years of age, particularly in the context of marriage. The conflict arose due to the differing provisions of the IPC and the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act (POCSO).

Issues:

Whether sexual intercourse between a man and his wife, where the wife is a girl between 15 and 18 years of age, constitutes rape.

Whether there is any incongruity between Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC and Section 5(n) of the POCSO Act, and which provision overrides the other.

Whether Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC, insofar as it pertains to girls aged 15 to 18 years, is unconstitutional and liable to be struck down.

Held:

The Court held that sexual intercourse with a girl below 18 years of age constitutes rape, regardless of marital status. Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC, which created a distinction based on marital status, was deemed arbitrary and discriminatory, and therefore required reinterpretation to align with pro-child legislations and constitutional principles.

The Court directed that Exception 2 should be interpreted purposively to state that sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, who is not under eighteen years of age, is not rape .

The Court acknowledged the conflict between the IPC and POCSO regarding the rape of a married girl child. It emphasized that pro-child statutes, including POCSO, must prevail in case of any inconsistency.

Thus, Exception 2 to Section 375 of the IPC was required to be read purposively to harmonize with POCSO and other child protection laws. This was necessitated to ensure the protection of the rights and interests of the girl child .

The Court found Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC, insofar as it related to girls aged 15 to 18 years, unconstitutional and violative of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution.

It held that the exception was arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory, violating the rights of the girl child and not being fair, just, or reasonable. The Court directed that the exception be read down to comply with constitutional principles, with prospective effect only .

Facts:

The dispute arose between MIS. DURO FELGUERA, S. A. and MIS. GANGAVARAM PORT LIMITED regarding multiple contracts awarded for different packages of work. The original contract was later split into five separate packages, each with its own arbitration clause. Additionally, a Corporate Guarantee and a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) were involved, each containing arbitration provisions. The parties invoked arbitration notices, leading to a dispute over whether there should be a single arbitral tribunal or multiple tribunals for resolving the disputes arising from the various contracts.

Issues:

Whether there should be a single arbitral tribunal for all the contracts or multiple tribunals.

Interpretation of arbitration clauses in the contracts, Corporate Guarantee, and MoU.

Held:

The court emphasized the amended provision of Section 11(6A) of the Arbitration and Conciliation (Amendment) Act, 2015, which limits the court's role to examining the existence of the arbitration agreement. This provision restricts the court's power to appoint arbitrators and emphasizes the finality of such appointments.

Since the dispute arose in 2016, the court applied the amended provision of Section 11(6A). It noted the existence of five separate contracts, each with its own arbitration clause, indicating the intention of the parties to treat them independently.

Therefore, there cannot be a single arbitral tribunal for international commercial arbitration. The Corporate Guarantee provided by the foreign company also contained a separate arbitration clause. Hence, disputes arising from the Corporate Guarantee should be resolved by a separate arbitral tribunal.

Each contract, including the Corporate Guarantee, had separate arbitration clauses, and they did not depend on the terms of the original package or the MoU. Therefore, separate arbitral tribunals were necessary for each contract.