Facts:

The case revolves around the interpretation of the Andhra Pradesh Police Subordinate Service Rules and the Andhra Pradesh Police Service Rules, specifically regarding eligibility for appointment as Inspector under the A.P. Police Service.

Issues:

The eligibility criteria for appointment as Inspector, particularly whether service rendered as Reserve Sub-Inspectors should be counted towards the total years of service required for eligibility.

Held:

The Court upheld the existing rules, which clearly specify that 6 completed years of service as Sub-Inspector of Police (Civil) are required for appointment as Inspector under the A.P. Police Service.

The judgment clarified that service rendered as Reserve Sub-Inspectors does not count towards the total years of service required. It affirmed that seniority alone cannot override eligibility criteria for promotion and that eligibility conditions must be fulfilled before consideration for promotion.

The Court found no violation of Article 14 of the Constitution of India in the existing rules. Therefore, the appeals challenging the rules were dismissed.

Facts:

A lease agreement was executed between the appellant-landlord and respondents-tenants for a period of three years with specified rent. The landlord filed an eviction application under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, alleging arrears of rent from a certain date.

The Rent Controller made a provisional assessment of the rent due, which the tenants failed to comply with. Consequently, the Rent Controller passed an eviction order. The tenants' appeal against this order was dismissed by the appellate authority, but the High Court, in a revision, set aside the eviction order based on its finding that the provisional assessment was flawed.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, specifically concerning provisional assessment of rent, the rights of tenants and landlords, and the consequences of non-compliance with provisional assessment orders.

Held:

The court clarified the provisions under Section 13(2)(i) of the Act, which provide a concession to the tenant, allowing them to be deemed to have duly paid or tendered rent within the prescribed time if they comply with certain conditions, including paying arrears of rent assessed by the Rent Controller. Failure to comply with a provisional assessment order would render the tenant liable to eviction.

The determination of provisional assessment by the Rent Controller forms the basis of the eviction order. Therefore, the tenant has the right to challenge the correctness of the provisional assessment even after the eviction order is passed.

The provisional assessment is based on a prima facie view formed by the Rent Controller and is subject to subsequent final adjudication. The deposit by the tenant, as per the final assessment order within the specified period, protects them from eviction.

The court emphasized the need to strike a balance between the rights of the tenant and the landlord in interpreting Section 13. If the tenant admits to rent being due for a certain period, the court should adopt an interpretation that does not allow the tenant to defeat the landlord's claim.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, thereby restoring the eviction order passed by the Rent Controller, and directed the respondents to pay costs to the appellant.

Referred Cases in the above Judgment:

Decided on : 11-04-2017

East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949 - Section 13(2)(i)

Rent and Eviction—Eviction Decree—Defaulting in payment of rent—Once Rent Controller has made a provisional assessment of arrears of rent, interest and costs, tenant must deposit amount so determined on first hearing of application for ejectment—A tenant who does so would be deemed to have duly paid or tendered rent within time prescribed by substantive provision of Section 13(2)(i)—A tenant failing to comply with terms of an order of provisional assessment, cannot thereafter avail of concession extended to a tenant and will be liable to suffer order of eviction—However, having suffered order of eviction, tenant is entitled to statutory remedy of appeal under Section 15(1)(b). [Sections 13 and 15 of East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949]

Counsel for Appearing Parties

Sudhir Walia, Abhishek Atrey, Advocates, for the Appellant; Rajesh Sharma, Ms. Shalu Sharma, Advocates, for the Respondents

Cases Referred

Harjit Singh Uppal Vs. Anup Bansal, (2011) 11 SCC 672

Hope Plantations Ltd. Vs. Taluk Land Board, Peermade, (1999) 5 SCC 590

Narayan Dutt Tiwari Vs. Rohit Shekhar, (2012) 12 SCC 554

Rakesh Wadhawan Vs. Jagdamba Industrial Corporation, (2002) 5 SCC 440

Vinod Kumar Vs. Premlata, (2003) 11 SCC 397

Facts:

The Dental Council of India (DCI) conducted assessments of a dental college regarding its eligibility to start post-graduate courses.

The college's scheme for post-graduate courses was disapproved by the Government of India based on recommendations from the DCI.

The college approached the High Court seeking relief against the disapproval, and the High Court passed an interim order staying the decision.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in passing the interim order interfering with the admission process of the college.

Whether such interim orders should be passed in matters concerning educational institutions lacking approval.

Held:

The Court held that while it generally refrains from interfering with interim orders, the High Court's order in this case was unsustainable. Despite this, the Court decided to strike a balance by allowing admitted students to continue their courses but adjusting their seats from the next academic session. Additionally, the college was directed to deposit a sum of Rs. 30 Lakhs before the Registry of the Court within eight weeks. The costs imposed on the college were not to be recovered from the students.

The Court emphasized the need to avoid chaos and uncertainty in the admission process and cautioned against institutions attempting to manipulate the system. The appeal stands disposed of in above terms.

Facts:

The case involved a dispute regarding the determination of tariff for the supply of power from power projects governed by Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) between State Government Utilities and power generating companies. The dispute arose due to a change in Indonesian law, which increased the export price of coal from Indonesia to the international market.

Issues:

Whether the change in Indonesian law constituted a valid ground for relief under force majeure or change in law provisions.

The interpretation of regulatory powers under Section 79 of the Electricity Act, 2003, concerning tariff determination.

The scope and applicability of clauses within the PPAs regarding force majeure events and changes in law.

Held:

The court held that the PPAs did not treat changes in the cost of fuel as force majeure events. Therefore, the unexpected rise in the price of coal did not exempt the generating companies from fulfilling their contractual obligations.

While a change in Indonesian law did not qualify as a change in law under the guidelines, a change in Indian law did. Consequently, the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) was directed to reconsider the matter for those power generators falling within Clause 13 of the PPA.

The court clarified that CERC's regulatory functions, especially concerning tariff determination, should be exercised in accordance with guidelines issued by the Central Government. However, CERC could utilize its general regulatory powers under certain circumstances where guidelines were not applicable.

The term "composite scheme" in the context of the Electricity Act was interpreted to mean a scheme for the generation and sale of electricity in more than one state. The expression "any law" in the PPAs referred only to Indian laws, not laws of other countries.

Decision: The court set aside the tribunal's judgment and directed CERC to reconsider the matter in light of the findings, particularly regarding the impact of changes in Indian law on compensatory tariffs for power generators falling within Clause 13 of the PPAs.

Facts:

An agreement was executed between Kamrup Industrial Gases Ltd. and Diesel Locomotive Works, Varanasi, for setting up a plant to manufacture Oxygen and Acetylene gases. The agreement required Diesel Locomotive Works to lift a minimum quantity of gases each month, with payment obligations even if the minimum quantity was not lifted. Kamrup Industrial Gases Ltd. initiated arbitral proceedings due to the non-lifting of the minimum quantity of gases by Diesel Locomotive Works. The arbitral proceedings lasted from 1982 to 2004.

Issues:

The production of documents by Kamrup Industrial Gases Ltd. before the arbitrator.

The entitlement of Kamrup Industrial Gases Ltd. to payment for the shortfall in gases lifted by Diesel Locomotive Works.

Held:

The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's decision and affirmed the arbitral award. The Court found that Kamrup Industrial Gases Ltd. had indeed produced the required documents before the arbitrator, contrary to the High Court's findings.

Additionally, the Court concluded that Kamrup Industrial Gases Ltd. had duly informed Diesel Locomotive Works before emptying their cylinders, as required by the agreement. Post-decretal interest was awarded to Kamrup Industrial Gases Ltd. at the rate of 9% on the awarded amount, with effect from the date the arbitral award was decreed.

Facts:

The dispute concerns land in Survey No.129/68 Paiki, with multiple parties asserting ownership or rights over it. Previous legal proceedings, including CCCA No.14 of 1972, established the appellant society's ownership of the land in Survey No.129/68 Paiki. Despite this, another case (LGC No.44/2000) was filed challenging the ownership, leading to the present appeals.

Issues:

whether the Special Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter, considering the doctrine of res judicata and previous decisions establishing the appellant's ownership of the land.

Held:

The court holds that the principles of res judicata apply, given the previous decisions establishing the appellant's ownership of the land. The court finds errors in the Special Court and High Court's failure to recognize the finality of the previous rulings.

The appeals filed by the appellant society are allowed, and those filed by the respondents are dismissed. The impugned judgment by the High Court and the orders passed by the Special Court are quashed and set aside. The contempt petition filed by the respondents is also dismissed. No costs are awarded.

Facts:

The appellant was tried for offenses under Sections 342, 376(2)(b), and 506 IPC and was acquitted by the Trial Court. The victim, represented by the widow of the deceased, challenged the acquittal by filing a criminal appeal under Section 372 CrPC.

The High Court initially allowed the appeal without requiring leave, but subsequent decisions questioned this interpretation. The matter was brought before the Supreme Court for resolution.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 372 CrPC and whether victims have an unfettered right to appeal against acquittal without obtaining leave from the High Court under Section 378(3) CrPC.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that while victims have a substantive right to appeal against acquittal under Section 372 CrPC, leave from the High Court as required under Section 378(3) CrPC is necessary. This position was clarified based on the decision in Satya Pal Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh.

The Court granted leave for the victim's appeal to proceed and remitted the matter back to the High Court for fresh consideration. The rejection of the state's application seeking leave to appeal does not preclude the victim from filing an appeal. The Court also expressed gratitude to the Amicus Curiae for their assistance in the case.

Facts:

The respondent, Ramanand, was convicted by the trial court for the murder of his wife Anita and daughter Ekta under Sections 302 and 201 IPC.

The High Court acquitted Ramanand of the charges under Sections 302 and 201 IPC but convicted him under Section 306 IPC.

The State of Rajasthan appealed against the decision of the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the evidence presented in the case was sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Whether Ramanand could be convicted under Section 306 IPC.

Held:

The medical evidence indicated that the deaths of Anita and Ekta were due to strangulation, not burn injuries. Therefore, the conviction under Section 306 IPC was unjustified.

There was insufficient evidence to conclusively establish Ramanand's guilt under Section 302 IPC. The prosecution relied on circumstantial evidence, but there was no direct evidence linking Ramanand to the murders.

Ramanand's statement provided to the police (Ext. D-1) was considered as evidence against him, but it alone was not sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The circumstances on record did not rule out every other hypothesis except the guilt of the accused. Therefore, Ramanand was entitled to the benefit of doubt and could not be convicted under Section 302 IPC.

The appeal by the State of Rajasthan was rejected, and Ramanand was acquitted of the charge under Section 306 IPC as well.

Facts:

The prosecution alleged that the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of a temple proposed to transfer the Kotharis from the temple due to misappropriation of funds. The Kotharis and their associates, including the appellants, conspired to kidnap and kill the Chairman.

Issues:

Whether the courts below correctly determined the guilt of the accused based on circumstantial evidence and legal principles.

Whether the evidence presented by the prosecution established the conspiracy and the involvement of each accused beyond reasonable doubt.

Held:

The courts below rightly proved the guilt of the accused based on motive, 'last-seen' theory, place of murder, disposal of the body, recovery of the body, and the conduct of the accused .

Conspiracy can be inferred from circumstantial evidence, and the courts found sufficient evidence to establish it beyond reasonable doubt.

The disclosure made by accused no. 3 about the location where the dead body was dumped was considered admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act .

The identity of the deceased was established through medical examination and other corroborating evidence.

The courts analyzed the involvement of each accused based on the evidence presented and found accused nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5 to be involved in various stages of the crime.

There was a strong motive for accused nos. 1 and 2 to commit the murder due to their fear of losing control over the temple affairs.

The judgment affirmed the order of conviction against accused nos. 1, 2, and 5, rejecting their appeals.

Decision: The court upheld the convictions based on the evidence and legal principles applied by the courts below, dismissing the appeals made by the accused.