Facts:

The appellant, who was elected as Chairman of District Cooperative Milk Producers Union Ltd. for a term of three years, continued to hold office beyond the prescribed period.

Issues:

The main issues included the validity of the actions taken by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies under Sections 76B and 81 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961.

The interpretation of the provisions regarding removal and disqualification of officers from cooperative societies.

Held:

The Court upheld the removal of the appellant from office as per the action initiated under Section 76B(1) of the Act. The removal was based on the Registrar's satisfaction regarding the appellant's misconduct and breach of duties.

The Court declined to act as an appellate court to examine the correctness of the conclusions drawn by the Registrar regarding the charges framed against the appellant. Such an exercise is generally not undertaken, neither by High Courts nor by the Supreme Court.

The Court clarified the distinction between Sections 76B and 81 of the Act, stating that action could be taken against individual officers or the entire committee of a cooperative society. The Registrar has discretionary power to decide which course of action to take.

The Court discussed the provisions of Section 76B(2) regarding the disqualification of officers from holding office. It emphasized that such disqualification can only be imposed after the removal of the officer under Section 76B(1) and that the factual basis for both actions must be the same.

Regarding the disqualification period, the Court noted that while Section 76B(2) allowed for a maximum disqualification period of six years, in this case, the acts leading to the action occurred before the amendment extending the disqualification period. Therefore, the six-year disqualification was not applicable retroactively.

Facts:

The appellant owned agricultural land, including the suit land, subject to the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act.

Sale of suit land to respondents in 1975 was declared void by the Tribunal.

Civil suit filed by the appellant in 1998 seeking injunction against respondents.

Appeal filed by respondents to High Court, which reversed Trial Court's decision and dismissed the suit.

Appellant appealed to Supreme Court.

Issues:

Validity of sale of suit land.

Appellant's lawful possession of the suit land.

Applicability of State laws regarding agricultural land.

Held:

The Supreme Court revoked the certificate granted by the High Court under Article 134-A of the Constitution. The Court upheld the High Court's decision, dismissing the suit.

The appellant was found to have no legal right to sell the land after the enactment of the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms Act. Additionally, the Tribunal's order from 1976 had legal implications, and the suit land was considered surrendered to the state.

The Court directed further action by the Tribunal regarding the appellant's rights under the Act. The absence of the State as a party defendant was noted, which was necessary considering the agricultural land's status under state laws.

Facts:

The National Auto Fuel Policy, 2003, aimed to address the alarming rise in air pollution attributed significantly to vehicular emissions.

The government implemented Bharat Stage norms gradually, starting with specific regions and later expanding nationwide.

The policy mandated the transition to Bharat Stage IV compliant vehicles, with a clear cutoff date of April 1, 2017, for the sale and registration of non-compliant vehicles.

Issues:

The plea of manufacturers of non-compliant vehicles, seeking reasonable time to dispose of existing stock, despite having sufficient notice of the transition to Bharat Stage IV norms.

Held:

The Court, underscores the government's determination to introduce Bharat Stage IV emission norms for all vehicles manufactured on and after April 1, 2017. The implementation of this policy was gradual, with clear indications of transitioning from Bharat Stage III to Bharat Stage IV compliant vehicles.

The Court emphasizes that the government's notifications regarding the sale and registration of non-compliant vehicles should be interpreted purposively, considering their direct impact on public health. The Court rejects the manufacturers' plea for an extended disposal period, emphasizing the importance of public health over commercial interests.

Highlight the manufacturers' failure to adjust production strategies despite having ample notice of the transition. The Court dismisses the explanations provided by manufacturers and stresses the health implications of vehicular emissions on millions of citizens.

The Court, reiterates the need for a purposive interpretation of notifications concerning public health issues, emphasizing the importance of safeguarding the health of citizens.

Additionally, The Court underscores the significant health benefits of using Bharat Stage IV auto fuel compared to Bharat Stage III fuel, further justifying the transition.

The Court, elucidates that the government's phased approach towards emissions regulation aimed to benefit society as a whole rather than catering solely to commercial interests.

Decision: The Court dismisses the intervention applications filed by manufacturers, upholding the government's policy of prohibiting the sale and registration of non-compliant vehicles from April 1, 2017.

Facts:

The Respondent, M/S. Palakkad Heritage Hotels, applied for an FL-11 Licence under the Foreign Liquor Rules.

The application was rejected by the Excise Commissioner based on an amendment introducing a minimum distance requirement of 200 meters from objectionable institutions.

The Respondent filed a writ petition in the High Court of Kerala challenging the rejection and seeking various reliefs, including the issuance of the FL-11 licence.

The Single Judge allowed the writ petition, relying on precedents and directed issuance of the licence based on the law prevailing at the time of the Excise Commissioner's recommendation.

The State of Kerala appealed to a Division Bench of the High Court, which upheld the Single Judge's decision.

The State further appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the law applicable should be as of the date of the final decision by the competent authority.

The Supreme Court considered the interpretation of relevant laws and remanded the case to the Single Judge for fresh consideration.

Issues:

Whether the law applicable for considering the application for the FL-11 licence should be as of the date of the recommendation by the Excise Commissioner or the date of the final decision by the competent authority.

Whether the rejection of the application based on the amended provisions of the Foreign Liquor Rules was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the relevant date for considering the law applicable to the application for the FL-11 licence is the date of the final decision by the competent authority, not the date of the recommendation by the Excise Commissioner.

The rejection of the application based on the amended provisions of the Foreign Liquor Rules was justified, and the case was remanded to the Single Judge for fresh consideration in light of the amended rules.

The decision of the Division Bench of the High Court and the Single Judge's judgment were set aside, and the writ petition was remanded to the High Court for fresh consideration.

Facts:

The case involved the murder of two individuals, with charges against 19 accused persons. Initially, the trial court acquitted all accused, giving them the benefit of the doubt due to a purported lack of evidence. Subsequently, the State and the complainant filed appeals and revisions challenging the acquittal.

Issues:

Whether the trial court's acquittal of all accused was based on a perverse and incorrect appreciation of evidence.

Whether the testimonies of eyewitnesses, including an injured witness, were reliable and corroborated by medical evidence.

Whether the High Court's decision to convict the accused was justified based on the evidence presented.

Held:

The trial court's reasoning for disbelieving the evidence of the injured witness (PW.5) was found to be perverse and incorrect. The Supreme Court observed that there was evidence indicating PW.5 was unconscious when admitted to the hospital, which the trial court had overlooked. (Para 22)

The absence of a certificate from the doctor regarding PW.5's state of consciousness was deemed inconsequential, as it was well established that such lapses do not undermine the prosecution's case. The High Court's reliance on PW.5's testimony and medical evidence was therefore justified. (Para 23)

The High Court appropriately considered the evidence of PW.5 and noted that his injuries were not disputed. The court found that the trial court's disregard of PW.5's testimony was unsustainable, as it was corroborated by medical evidence. (Para 24-25)

The testimonies of other eyewitnesses, such as PW.1 and PW.2, were also found reliable and consistent with the prosecution's case. The trial court's dismissal of their testimonies was unwarranted, and the High Court's reliance on them was deemed appropriate. (Para 26-27)

The trial court's criticism of certain witnesses' presence at the court on the day of the incident was rejected, as it did not undermine their credibility. The High Court's decision to convict the accused based on the eyewitness testimonies and medical evidence was upheld. (Para 28)

Despite the non-presentation of weapons to the doctors, the Supreme Court emphasized that this did not weaken the prosecution's case, given the clear medical evidence indicating homicidal injuries. (Para 30-31)

The Supreme Court affirmed that when evidence supports guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, acquittal should not be upheld. It reiterated that while it typically refrains from interfering with acquittals, it would do so if the acquittal appears perverse, illegal, or unjust. (Para 35-37)

Decision: In conclusion, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and affirmed the High Court's decision to convict the accused based on the reliable eyewitness testimonies and medical evidence presented.

Facts:

Simplex Infrastructures Ltd., the Respondent, was awarded a construction contract by the Union of India, the Appellant.

Disputes arose, leading to arbitration proceedings, where the Arbitrator ruled in favor of Simplex Infrastructures Ltd.

The Union of India filed a petition to set aside the arbitral award before the District Court at Port Blair, which was held not maintainable.

Simplex Infrastructures Ltd. filed an execution proceeding in the High Court at Calcutta related to the arbitral award.

The District Court held that the petition filed by the Union of India under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was not maintainable due to lack of territorial jurisdiction.

The Union of India filed a petition under Section 34 of the Act before the High Court at Calcutta, seeking to set aside the arbitral award, and also filed an application for condonation of delay.

The Single Judge of the High Court allowed the application for condonation of delay.

Issues:

Whether an intra-Court Letters Patent Appeal under clause 15 of the Letters Patent of the High Court at Calcutta can be maintained against an order passed by a Single Judge regarding condonation of delay in filing a petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Held:

The Court held that the remedy of appeal against the order of the Single Judge condoning the delay in filing the petition under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act was not available under Section 37 of the Act. The Act provides for a remedy of appeal only against orders setting aside or refusing to set aside an arbitral award under Section 34(1)(c). The decision of the Division Bench to entertain the Letters Patent Appeal was erroneous, as the order of the Single Judge fell within the ambit of the Act.

The Union of India was permitted to challenge the judgment of the Single Judge through appropriate legal recourse, but not through a Letters Patent Appeal. The appeals were allowed, and the Division Bench's judgment was set aside.

The Court granted liberty to Simplex Infrastructures Ltd. to challenge the judgment of the Single Judge separately.

Facts:

The appellant, Vaneet Mahajan, was the complainant in a case where he, along with his brother and an employee, was attacked by a group of individuals armed with deadly weapons. The attack was allegedly orchestrated by a cabinet minister in the Punjab government. The appellant suffered several injuries, including grievous ones, leading to the registration of a criminal case under various sections of the IPC, including Section 307.

Issues:

Whether the charges under Section 307 IPC were sustainable based on the evidence presented. Whether the High Court's decision to delete the charge under Section 307 IPC was justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court disagreed with the High Court's conclusion that the intention to kill was conspicuously missing. It observed that the prosecution's case, as detailed in the FIR and supported by medical evidence, clearly indicated that the accused had attacked the victims with deadly weapons, targeting their heads and causing grievous injuries.

The Court cited precedent to emphasize that for an offense under Section 307 IPC, it is not necessary that the injury be on a fatal part of the body. It also highlighted that when several persons attack unarmed individuals with deadly weapons, it is reasonable to presume that they had the intention or knowledge that such attack could result in death.

Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashed the High Court's order, and directed that the accused persons be tried for the offense under Section 307 IPC as well.

Facts:

Anant Singh @ Anant Kumar Singh, the appellant, was preventively detained under the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981, on 21.9.2016, for a maximum period of one year.

The appellant was alleged to be involved in 31 grave crimes, including murder, attempt to murder, and kidnapping, and had been in jail since 24.6.2015.

A previous preventive detention order dated 5.9.2016 was revoked due to lack of State Government approval within the specified time.

The subsequent detention order was passed on 21.9.2016 based on grounds prior to the revocation of the earlier order.

Issues:

Whether the subsequent detention order passed on 21.9.2016 is valid under Section 23(2) of the Bihar Control of Crimes Act, 1981.

Whether the appellant's representation rights and procedural safeguards were violated under the Act.

Whether the detention order met the requirements of Section 12(1) of the Act.

Held:

The Court held that the detention order dated 21.9.2016 was invalid due to non-compliance with Section 23(2) of the Act, as it was based on grounds that arose prior to the revocation of the earlier order.

The Court relied on the judgment in Hadibandhu Das v. District Magistrate, Cuttack (1969) 1 SCR 227, which established that revocation includes both valid and invalid orders, and fresh orders must be based on new grounds. This principle ensures that the detaining authority fully applies its mind and complies with statutory requirements.

Consequently, the judgment of the High Court was set aside, and the appellant's appeal was allowed, resulting in the annulment of the detention order dated 21.9.2016. However, the Court clarified that its decision does not preclude the State Government from taking any other lawful action against the appellant.

Facts:

Anil Kumar Dadurao Dhekale (the appellant) sought eviction of the respondents from his property under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947.

The original tenant, Manilal Ishwarbhai Valand, defaulted on rent payments, leading to a notice from the appellant.

The appellant filed a Rent Suit No.499 of 1978 seeking possession of the property and arrears of rent.

The trial court ruled in favor of the appellant, but the decision was overturned by the First Appellate Court.

The High Court affirmed the decision of the First Appellate Court.

Issues:

Whether there was default in payment of rent.

Whether the property had been sublet without permission.

Whether the defendants were entitled to continue the tenancy after the death of the original tenant.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the evidence supported a monthly tenancy, not an annual one as concluded by the lower courts. The respondents had defaulted on rent payments for more than six months, making them liable for eviction under Section 12(3)(a) of the Bombay Rent Control Act.

The defendants were not entitled to continue the tenancy after the death of the original tenant, as they were not carrying on the same business as the tenant, as required by Section 5(11)(c) of the Act.

Evidence of subletting was found, and the findings of the lower courts on this matter were reversed.

The appeal was allowed, the High Court's judgment was set aside, and the eviction order passed by the trial court was restored.

The respondents were directed to vacate the premises within two months.