Facts:

K.K. Mishra faced criminal prosecution for allegedly defaming the Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh during a press conference.

The prosecution initiated the case under Section 199(2) Cr.P.C., alleging defamation against the Chief Minister based on certain statements made by Mishra during the press conference.

Issues:

Whether the statements made by Mishra during the press conference had a reasonable nexus with the discharge of public duties by the Chief Minister.

Whether the Public Prosecutor properly scrutinized the materials before initiating the prosecution.

Held:

The alleged defamatory statements lacked a reasonable connection with the discharge of public duties by the Chief Minister.

The Public Prosecutor failed to properly scrutinize the materials before initiating the prosecution. Therefore, the prosecution proceedings were quashed, and Mishra's conviction and sentence were set aside. The court invoked its powers under Article 142 of the Indian Constitution to ensure justice.

Facts:

The appellant association, representing 'Paramparya Vaidyas' practicing Siddha/Unani/Ayurveda systems of medicine, challenged provisions in the Travancore-Cochin Medical Practitioners Act, 1953, which restricted them from practicing certain types of medicine without registration under the Act.

The High Court dismissed the challenge, prompting the appeal before the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the restrictions imposed by the Travancore-Cochin Medical Practitioners Act, 1953, on the practice of indigenous medical systems by Paramparya Vaidyas violate their fundamental right to practice a profession guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution.

The applicability of exemptions under the Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970, and their impact on the eligibility and registration of practitioners of indigenous medical systems.

Held:

The Travancore-Cochin Medical Practitioners Act, 1953, aimed to regulate qualifications and registration of practitioners of modern medicine in the State of Travancore-Cochin.

The Indian Medicine Central Council Act, 1970, does not provide exemptions from qualification or registration requirements for practitioners of indigenous medical systems. However, Section 17(3)(c) protects those practicing Indian systems of medicine for at least five years before the commencement of the IMCC Act, subject to certain conditions.

Section 23 of the 1953 Act sets eligibility conditions for registration of medical practitioners, while Section 38 prohibits unregistered persons from practicing various types of medicine unless exempted by the State Government.

The capacity to diagnose diseases depends on possessing necessary professional skills, typically certified by recognized diplomas or degrees. Without such qualifications and registration under relevant acts, individuals are not entitled to practice medicine.

The right to practice any profession is guaranteed under the Constitution but is subject to laws regulating professional qualifications. Regulatory measures aim to ensure the standard of professional qualifications and conduct for the protection of public health and safety.

Every practitioner is deemed registered under the 1953 Act if their name appears in the appropriate register at the Act's commencement. However, the appellants failed to demonstrate possession of recognized qualifications for registration.

Decision: The Court upheld the dismissal of the appeals, emphasizing the importance of regulatory measures ensuring professional qualifications and conduct for the protection of public health and safety.

Facts:

The case concerns a challenge to Regulation 9(IV) and (VII) of the Postgraduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000, as amended on 5th April 2018. These regulations relate to the selection procedure for candidates for postgraduate medical courses, particularly focusing on the reservation of seats for in-service medical officers.

Issues:

Whether Regulation 9 of the Postgraduate Medical Education Regulations, 2000, as amended, permits reservation of seats for in-service medical officers.

Whether the legislative competence of the Union and the States, as outlined in relevant entries of the Constitution, allows for such reservation.

Held:

The court held that the issues raised required consideration by a larger bench, as they had not been adequately addressed in previous judgments. It noted that Regulation 9 is a self-contained code regarding admission procedures for medical courses and emphasized that the state has no authority to undermine these procedures. While the petitioners argued that previous relevant decisions and legislative entries were not considered in previous judgments, the court decided that the issues required thorough examination. Therefore, the matters were to be placed before the Chief Justice of India for consideration by a larger bench. The petitioners were given the opportunity to make a mention on a specified date.

The decision to refer the case to a larger bench was based on the need for a comprehensive consideration of the legislative competence of the Union and the States, as well as the interpretation of Regulation 9 in light of previous relevant decisions. This decision aligns with the court's commitment to ensuring the proper interpretation and application of laws and regulations governing medical education and admissions. The court's approach underscores the importance of legal clarity and consistency in matters of significant public interest, such as access to postgraduate medical education.

Facts:

The original plaintiff, Sucha Singh, filed a suit for permanent injunction against the respondent, alleging threats of dispossession from the property. Subsequently, he withdrew this suit and filed another suit for specific performance of an agreement regarding the same property.

Issues:

Whether the subsequent suit for specific performance was barred under Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC.

Whether the plaintiff needed specific permission to file the subsequent suit after withdrawing the first one.

Held:

The Court analyzed the provisions of Order 2, Rule 2 of the CPC and emphasized the distinction between causes of action for different reliefs. It held that the subsequent suit for specific performance was not barred under Order 2, Rule 2 because the causes of action for claiming permanent injunction and specific performance of an agreement are independent. The Court referred to relevant sections of the Limitation Act to support its interpretation. Additionally, the Court held that the plaintiff's statement at the time of withdrawal, coupled with the court's permission, satisfied the requirement for filing a fresh suit. Therefore, the Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgments of the Trial Court and High Court, and dismissed the application under Order 7, Rule 11 of the CPC. The original civil suit for specific performance was restored to be tried on its merits, with directions for expeditious disposal by the Trial Court.

Facts:

Shiva Kant Jha, a retired pensioner and CGHS beneficiary, submitted medical bills for reimbursement for treatment received at non-empaneled hospitals for cardiac and cerebral ailments.

Despite multiple attempts and representations, a significant portion of the claims was denied by the CGHS.

The petitioner sought relief under Article 32 of the Constitution, asserting violations of Articles 14 and 21, and requested the Court's intervention to protect his fundamental rights.

Issues:

Whether the petitioner was unfairly denied medical reimbursement under the CGHS.

Whether the CGHS procedures and guidelines were properly followed in the petitioner's case.

Whether the actions of the CGHS officials violated the petitioner's fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution.

Held:

The Court held that the petitioner was unfairly denied medical reimbursement despite genuine emergency conditions and the lack of options for empaneled hospitals at the time of treatment. It emphasized the entitlement of government employees to medical facilities during and after their service, without undue restrictions. The Court criticized the mechanical approach of CGHS officials and directed the respondent-State to pay the balance amount owed to the petitioner.

Furthermore, the Court instructed the establishment of a Secretary level High Powered Committee to ensure timely disposal of similar cases and mandated the formation of a grievance redressal committee for retired pensioners. These measures aimed to streamline the process and ensure hassle-free disposal of claims within a specified timeframe.

Facts:

Appellant and respondent companies entered into an agreement in 1982.

Disputes arose regarding import of materials, leading to arbitration.

Arbitrators couldn't reach a consensus, resulting in the appointment of an umpire.

Appellant sought de novo proceedings before the umpire, but request was dismissed.

Umpire passed an award in favor of respondent, challenged by appellant in High Court.

High Court upheld the award, leading to present appeal in Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether umpire must conduct de novo hearing from stage of disagreement between arbitrators.

Whether appellant's conduct amounts to waiver of right to de novo hearing.

Held:

The court held that the umpire, when appointed due to disagreement between arbitrators, should conduct a de novo hearing, but not necessarily from scratch. The term "de novo hearing" implies a fresh hearing based on existing pleadings, evidence, and documents. However, the appellant's conduct, in delaying its request for de novo hearing until a late stage, amounted to waiver of its right to such a hearing.

Therefore, the umpire was not obliged to entertain the appellant's request for de novo proceedings. The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decisions of the lower courts.

Facts:

The case involved the interpretation of sections 84 and 86 of the Electricity Act 2003 concerning the appointment of Chairpersons and Members of Central and State Regulatory Commissions.

Issues:

Whether it is mandatory to appoint a High Court Judge as the Chairperson of the State Commission.

What are the qualifications required for the appointment of Chairpersons and Members of State Commissions.

How should statutory provisions be interpreted in determining the requirements for appointments to regulatory bodies.

Held:

The judgment clarified that Section 84(2) of the Electricity Act 2003 is an enabling provision, and it is not mandatory to appoint a High Court Judge as the Chairperson of the State Commission.

However, it is mandatory to have a person of law as a Member of the Commission, possessing qualifications equivalent to those required for a High Court Judge or a District Judge, due to the adjudicatory functions of the State Commission.

The judgment emphasized that while interpreting statutory provisions, both the golden rule and literal rule of statutory construction must be applied. It's not the court's role to read into the statute something not provided, but the real intention of the legislature can be ascertained by considering the entire scope of the statute.

The functions of the State Commission under Section 86 of the Act were analyzed, concluding that while regulatory functions predominate, there are also limited adjudicatory functions. Therefore, it's not imperative for the Chairperson to be a judicial member.

The judgment dismissed challenges to appointments made to the Tamil Nadu State Commission and the exercise of suo moto powers by the Commission, finding no evidence of financial bias and stating that appointments were made following due process .

Facts:

The appellant filed an application for an Agricultural Electricity Service Connection on 06.12.2010, which was initially returned due to a missing signature.

Upon resubmission on 21.03.2011, no action was taken by the respondents.

A writ petition was filed, and the Single Judge directed consideration of the application after necessary conditions were fulfilled.

The Division Bench set aside the Single Judge's order, stating that the 2017 application should be considered if found to be in order.

Issues:

Whether the appellant's application for an agricultural electricity service connection should be considered from the date of initial submission or resubmission.

Whether the non-deposit of the registration fee constitutes a valid reason for rejecting the application.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the application should be considered from the date of resubmission, 21.03.2011, as the defect of non-payment of the registration fee was not communicated by the respondents initially.

The respondents cannot benefit from their lapse in not communicating the defect, and thus the appellant's application cannot be rejected solely on the grounds of non-payment of the registration fee.

The respondents are directed to consider the application from 21.03.2011 and the appellant to resubmit the demand draft.

The respondents are given three months to process the application and notify any further requirements.

Facts:

The dispute arose from a direction issued by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh regarding alleged violations of previous court judgments and interim arrangements.

The respondents alleged that certain policy guidelines dated February 17, 2014, violated the spirit of an earlier judgment dated May 17, 2012, and interim arrangements made by the court.

The appellants challenged the High Court's findings in the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the guidelines framed and notified in accordance with court directions violated previous judgments and interim orders.

Whether the contempt proceedings initiated by the High Court were justified.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that once guidelines were framed and notified, the interim order to maintain status quo lapsed. The Court emphasized that contempt jurisdiction is limited to instances of willful disobedience of court directions.

The High Court's finding of violations of the earlier judgment and its subsequent contempt proceedings were not justified.

The impugned order dated May 28, 2015, was set aside, and the appeal was allowed.

Civil Appeal No. 9310 of 2016 and SLP (C) No. 1865 of 2016 were disposed of in accordance with the judgment.