Facts:

Canara Bank (appellant) received an application from C.S. Shyam (respondent) seeking information about the transfer and posting of clerical staff from 2002 to 2006.

The information sought included personal details of individual employees such as joining date, designation, promotions, and transfer orders.

The bank's Public Information Officer declined to provide the information citing Section 8(1)(j) of the Right to Information Act, 2005, and stating it had no nexus with public interest.

Issues:

Whether the information sought by the respondent falls within the ambit of personal information exempted from disclosure under Section 8(j) of the Act.

Whether there is a requirement to establish a public interest, especially a larger public interest, for the disclosure of such personal information.

Held:

The Supreme Court held in favor of Canara Bank and against C.S. Shyam. The Court concluded that the information sought was indeed personal in nature and exempted from disclosure under Section 8(j) of the Right to Information Act, 2005. Moreover, the respondent failed to establish any public interest, let alone a larger public interest, justifying the disclosure of this information.

Therefore, the application made by the respondent under Section 6 of the Act was deemed misconceived. The Court set aside the orders of the High Court and Central Information Commission and restored the original decision of rejecting the respondent's application for information. The appeal is allowed,

Facts:

The case involves a challenge to the appointment of arbitrators under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

Whether the appointed arbitrators met the requirements of independence and impartiality as per the Act and relevant schedules.

Whether the challenges raised against the appointment of the arbitrators are sustainable under the provided grounds.

Held:

Under Section 12 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, a person approached for possible appointment as an arbitrator must make a written disclosure regarding any past or present relationship or interest in the parties or dispute that could raise doubts about their independence or impartiality.

The 2016 Amendment Act introduced a distinction between persons who become "ineligible" to be appointed as arbitrators and those about whom doubts exist regarding their independence or impartiality. If an arbitrator falls into any category specified in the Seventh Schedule, they become "ineligible" to act as an arbitrator.

Challenges based on grounds listed in the Fifth Schedule should be determined by the Arbitral Tribunal under Section 13. If unsuccessful, the party challenging the appointment may seek to set aside the arbitral award under Section 34. However, challenges based on the Seventh Schedule render the arbitrator "ineligible" and can be addressed directly by the Court under Section 14(2).

Items listed in the Schedules should be interpreted broadly to ensure arbitrators' impartiality and independence.

Previous involvement in an arbitration between the parties does not necessarily render an arbitrator ineligible due to bias, as long as there is no indication of a pronounced anti-claimant view.

Arbitrators should make timely written disclosures to parties, but failure to do so due to administrative oversight may not necessarily invalidate the appointment.

Explanation 3 to the Seventh Schedule, regarding maritime or commodities arbitration, does not affect the applicability of other items in the Schedule.

Decision:

The Court upheld the appointment of the arbitrators, finding the challenges to their appointments unsustainable based on the disclosed grounds.

Facts:

The appellant company, MIS. INNOVENTIVE INDUSTRIES LTD., defaulted on payments owed to ICICI BANK under credit facilities. ICICI BANK filed an insolvency petition against the appellant to initiate the insolvency resolution process under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (the Code). The appellant argued that its liability was suspended temporarily under the Maharashtra Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions Act), 1958 (the Maharashtra Act), and it was unable to pay debts due to non-release of funds under a master restructuring agreement (MRA).

Issues:

Whether the Maharashtra Act conflicts with the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Whether the appellant's arguments regarding suspension of liability under the Maharashtra Act and non-payment due to the MRA are valid.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decisions of the National Company Law Tribunal (NCLT) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), affirming that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 prevails over the Maharashtra Relief Undertakings (Special Provisions Act), 1958. The Court emphasized the objective of the Code to speed up the insolvency process and prevent entrenched managements from continuing if they cannot pay debts.

The Court clarified the principles of repugnancy between central and state laws under Article 254 of the Constitution, stating that the later central enactment prevails over earlier state enactments if they are repugnant. The Court concluded that the Maharashtra Act cannot hinder the corporate insolvency resolution process under the Code, as it directly conflicts with the objectives and procedures of the Code.

The Court rejected the appellant's arguments regarding the suspension of liability under the Maharashtra Act and non-payment due to the MRA, stating that these do not hold weight in the insolvency resolution process.

Facts:

The appellant's ancestors claimed possession of roughly 5 acres of land since 1930.

Proceedings were initiated against the appellants under various Acts, including the U.P. Zamindari Act and the U.P. Tenancy Act.

Eventually, proceedings were initiated under the Public Premises Act, alleging unauthorized occupation by the appellants.

Issues:

Whether the appellants were unauthorized occupants or non-occupancy tenants.

Whether the proceedings under the Public Premises Act were valid.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the dismissal of the suit under Section 180 of the U.P. Tenancy Act for non-prosecution automatically conferred hereditary tenancy status upon the appellants.

As hereditary tenants, the appellants could not be considered unauthorized occupants under the Public Premises Act.

Therefore, all previous orders against the appellants were without jurisdiction.

The Court directed the return of possession of the land to the appellants and ordered that equivalent land with a lease should be made available to ex-servicemen currently occupying any part of the land.

The judgment under appeal was set aside, and the appeal was allowed in favor of the appellants.

Facts:

Gangajali Education Society filed a writ petition challenging the rejection of their application to establish a medical college by the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Government of India, based on recommendations from the Medical Council of India (MCI).

Issues:

The petitioner argued that the rejection was unjustified, as they had addressed the deficiencies highlighted by the MCI, and the Oversight Committee (OC) had recommended confirming their Letter of Permission (LoP).

They contended that the Competent Authority (MHFW) failed to adequately consider the OC's opinion and did not provide tangible reasons for rejecting it.

Held:

The Court observed that the Competent Authority's decision lacked proper analysis and failed to address the factors highlighted by the OC. While the Competent Authority is not bound by the OC's recommendations, it should provide clear reasons for disagreeing with them. The Court found that the deficiencies noted by the MCI were within permissible norms, and the explanations offered by the petitioner were acceptable. Additionally, the Court noted that the Competent Authority's decision was influenced by one-off incidents rather than a pattern of non-compliance. It emphasized the need for an objective assessment based on the entire record.

Ultimately, the Court allowed the writ petition, quashing the decision to bar the petitioner from admitting students and directing the respondents to permit the petitioner college to participate in the current year's counselling process.

The Court extended the deadline for admissions and directed the respondents to provide willing students to the petitioner college through central counselling. However, it allowed the MCI or the Competent Authority to inspect the petitioner college and take appropriate action if any deficiencies were found.

Facts:The appellant's wife underwent a hysterectomy at Ashutosh Nursing Home, following consultation with Dr. Biswanath Das. The surgery was performed despite the patient's high blood pressure and low hemoglobin levels. The appellant alleged medical negligence, particularly concerning the decision to operate without controlling these conditions and the choice of a nursing home without ICU facilities.

Issues:

Whether the decision to perform surgery amounted to medical negligence.

Whether the choice of a nursing home without ICU facilities constituted negligence.

Held:

The Court held that while the decision to perform surgery may not itself be considered medical negligence, the choice of a nursing home lacking ICU facilities was negligent. This decision was based on the foreseeability of post-operative risks to the patient's life due to the absence of an ICU. Compensation of Rs. 5 lakhs was awarded to the appellant's heirs.

The Court emphasized the need for speedy resolution of consumer disputes, suggesting measures such as monitoring mechanisms for timely adjudication and encouraging alternative dispute resolution methods like mediation.

Facts:

Dr. Jagat Narain Subharti Charitable Trust applied for establishing a medical college, which was initially denied due to deficiencies in land ownership and other criteria.

Despite earlier approvals, subsequent inspections highlighted deficiencies, leading to the college being debarred from admitting students for two academic sessions.

Issues:

Whether the decision to debar the college was justified, considering the explanations provided by the college and recent developments in land ownership.

Held:

Highlights that the deficiencies cited by the Hearing Committee and the competent authority of the Central Government were already addressed by the college and were within permissible norms. The lack of rejection of the college's explanations suggests the decision lacked proper consideration.

Emphasizes the issue of land ownership, indicating that recent judgments favored the college's ownership of the required land. The competent authority failed to analyze this crucial aspect, displaying non-application of mind.

Dismisses concerns regarding the submission of Form-5, as the application was made before the requirement's effective date and the information provided was substantial.

Concludes by setting aside the decision to debar the college and directing authorities to permit admission of students for the academic session 2017-18. The judgment stresses the importance of complying institutions for imparting medical education, citing a recent case as precedent.

Facts:

The petitioner, Kanachur Islamic Education Trust, had its college admission allowed for the academic year 2016-2017 with the condition that admission for the next academic year would require permission from the respondent. Subsequent inspections by the Medical Council of India (MCI) recorded deficiencies, leading to negative recommendations for two academic years. However, the Oversight Committee recommended confirming the conditional Letter of Permission (LOP) granted to the petitioner's college. Despite this, the respondent concurred with the MCI's decision to debar the college from admissions for the academic years 2017-2018 and 2018-2019.

Issues:

The procedural fairness of the decision-making process, the adequacy of the inspections, and the justification for debarment from admissions.

Held:

The importance of fair hearing and the audi alteram partem principle, which requires giving the affected party a reasonable opportunity to be heard.

This principle is fundamental to fair procedure and applies to administrative actions with civil consequences, as emphasized in paragraph 20.

The court found that the respondents failed to conduct a dispassionate and rational analysis of the materials on record, resulting in casual findings against the petitioner's college. Consequently, the decision to debar the college lacked justification and violated the principles of natural justice.

Decision:The court allowed the writ petition, confirming the conditional LOP granted to the petitioner's college for the academic year 2016-17 and granting LOP for the academic year 2017-18. Additionally, the court directed the Central Government and the MCI to conduct inspections if necessary to ensure compliance with medical education standards. The date of counseling for admissions for the academic year 2017-18 concerning the petitioner's college was extended accordingly.

Facts:

The complainant, N. Harihara Krishnan, sought to implicate a company during the trial under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, on the grounds that the company was the drawer of the dishonored cheque, and the accused, J. Thomas, was merely a signatory .

Issues:

Whether the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to summon the company during the trial was valid.

The nature of the offense under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Liability of the appellant (Director of the Company) and compliance with procedural requirements.

Justification for condoning any delay in initiating prosecution against the company.

Held:

The application under Section 319 Cr.P.C. was deemed an attempt to initiate prosecution against the company beyond the statutory period of limitation, as stipulated in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 .

The offense under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, is person-specific, and the complaint must contain all necessary factual allegations, including disclosing the name of the person drawing the cheque.

The liability of the appellant (Director of the Company) is statutory, and the company can raise defenses such as the initiation of prosecution being barred by limitation .

Strict compliance with procedural requirements under Section 138 is essential, and failure to comply with any step would not provide a cause of action for prosecution .

No justification was found to condone the delay in initiating prosecution against the company, as the complainant had already issued a notice to the company as per the provisions of Section 138 .

Decision: The appeal was allowed, and the High Court's decision was overturned .