Facts:

The appellant, Maharishi Markandeshwar Medical College and Hospital, along with others, challenged the validity of sections 3(6), 3(6a), and 3(6b) of the Himachal Pradesh Private Medical Educational Institutions Act, 2006, as amended.

They contended that the requirement for private medical institutions to obtain affiliation from Himachal Pradesh University infringed upon the autonomy of Maharishi Markandeshwar University, established under a separate legislation.

Issues:

Whether the amendment requiring private medical institutions to seek affiliation from Himachal Pradesh University is valid.

Whether such a requirement infringes upon the autonomy of Maharishi Markandeshwar University.

Held:

The Court ruled that since Maharishi Markandeshwar Medical College and Hospital is a constituent of Maharishi Markandeshwar University, it cannot be compelled to seek affiliation from another university, namely Himachal Pradesh University.

Section 3(6a) of the Himachal Pradesh Private Medical Educational Institutions Act, 2006, was struck down as irrational, unreasonable, ultra vires, and unconstitutional.

The autonomy of Maharishi Markandeshwar University, established under the Maharishi Markandeshwar University (Establishment and Regulation) Act, 2010, should be respected. The university has the authority to grant affiliation to its constituent colleges.

The 2006 Act primarily deals with admissions and fees in private medical colleges and does not extend to matters of establishing a university or starting new courses. Therefore, the requirement of affiliation from Himachal Pradesh University for Maharishi Markandeshwar University's constituent college was deemed outside the scope of the Act.

Provisions of the 2010 Act establish Maharishi Markandeshwar University as an independent and autonomous university, and any attempt to compel it to seek affiliation elsewhere would impinge upon its autonomy and conflict with the special state legislation under which it was established.

The court rejected the argument that the university's grant of an essentiality certificate was conditional upon compliance with the 2006 Act, stating that such conditions cannot impose unconstitutional obligations on the university.

Facts:

Pawan Kumar was convicted under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) for abetting the suicide of a young girl. The girl had committed suicide by setting herself ablaze after facing constant harassment and threats from Pawan Kumar, who had previously been acquitted in another criminal case.

Issues:

The credibility of the dying declaration recorded by a Head Constable without a certificate of fitness from a doctor.

Interpretation of abetment under Section 306 of the IPC and its application to the facts of the case.

Assessment of evidence regarding harassment and its role in the victim's decision to commit suicide.

Examination of the societal impact of eve-teasing and its violation of women's rights under the Indian Constitution.

Held:

The dying declaration, despite lacking a certificate of fitness from a doctor, was considered credible by the court.

The court emphasized that a certificate of fitness is not a legal requirement and upheld the reliability of the dying declaration.

Abetment under Section 306 of the IPC involves actively suggesting or supporting someone to commit suicide, which can be inferred from the continuous conduct of the accused. The court explained the meaning of abetment and its application to the case.

The court found that the accused's continuous harassment and threats had led the victim to commit suicide. It emphasized that mere allegations of harassment without positive action by the accused are insufficient for a conviction.

Eve-teasing was deprecated by the court, which emphasized the importance of respecting women's rights and dignity under the Indian Constitution. The court highlighted the societal impact of eve-teasing and its violation of women's fundamental rights.

Decision: The court upheld Pawan Kumar's conviction under Section 306 of the IPC, agreeing with the High Court's decision to reverse the acquittal. It underscored the importance of respecting women's rights and condemned any form of harassment or violence against them.

Facts:

A complaint was filed leading to the registration of FIR No. 53 of 2000, alleging offenses under various sections of the IPC and the SC/ST Act.

The appellants, who were not originally accused, were summoned by the Court of Special Judge, SC/ST Act, to face trial under Section 319 of the Cr.P.C. based on an application filed by the complainant.

The appellants pleaded alibi, claiming they were in Jaipur at the time of the incident, which was supported by documentary evidence collected during the investigation.

Despite the evidence supporting their alibi, the trial court allowed the application under Section 319 Cr.P.C., and this decision was affirmed by the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the trial court and the High Court properly considered the evidence supporting the appellants' alibi before summoning them to face trial under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

Held:

The Supreme Court examined the principles governing the exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. and emphasized that it should be exercised sparingly and based on strong and cogent evidence. The Court reiterated that the purpose of this provision is to ensure that the real culprits do not escape punishment.

In this case, the Court found that the trial court acted in a casual manner by relying solely on the statements of the complainant and other witnesses during trial, ignoring the documentary evidence collected during the investigation that supported the appellants' alibi. The Court criticized the trial court and the High Court for overlooking this crucial evidence.

Ultimately, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, setting aside the order summoning the appellants under Section 319 Cr.P.C.

This case underscores the importance of careful consideration of all available evidence before exercising the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to summon additional accused persons to face trial.

Facts:

In the case of Common Cause v. Union of India (Writ Petition (Civil) No. 245 of 2014), an NGO filed a writ petition seeking a declaration that certain provisions of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013, and the Rules were ultra vires.

The petition also sought to restrain the initiation of any process for the selection and appointment of the Chairperson and Members of the Lokpal under the said Rules.

Issues:

Whether the enforcement of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 should be suspended until the proposed amendments through the Lokpal and Lokayuktas and Other Related Law (Amendment) Bill, 2014, are carried out.

Held:

The court, comprising Justices Ranjan Gogoi and Navin Sinha, held that the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013, as it stands today, is an eminently workable piece of legislation.

Therefore, there is no justification to keep the enforcement of the Act under suspension until the proposed amendments are implemented. The amendments proposed in the Lokpal and Lokayuktas and Other Related Law (Amendment) Bill, 2014, seek to include the Leader of the largest Opposition Party in the Lok Sabha in the Selection Committee, among other changes.

The court emphasized that the legislative prerogative to seek changes in an existing law through amendments lies within the exclusive domain of the legislature.

It held that interference by the court in such legislative functions should be avoided. The Act should be allowed to be enforced without suspension until the amendments, if any, are made.

The absence of specific provisions for a truncated Selection Committee to constitute a Search Committee does not invalidate the constitution of the Search Committee.

The proposed amendments and the views of the Parliamentary Standing Committee are seen as attempts to streamline the working of the Act and do not hinder its enforcement.

Decision: The court allowed the writ petitions and held that the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013, should be enforced without suspension until the proposed amendments, if any, are made.

Facts:

A suit was filed for specific performance of a contract regarding a piece of land.

The plaintiff appealed to the High Court after the Trial Court and the First Appellate Court dismissed the suit.

During the pendency of the second appeal, the plaintiff and two defendants passed away, and their legal representatives were not brought on record.

Despite the deaths of the parties, the High Court allowed the second appeal and decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff.

The legal representatives of the deceased defendants challenged the legality of the High Court's judgment.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's judgment, passed after the death of parties without bringing their legal representatives on record, is legally sustainable?

Whether the failure to substitute the legal representatives within the prescribed time period leads to the automatic abatement of the appeal?

Held:

The court held that the failure to substitute the legal representatives of deceased parties within the prescribed time period results in the automatic abatement of the appeal.

The High Court's judgment passed after the death of parties without bringing their legal representatives on record was considered null and void.

The court emphasized the fundamental principle that a decree passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity and can be challenged in any proceeding.

Therefore, the appeal was allowed, and the High Court's judgment was set aside.

Facts:

The petitioner sought a declaration that several provisions of the Lokpal and Lokayuktas Act, 2013 were ultra vires Articles 14 and 50 of the Constitution of India.

Issues:

The primary contention was that the Chief Justice of India or his nominee held a nominal position in the Selection Committee under Section 4(1)(d) of the Act,

lacking primacy in the selection of the Lokpal Chairperson and Members. Additionally, the petitioner argued that the absence of laid-down norms or criteria for appointing an 'eminent jurist' under Section 4(1)(e) rendered the provision legally and constitutionally fragile.

Held:

The Court dismissed the contentions. It ruled that the absence of the expression "in consultation" in the Act did not render Section 4(1)(d) ultra vires the Constitution.

The Court held that according primacy to the opinion of the Chief Justice or his nominee was not mandated by the Constitution in all matters concerning appointments, leaving such decisions to legislative discretion. Similarly, the Court found no ex-facie illegality in Section 4(1)(e) regarding the appointment of an eminent jurist, given the involvement of high-powered Constitutional functionaries. Thus, no declaration of infirmity of these provisions could be made based on the grounds urged by the petitioner.

Facts:

The appellants were convicted under various sections of the IPC and TADA for their involvement in the death of an individual. The conviction was primarily based on confessions and identification parades conducted during the investigation. The prosecution obtained sanction from the competent authority under Section 20A of TADA. However, it was contended that the sanctioning authority failed to comply with the procedural requirements, and the evidence presented, including the confessions and identification parades, lacked reliability.

Issues:

Compliance with Section 20A of TADA regarding the approval of the competent authority.

Reliability of evidence, including confessions and identification parades.

Whether the acts of the accused fulfilled the criteria of creating terror in the minds of the public, as required under TADA.

Held:

The court held that compliance with Section 20A of TADA is mandatory for taking cognizance of offenses under TADA. However, such provisions must be strictly interpreted, and non-compliance may vitiate the proceedings entirely. In this case, the sanctioning authority granted approval mechanically without proper application of mind, rendering the sanction invalid.

The identification parade conducted after the accused were already seen through newspapers was deemed unreliable, undermining its evidentiary value.

Non-voluntary confessions, taken in the immediate custody of high-security CBI, were deemed unacceptable as a basis for conviction. Moreover, the contradictory nature of the confessions further raised doubts about their reliability.

The court emphasized the requirement of demonstrating an intention to create terror in the minds of the public, a crucial element under TADA. The sanctioning authority failed to establish this intention based on the available evidence.

Facts:

The appellant filed an application for execution of a preliminary decree for partition thirty years after the decree was passed.

The application sought the appointment of a court commissioner to carry out the decree passed on 23.11.1959.

Issues:

Whether the application for execution of the preliminary decree for partition was barred by limitation.

The contention revolved around whether the application for the appointment of a court commissioner fell under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

Held:

The Court held that a preliminary decree for partition crystallizes the parties' rights to seek partition to the extent declared, with equities to be worked out in final decree proceedings.

Until the final decree is passed, there is no limitation running against the right to claim partition as per the preliminary decree.

The Court noted that even when an application is filed seeking the appointment of a Commissioner, no limitation is prescribed for this purpose. Therefore, such an application would not be barred by limitation.

The judgment cited various precedents from different High Courts supporting the view that no obligation exists for a litigant to apply for final decree proceedings, and hence, there is no question of limitation until the final decree is passed.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in the arguments presented, and emphasized the necessity of drawing up a final decree in accordance with the law, especially when parties have not worked out their rights by mutual agreement as per the preliminary decree.

Facts:

Several agreements to sell land were made between Tanmay Developers Pvt. Ltd. and landowners, with earnest money paid but sale deeds not executed within the stipulated time frame.

A notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued for acquiring the land.

The landowners filed civil suits for recovery of earnest money and for specific performance of the agreement.

Issues:

Whether the dispute regarding the forfeiture of earnest money should be adjudicated through a reference under Section 30 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, or through civil suits.

Whether the High Court's decision to direct refund of earnest money with interest was appropriate.

Held:

Since civil suits were already filed by the respondent, it was not appropriate to seek a reference under Section 30 of the Act. The dispute should be adjudicated in civil suits.

The scope of Section 30 is narrower compared to Section 18 of the Act, and it is discretionary for the court to refer a dispute under Section 30.

Issues such as the forfeiture of earnest money and the readiness of the respondent to purchase the property were already in dispute in civil suits and should not be decided under Section 30.

The High Court's reliance on a previous judgment was criticized as it was a civil suit case and not applicable to the reference under Section 30.

The appellant's appeals were allowed, setting aside the High Court's judgment, and the landowners were entitled to compensation subject to the outcome of the civil suits regarding earnest money refund.