Facts:

The dispute arises between members of a Hindu family, including uncle, aunt, and nephews, regarding ownership and partition of agricultural lands.

The family tree is provided, showing the relationship between the parties involved.

The appellants filed a suit seeking declaration and partition of certain properties claimed to be self-acquired, while the respondents contested this claim, asserting that the properties were ancestral and had been partitioned previously.

Issues:

Whether the properties claimed by the appellants as self-acquired were indeed so.

Whether the partition of ancestral properties had occurred as claimed by the respondents.

Held:

The Court upheld the findings of the trial court and the high court, which concluded that the plaintiffs failed to prove their case regarding the ownership of the properties in question.

The Court emphasized the burden of proof on the plaintiffs to establish their claims, which they failed to discharge.

The legal presumption of jointness in a Hindu family and the absence of evidence to the contrary led to the rejection of the plaintiffs' claims.

The appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The dispute arose regarding the proper annual valuation of premises for tax assessment under the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980.

The premises consisted of a two-storey building and adjoining land.

The Assessing Officer had determined the valuation of the premises for two assessment years, which was challenged by the appellant before the Tribunal.

Issues:

What is the proper annual value of the premises under Section 174 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980?

How should the annual value be determined for tax assessment purposes?

Held:

The Supreme Court analyzed Section 174 of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation Act, 1980, which distinguishes between land with buildings and open land without buildings for the purpose of annual valuation. It held that these sections operate in separate fields, and the two categories should not be clubbed together for assessment.

The Court disagreed with the High Court's direction to treat land and building as separate units for assessment. It upheld the Tribunal's decision to apply Section 174(1) for determining the gross annual value of the premises. The Court restored the Tribunal's order dated 18.11.2002.

The result, the appeal succeeds and is allowed.

Facts:

The appellant, Maharaja Amrinder Singh, challenged the decision of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, which allowed the appeals filed by the Revenue (Commissioner of Wealth Tax) under Section 27-A of the Wealth Tax Act, 1957. The High Court set aside the orders passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal and restored the order of assessment passed by the Assessing Officer for levying penalty for the entire period of delay in respect of Assessment Years 1981-82, 1982-83, and 1983-84.

Issues:

Whether the High Court was justified in allowing the appeals filed by the Revenue and setting aside the orders passed by the Tribunal.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court had proceeded to decide the appeals without formulating the substantial questions of law, as required by Section 27-A of the Wealth Tax Act.

The Court found that the High Court failed to determine whether the appeals involved any substantial questions of law and, therefore, the impugned orders of the High Court were not legally sustainable. Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals, set aside the impugned orders, and remanded the cases to the High Court for deciding the appeals afresh, directing the High Court to formulate the substantial questions of law involved in the appeals and decide them accordingly. As a result, the appeals succeed and are allowed.

Facts:

The respondent leased premises to the appellant-company from 1964 to 1985.

Legal proceedings ensued when the respondent sought possession.

Various orders were passed by lower courts and the High Court.

The appellant eventually surrendered possession on 08.10.1998.

The respondent filed a fresh suit (Civil Suit No. 457 of 1998) claiming damages for wrongful possession.

Issues:

Whether the subsequent suit for mesne profits is maintainable?

Whether the respondent had relinquished the claim for mesne profits in previous proceedings?

Held:

The Supreme Court agreed with the appellant's argument, stating that the subsequent suit for mesne profits was not maintainable. The court emphasized that the respondent had relinquished the claim for mesne profits in previous proceedings, and subsequent actions were barred by Order II Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code.

The court ruled in favor of the appellant, holding that the possession of the appellant was not illegal or unauthorized, and the respondent was not entitled to claim mesne profits for the period in question.

Facts:

Samar Kumar Roy filed a suit against Jharna Bera seeking a declaratory decree and perpetual injunction regarding their alleged marriage.

The plaintiff passed away during the pendency of the suit, and his mother applied to be substituted as his legal representative.

The High Court set aside the substitution, stating that no right to sue survived after the plaintiff's death.

The appellant's counsel argued that the suit was maintainable under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act even after the plaintiff's death.

Issues:

Whether a suit filed under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act by a legal representative of a deceased plaintiff is maintainable.

The jurisdiction of family courts in matters related to such suits.

Whether the suit is time-barred.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that A suit for declaration of a legal character, including the status of parties to a marriage, under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, could be filed by a third-party plaintiff or continued by the legal representative of a deceased plaintiff. This was affirmed by various judgments from different High Courts.

The exclusion of jurisdiction under the Family Courts Act, 1984 applied only to suits or proceedings specifically related to the Hindu Marriage Act or the Special Marriage Act, and not to suits filed under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act.

The cause of action would begin to run from the date of the plaintiff's death, and in this case, the appellant's application to continue the suit was timely.

The appellant's counsel offered to settle the matter by sharing the deceased plaintiff's estate with the respondent, and the court directed the respondent to file an affidavit disclosing the amounts received due to her alleged marriage with the deceased plaintiff, with half of the total amount stated therein to be payable to the appellant.

Facts:

Siddalingayya filed a civil suit against Gurulingappa for recovery of damages.

Defendants failed to file their written statement despite granted time.

Trial Court decreed the suit in favor of the plaintiff.

Defendants appealed to higher courts, alleging insufficient opportunity to file written statement.

High Court remanded the case to Trial Court, imposing a cost on defendants.

Plaintiff appealed to Supreme Court against the remand order and the imposed cost.

Issues:

Whether the High Court's remand order was justified.

Whether the imposition of cost on defendants was appropriate.

Held:

The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court to remand the case and impose a cost on the defendants. The Court emphasized the principle of natural justice and fair opportunity for both parties. It concluded that the Trial Court should have granted the defendants some time to file their written statement, subject to payment of a reasonable cost to compensate the inconvenience caused to the plaintiff.

The Court dismissed the appeal and directed the Trial Court to proceed with the trial, issuing notice to the defendants and granting them time to deposit the cost and file their written statement. Failure to comply would result in the revival of the decree passed by the Trial Court against the defendants.

Facts:

The respondents, who were advocates by profession, were appointed by the State Government as Additional Government Pleaders/Assistant Government Pleaders/Additional Public Prosecutors for the Bench of the High Court at Aurangabad. However, the State Government later issued a cancellation order terminating their appointments, which was challenged by the respondents in a writ petition.

Issues:

The Court was to determine the legality and correctness of the cancellation order dated 28.08.2015 issued by the State Government.

Held:

The Court modified the cancellation order, treating it as having been passed under Rule 30(6) of the Maharashtra Law Officers (Appointment, Conditions of Service and Remuneration) Rules, 1984. It directed the State to pay one month's retainer in lieu of notice period to each respondent as fixed in their respective appointment letters.

The State was given three months to make the payments. Additionally, the Court stated that the State could consider the respondents' cases for future appointment if desired, and the cancellation order and any observations made by the High Court would not hinder such consideration.

FACTS:

Dharam Pal, the respondent, was initially appointed as a clerk in 1970 and later promoted to the post of Senior Assistant in 1980.

He was subsequently given officiating charges for higher positions, including Superintendent Grade II and Grade I.

Dharam Pal approached the High Court seeking the benefit of the pay scale for the higher positions he had officiated in, which had not been granted to him.

The High Court, relying on previous decisions, granted Dharam Pal's request for the pay scale benefit.

The State of Punjab appealed against this decision to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

Whether Dharam Pal was entitled to the pay scale benefit for the higher positions he had officiated in.

Whether the High Court's decision was legally sound in light of relevant statutes and precedents.

HELD:

The Supreme Court upheld the High Court's decision, ruling that Dharam Pal was entitled to the pay scale benefit for the higher positions he had officiated in. The Court analyzed the relevant provisions of the Contract Act, 1872, and the Punjab Civil Services Rules and found no prohibition against granting such benefits.

The Court also referred to previous judgments cited by both parties to support its decision. Therefore, the appeal by the State of Punjab was dismissed, affirming the High Court's judgment.

Facts:

Introduction of the parties involved: The appellant is defendant No. 1, while the respondent is the plaintiff. Additional parties were also involved in the case.

Background of the dispute: The dispute revolves around land described in a sale deed dated 09.02.1978, referred to as the "suit land". The plaintiff alleges that they purchased the land for charitable activities, while the defendant contests this claim.

Legal proceedings: The plaintiff filed a suit seeking cancellation of the sale deed, which was initially dismissed by the Trial Court but later decreed by the High Court.

Appeals and remand: The case went through various appeals and was remanded to the Trial Court due to procedural irregularities.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiff, as a society, could invoke Order 1 Rule 8 of the CPC for a representative suit.

Whether the lower courts adequately addressed the jurisdictional issue regarding the trial of the suit.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the lower courts had not properly addressed the issue of jurisdiction to try the suit. Despite the plaintiff seeking permission to prosecute the suit as a representative suit under Order 1 Rule 8 of the CPC, the Trial Court did not sufficiently examine whether a society could be considered a "person" under the said rule. Additionally, the Trial Court failed to determine if the suit met the requirements of a representative suit. Therefore, the Supreme Court decided to remand the case to the Trial Court to address these issues and decide the suit accordingly.

The appeal was allowed, the judgments of the lower courts were set aside, and the case was remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings. The Trial Court was directed to answer the relevant issues and decide the suit within one year from the specified date.