Facts:

A society named Mukka Welfare Society was formed for charitable purposes.

The appellants, who were members of the society, were accused of facilitating the sale of society property to their relatives, allegedly committing fraud and cheating.

The complainant, not a member of the society, filed a criminal complaint after a significant delay of over twelve years since the execution of the sale deeds.

Issues:

Whether the essential elements of the offenses under Sections 406, 409, and 420 of the Indian Penal Code were established based on the complaint and evidence on record.

Whether the inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised to prevent abuse of process or harassment.

Held:

The court found that none of the offenses for which the appellants were summoned were made out based on the complaint and material on record.

Specifically, the court noted that no entrustment of property was proven to establish criminal breach of trust, and there was no indication that the appellants acted in capacities outlined in Section 409 of the IPC.

Regarding cheating, the court found that the complainant was not deceived or induced to deliver the property by deception, as the transactions were reflected in resolutions and sale deeds.

Citing legal precedents, the court emphasized that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Courts under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be used sparingly and with caution, especially to prevent abuse of process or harassment.

Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, quashing the summoning order passed by the magistrate and dismissing the criminal complaint against the appellants.

Facts:

The case involves the acquittal of the accused persons in a criminal trial where the husband of the informant was allegedly abducted and murdered by them. The trial court acquitted the accused due to various procedural lapses, including the non-service of summons to witnesses and lack of efforts by the prosecution to produce witnesses.

Issues:

Whether the trial court's acquittal of the accused was justified given the procedural lapses and miscarriage of justice?

Whether the High Court's decision to order a retrial was appropriate in the circumstances of the case?

Held:

The Court emphasized the fundamental importance of fair trial principles within the criminal justice system. It criticized the negligent attitude of both the prosecution and the trial court, highlighting the trial's farcical nature rather than a genuine pursuit of justice.

The Court observed serious failures on the part of the prosecution and the trial court, including the neglect of summons to witnesses and the hasty conclusion of the trial without ensuring the presence of crucial witnesses.

The High Court's intervention was deemed necessary to rectify the miscarriage of justice evident in the trial proceedings. Its decision to order a retrial was affirmed by the Supreme Court, underscoring the importance of correcting the glaring defects in the initial trial.

Facts:

The Commissioner of Central Excise filed an application before the tribunal under Section 35E(4) within one month of the communication of the order of review. The application also sought condonation of an 8-day delay. The delay occurred during the review process of the Commissioner's order by the Committee of Chief Commissioners, where the reviewing authority received the Commissioner's order three days after its pronouncement. The review order, which was supposed to be passed within three months from the date of communication, was passed after eight days beyond the period.

Issues:

Whether the tribunal has the power to condone the delay in filing appeals, including those under Section 35E(4), of the Central Excise Act, 1944?

Held:

The court held that the analysis made by the Full Bench of the tribunal in a previous case (CCE v. Monnet Ispat & Energy Ltd.) was correct. The Full Bench had opined that the tribunal has the power to condone the delay in filing appeals, including those under Section 35E(4). The court emphasized that the members deciding the case should have been aware of this Full Bench decision to avoid conflicting views on the same issue. Therefore, the court set aside the tribunal's order and remanded the matter back to the tribunal for reconsideration of the application for condonation of delay on its own merits.

Decision: The order passed by the tribunal is set aside, and the matter is remanded to it for consideration of the application for condonation of delay on its own merits.

Facts:

The appellants were added as accused under Section 319 of the CrPC in a murder trial involving the death of Saryug Yadav.

The trial commenced with an FIR against 8 accused, followed by a charge-sheet against four persons. Later, one more person was included via a supplementary charge-sheet.

The appellants were summoned as accused under Section 319 after evidence was considered by the Additional Sessions Judge.

They sought discharge under Section 227, contending insufficient grounds for proceeding against them.

Issues:

Whether a person added as an accused under Section 319 can seek discharge under Section 227.

Interpretation of the opposite effects of Sections 227 and 319 of the CrPC.

Held:

The Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a person added as an accused under Section 319 cannot seek discharge under Section 227.

The interpretation ensures the integrity of the power under Section 319 and aligns with the purpose and intent of the CrPC.

The standard of proof for summoning under Section 319 is higher than that for framing a charge against an accused, as clarified in previous judgments.

Facts:

The Ponnaiyah Ramajayam Institute of Science and Technology Trust submitted an application for establishing a new medical college under Section 10A of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956.

The application was rejected by the Central Government citing the non-submission of essential documents before the cut-off date.

The High Court initially ruled in favor of the petitioner, directing the Medical Council of India (MCI) to consider the application. However, the MCI challenged this ruling in a writ appeal, which was disposed of by a Division Bench of the High Court.

The Division Bench found fault with the rejection of the application solely on procedural grounds and criticized the approach of rejecting applications based on timing without considering the availability of necessary documents.

Issues:

Whether the rejection of the application by the Central Government solely on the ground of late submission of documents was justified?

Whether the Central Government and the Medical Council of India fulfilled their duties in accordance with the law?

Held and Decision:

Prima facie, therefore, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Respondents have not discharged their duty in accordance with the provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder rather acted in a biased manner.

We, therefore, dispose of this application with a direction to the Respondent Medical Council of India to consider the application and make its recommendation within a period of three weeks from today.

FACTS:

Maharani Ushadevi, as the legal heir of the Maharaja of Holkar, claimed ownership of properties managed by the Household Department of the Holkar State. She argued that these properties were the exclusive and individual property of the Maharaja and not owned by the State of Madhya Pradesh. The claim was based on a Covenant whereby the Maharaja of Holkar and other princely States agreed to merge with the Dominion of India.

ISSUES:

Whether the relief sought by Maharani Ushadevi falls within the ambit of Article 363 of the Constitution.

Whether Maharani Ushadevi can claim the status of 'Bhumiswami' independently of the Covenant.

Whether Maharani Ushadevi can claim tenancy rights over the properties.

Whether continuous possession and tax payment by Maharani Ushadevi grant her ownership rights over the properties.

Whether the burden of proof lies with the plaintiff (Maharani Ushadevi) in this case.

HELD:

The right claimed by Maharani Ushadevi flows from the Covenant, and thus the relief sought falls within the ambit of Article 363 of the Constitution.

Maharani Ushadevi cannot claim the status of 'Bhumiswami' independently of the Covenant, as the rights under Section 158(2) of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code arise from the Covenant itself.

Maharani Ushadevi's claim of tenancy rights over the properties is rejected, as it is based solely on the Covenant and not on any tenancy rights.

Continuous possession and tax payment by Maharani Ushadevi do not grant her ownership rights over the properties, especially when they are subject to the Covenant.

The burden of proof lies with the plaintiff (Maharani Ushadevi), and the State's failure to provide evidence weakens its case.

DECISION: The appeals are allowed, and the suit filed by Maharani Ushadevi is deemed not maintainable.

REFERRED CASES:

Draupadi Devi and Others vs. Union of India and others - 2004 (4) Suppl. SCR 223: (2004) 11 SCC 425

Madhav Rao Scindia vs. Union of India - AIR 1971 SC 53: 1979 (2) SCR 62

Karan Singh (Dr.) vs. State of J&K - 2004 (1) Suppl. SCR 43: (2004) 5 SCC 698

FACTS:

Brother-in-law of the appellant created two trusts for the benefit of two minor children of the appellant, Kapoor Chand.

The trusts became partners in a partnership firm, which earned profits in the relevant year.

The Assessing Officer included the income of the trusts in Kapoor Chand's income under Section 64(1)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Kapoor Chand contested the assessment, arguing that since the minors had no immediate access to the income, Section 64(1)(iii) should not apply.

The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) ruled in Kapoor Chand's favor, but the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal overturned this decision.

The High Court upheld the Tribunal's decision, leading Kapoor Chand to appeal to the Supreme Court.

ISSUES:

Whether the income earned by the trusts for the benefit of minor children should be included in Kapoor Chand's income under Section 64(1)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

HELD:

The income earned by the trusts for the benefit of minor children should not be included in Kapoor Chand's income under Section 64(1)(iii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961.

Section 64(1)(iii) requires immediate or deferred benefit to the minor child, which was not fulfilled in this case as the income was not available to the minors until they reached the age of majority.

The trusts' stipulation that income would only be given to the minors upon attaining majority meant that Section 64(1)(iii) did not apply.

Decision: The Supreme Court allowed Kapoor Chand's appeal and set aside the High Court's judgment.

Referenced Cases:

Commissioner of Income-Tax v. M.R. Doshi (211 ITR 1) Yogindraprasad N. Mafatlal v. Commissioner of Income Tax, Bombay City-I (1977) 109 ITR 602

Facts:

The plaintiff-daughter-in-law sought a share in the joint family properties, particularly the 'B' schedule property, which was dismissed by the trial court and first appellate court.

Issues:

The validity of a gift deed executed during the proceedings and the rightful devolution of the property upon the death of the defendant.

Held:

The trial court and first appellate court erred in not granting a share to the plaintiff in the 'B' property despite evidence of its joint family nature and the plaintiff's husband's contribution to its construction.

The gift deed executed by the defendant during the proceedings was invalid under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, as it was executed without seeking leave from the court and couldn't be acted upon by the defendants due to the plaintiff's possession of the property.

The property would devolve upon the deceased husband of the plaintiff along with other legal heirs upon the death of the defendant.

Decision: The judgments of the trial court and first appellate court regarding the 'B' property were set aside. Each party was assigned a 1/4 share in the property.

Facts:

Vijay Mallya, the appellant, was summoned by the Enforcement Directorate regarding a transaction involving Flavio Briatore of M/s. Benetton Formula Ltd. Allegedly, Mallya entered into an agreement without obtaining requisite permissions from the Reserve Bank of India, violating FERA provisions. Mallya failed to appear in response to the summons issued, leading to a criminal complaint being filed against him under Section 56 of FERA.

Issues:

The Mallya's non-compliance with the summonses and the legality of the criminal proceedings initiated against him under FERA.

Held:

The Court dismissed Mallya's appeal, affirming the lower courts' decisions. The court emphasized that the offense under Section 56 read with Section 40 of FERA is independent and not contingent upon the outcome of adjudicating proceedings.

Exoneration by departmental authorities, despite an appeal pending in the High Court, does not absolve Mallya of criminal liability.

The court rejected the argument that withdrawal of the complaint should be considered, emphasizing the seriousness of the offense.

The Supreme Court imposed exemplary costs of rupees ten lakhs to be paid to the Supreme Court Legal Service Authority, denouncing any abuse of the legal process.