Facts:

Royal Orchid Hotels Ltd. (the petitioner) sought registration of their trademark "Royal Orchid" in class 42.

Kamat Hotels (India) Ltd. (the respondent) challenged the registration, claiming prior use of the mark "Orchid."

The Deputy Registrar refused registration based on evidence showing the respondent as the first user.

The IPAB reversed the decision, allowing registration of the petitioner's trademark.

The High Court, upon review, sided with the Deputy Registrar's decision, considering detailed evidence presented by both parties.

Issues:

Determination of the first user of the mark "Orchid/Royal Orchid."

Assessment of similarity between the marks and potential confusion among customers.

Held:

The Supreme Court, after careful consideration, upheld the decision of the High Court. They found the conclusions reached by the High Court to be reasonable and justified. The Court emphasized that confusion could arise among customers using the hotels due to the similarity between the marks. Therefore, the Special Leave Petition was dismissed, and leave to appeal was refused.

Facts:

The case originated from a ban on mining activities imposed by the Supreme Court in three districts of Karnataka due to rampant illegal mining and ecological concerns.

Lessees, including M/s Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Ltd. and M/s MSPL Ltd., sought modifications of earlier orders to increase iron ore extraction within permissible limits.

Various stakeholders, including mining associations, the State of Karnataka, and others, presented arguments regarding the cap on iron ore production.

Issues:

Whether the cap on iron ore production should be maintained, modified, or lifted in light of changing circumstances and recommendations by the Central Empowered Committee (CEC).

Whether category C mines, auctioned under a different regime, should be included within the production cap for the districts.

Held:

The Court accepted the recommendations of the CEC to increase the cap for category A and B mines in Bellary, Tumkur, and Chitradurga districts. This decision was based on changes in mineral reserves, infrastructure improvements, and R&R Plans.

The Court decided not to include category C mines within the revised cap, recognizing them as operating under a different legal and business regime. Separate consideration for their production limits in the future was suggested.

Pending proposals for MPAP enhancement were directed to be decided without delay, subject to the revised cap.

The Court emphasized the need for a realistic solution based on current circumstances and projected future developments, including the availability of iron ore reserves and infrastructure improvements.

Facts:

The case involves a dispute between The State of Jharkhand & Ors. and M/s Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd.

The matter pertains to the jurisdiction of courts in relation to arbitration proceedings under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Issues:

The interpretation of Section 31 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, regarding the jurisdiction of courts in arbitration matters.

Held:

The Court clarified the jurisdictional provisions under Section 31 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Interpretation of Section 31(4) was provided, emphasizing exclusive jurisdiction in the court where the first application relating to the matter is filed.

Original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Articles 32 and 131 of the Constitution was discussed, clarifying that it cannot assume original jurisdiction solely based on control over proceedings.

The Court emphasized that the jurisdiction of a court under a statute cannot shift or become flexible due to the interference of a superior court in a different manner.

It was directed that the matter should be listed before the appropriate Bench, and if objections are already filed before the Civil Court, both parties are granted liberty to file respective objections within the stipulated period.

Decision: The Court disposed of the appeal and provided clarifications on the jurisdictional aspects under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.

Facts:

The appellants/defendants owned a parcel of land, part of which was sold to Madhavan Pillai through a registered sale deed dated April 21, 1975.

Dispute arose over two adjoining sites, numbered 47 and 53, forming part of the land sold to Madhavan Pillai.

Plaintiff claimed ownership and possession of both sites, supported by documents and witness testimony.

Trial court partially decreed the suit, granting injunction for site no. 53 but dismissing the claim for site no. 47.

Both parties appealed to the High Court.

Issues:

Whether the plaintiff had established lawful possession of site no. 47.

Whether the suit for permanent injunction should be decided based on possession rather than ownership.

Whether the defendants' claims regarding the forged documents and denial of witness identity were substantiated.

Held:

The Supreme Court affirmed the High Court's decision, ruling in favor of the plaintiff's possession of site no. 47 based on the evidence presented during the trial. The Court emphasized that the suit for permanent injunction was based on possession rather than ownership. The plaintiff had established lawful possession through the general power of attorney and witness testimony. The Court declined to delve into the question of ownership based on the registered general power of attorney, as the defendants had filed a separate suit for declaration of ownership, pending appeal. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed.

Facts:

The appellant, an automobile manufacturer from Japan, initiated legal action against the respondents, seeking to restrain them from using the unregistered trademark "Prius." The appellant claimed to be the prior user of the mark globally, including in Japan, where they first introduced the "Prius" hybrid car in 1997. However, the respondents had been using the mark since 2001 in India and obtained its registration in 2002. Despite the appellant's global goodwill, the Indian market's reception remained contentious. The Single Judge initially restrained the respondents, but the Division Bench overturned this decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court deliberated over the maintainability of the appellant's action for passing off.

Issues:

Whether the appellant established sufficient goodwill, reputation, and market presence for the "Prius" brand in India at the relevant time?

Whether the territoriality principle governs the trademark dispute, requiring the appellant to demonstrate goodwill in each jurisdiction where protection is sought?

What burden of proof should be placed on the claimant regarding actual confusion versus likelihood of confusion in passing off actions?

Held:

The appellant failed to provide adequate evidence of the "Prius" brand's goodwill and reputation in the Indian market. Limited sales and advertising before 2001, coupled with delayed legal action, weakened their claim. The brand had not acquired sufficient goodwill in the Indian market to maintain a successful action for passing off against the registered owner.

The territoriality principle dictates that a claimant must establish goodwill in each jurisdiction where protection is sought. In this case, the appellant did not sufficiently demonstrate the requisite goodwill in India.

The burden of proving actual confusion should not solely rest on the claimant. Likelihood of confusion can serve as a sufficient test, considering the difficulty in providing evidence of actual confusion.

Decision: The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the Division Bench's decision to set aside the injunction against the respondents' use of the "Prius" mark.

Facts:

The petitioner, Dr. Sabu Mathew George, filed a Writ Petition (Civil) No. 341 of 2008 seeking necessary directions for the effective implementation of the Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994. The petition specifically sought directions to block online sex determination advertisements on websites such as Google India, Yahoo! India, and Microsoft Corporation (I) Pvt Ltd. The petitioner also requested the formation of a separate monitoring committee. Several orders had been pronounced by the Court earlier concerning this matter, yet the petitioner alleged that the Nodal Agency had not been effective in stopping offending material from being displayed on the internet, with Google India, Yahoo! India, and Microsoft Corporation (I) Pvt Ltd. being held responsible.

Issues:

The Court was to address the petitioner's concerns regarding the ineffective implementation of the Pre-conception and Pre-natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994, particularly regarding the prohibition of online advertisements related to sex determination.

Held:

The Court directed the Nodal Agency and the Expert Committee to convene a meeting within six weeks, with the assistance of the petitioner's counsel, to collectively understand and approach the problem. Representatives from Google India, Yahoo! India, and Microsoft Corporation (I) Pvt Ltd. were also directed to appear before the Committee and offer their suggestions. The Court emphasized the need for a constructive and collective approach to finding solutions to ensure compliance with the Act (Para 28).

The Court expressed confidence in the Union of India and its Committee to take appropriate steps to prevent violations of the Act and address the declining sex ratio in the country. It stressed the importance of controlling inappropriate internet exposure and urged cooperation from Google India, Yahoo! India, and Microsoft Corporation (I) Pvt Ltd. in finding a satisfactory solution (Para 29, 30).

Decision:The writ petition was disposed of with the directions outlined above.

Facts:

The incident occurred on 30th July 2003, where the accused persons fired upon and killed Lallu Singh. The prosecution alleged that the accused had a motive due to prior enmity.

Issues:

The credibility of eyewitness testimony, the significance of the ballistic report, the delay in lodging the FIR, and inconsistencies in the evidence.

Held:

The Supreme Court found the testimony of eyewitnesses credible and reliable, as they were close relatives of the deceased and provided consistent details of the incident (para 10).

The court upheld the importance of the ballistic report, which connected the gun recovered from one of the accused to the empty cartridges found at the crime scene (para 11).

The court accepted the prosecution's explanation for the delay in lodging the FIR, considering factors like heavy rain and fear of the accused, and criticized the High Court for relying excessively on this factor (para 15).

Minor inconsistencies in the evidence of eyewitnesses were dismissed as they did not affect the credibility of the witnesses or the prosecution's case (para 14).

The appeal by the State regarding accused Prem Yadav was allowed, confirming his conviction and sentence. The appeals concerning the other three accused were dismissed (para 18).

Facts:

The Section 4(1) Notification for land acquisition was issued on 17.01.1974.

Compensation was determined by the Land Acquisition Officer on 04.06.1977.

The appellants did not pursue the matter further under Section 18 of the Act for reference.

Other claimants pursued the matter, leading to an enhancement of compensation by the Reference Court.

The appellants filed an application under Section 28A seeking similar enhancement.

While the Section 28A application was pending, the award under LAR Nos. 123 and 129 of 1983 was challenged in appeals.

The High Court disposed of these appeals on 23.03.2009, granting compensation at a higher rate.

However, during the pendency of the appeal, the Land Acquisition Collector passed an award on the Section 28A application on 25.10.2000, awarding compensation at the previous rate.

The appellants filed fresh applications under Section 28A on 27.05.2009 based on the judgment of the High Court dated 23.03.2009.

Issues:

Whether successive applications under Section 28A are permissible.

What is the proper course of action for the Land Acquisition Collector when the award is pending in appeal.

Held:

In the peculiar facts of the case, the Court held that while only a single application is maintainable under Section 28A, the Collector should have kept the application pending until the appeals were decided. Therefore, the Court directed the Collector to reconsider the original Section 28A application dated 31.12.1992 in light of the High Court's judgment dated 23.03.2009. The Court set aside the previous award dated 25.10.2000. The Court also directed the Collector to pass orders within three months from the presentation of the judgment copy and disbursed the consequential benefits to the appellants within one month. There shall be no order as to costs. (Para. 17-19)

Facts:

The appeal arises from a Writ Petition filed by the Federation of Hotel and Restaurant Associations of India in the Delhi High Court, challenging the applicability of certain Acts and Rules to services rendered in hotels and restaurants, particularly concerning the pricing of mineral water.

Issues:

Whether composite contracts for services and food and drinks in hotels/restaurants are subject to the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976, and the Legal Metrology Act, 2009, especially regarding charging prices exceeding the MRP for mineral water.

Held:

The court held that the definition of "sale" under the relevant Acts does not differentiate between the sale of goods and the provision of services in composite contracts. Despite a constitutional amendment deeming supply of goods as part of any service to be a sale, subsequent enactments retained the same definition of "sale." The objective of these enactments is to standardize weights and measures for defined goods, ensuring transparency and consumer protection, rather than regulating services.

The court affirmed that neither the Standards of Weights and Measures Act, 1976, nor the Legal Metrology Act, 2009, apply to regulate the sale of mineral water in hotels and restaurants. This interpretation is in line with previous judgments emphasizing the indivisibility of service and sale in such establishments.