Facts:

The appellant participated in a public auction conducted by the State of Madhya Pradesh for the sale of government nazul plots. After winning the bid, the State imposed additional conditions which were not part of the original terms.

Issues:

Whether the appellant breached the contract, the validity of the additional conditions imposed by the State, and the legality of forfeiting the appellant's security deposit.

Held:

The court ruled that the appellant did not commit any breach of the terms and conditions of the original public notice. It was the State that committed breaches, and thus, had no right to forfeit the security deposit.( Para 19)

The court highlighted previous cases where specific clauses in contracts empowered one party to forfeit earnest money in the event of non-performance. Such clauses were absent in this case, leading to the conclusion that the State had no right to forfeit.( Para 36)

It was noted that the State did not suffer any monetary loss as a result of the appellant's actions. On the contrary, the State earned more money from the subsequent re-auction of the plot, strengthening the argument against forfeiture.( Para 41)

The court criticized the State's conduct, emphasizing the need for fair and honest dealings, particularly when the State interacts with individual citizens.( Para 42)

The court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgments of the lower courts. It decreed the appellant's suit, ordering the State to refund the security deposit along with interest. Costs were also awarded to the appellant.( Para 46)

Facts: The case involves the assessment of tax liability on the business income of companies incorporated in the US, specifically Mis. E-Funds IT Solution Inc. The Revenue contends that this income should be taxable in India due to the existence of a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India.

Issues:

Whether the activities of the US companies in India constitute a Permanent Establishment (PE) as per the provisions of the Income Tax Act and the Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA).

Whether the burden of proof lies on the Revenue to establish the existence of a PE in India for the foreign assessee.

Whether the outsourcing of work to India by the US companies gives rise to a fixed place PE or a service PE.

Held:

The judgment confirms that under Article 7(1) of the DTAA, the business income of companies incorporated in the US is taxable only in the US unless they have a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India. No specific finding in the assessment order or appellate orders established the existence of a fixed place of business in India put at the disposal of these companies. (Para 10, 11)

The burden of proving the existence of a PE in India lies initially on the Revenue. (Para 10)

The activities of the Indian company were limited to providing support services, which did not amount to the creation of a fixed place PE. Similarly, the conditions for a service PE were not met as none of the customers of the US companies were located in India or received services in India. (Para 16, 17)

The Revenue failed to establish that the Indian company acted as an agent of the US companies, as required for an agency PE. (Para 21)

The arm's length principle has been satisfied in the case, mitigating further profits attributable to a potential PE in India. (Para 21)

Decision: The judgment dismisses the appeals, affirming that the business income of the US companies is not taxable in India due to the absence of a Permanent Establishment (PE).

Facts:

The case involved an appeal before the Supreme Court against an order of the Recovery officer under the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 (RDB Act). The appeal was filed beyond the prescribed period of 30 days, and the question before the Court was whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 could be invoked to condone the delay.

Issues:

Whether the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 apply to proceedings under Section 30(1) of the RDB Act.

Whether the Tribunal has the power to condone delay in preferring an appeal beyond the prescribed period under Section 30(1) of the RDB Act.

Held:

The Court held that the proceedings under the RDB Act are before a statutory Tribunal and not a court, and therefore, the Tribunal does not have inherent power to condone delay unless expressly conferred by the statute. (Para 11)

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies only to proceedings before a court and does not extend to proceedings before a Tribunal, unless expressly provided for by the statute. (Para 12)

Section 24 of the RDB Act applies only to original applications made under Section 19 of the Act and does not extend to appeals under Section 30(1) of the Act. (Para 12)

The legislative intent for the exclusion of extension of time by the Tribunal in preferring an appeal under Section 30 of the Act was express. (Para 14)

Therefore, the prescribed period of 30 days under Section 30(1) of the RDB Act for preferring an appeal against the order of the Recovery officer cannot be condoned by application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. (Para 14)

The appeals were dismissed on these grounds. (Para 16)

Facts:

The case involves the requisition and acquisition of land for the development of Calcutta. The property was requisitioned in 1979, and this requisition continued for 14 years. A Single Judge of the High Court, through an order dated 10.03.1993, directed the authorities to acquire the properties within 6 months. However, there was a delay in initiating land acquisition proceedings. Subsequently, a notification under section 4(1)(a) for acquisition of premises was issued. The Division Bench of the High Court held that the requisition under section 3(1) had lapsed, deeming the acquisition illegal.

Issues:

Whether the requisition of the property automatically lapsed upon the expiration of the specified time in the earlier court order?

What is the effect of the statutory power to acquire the land in light of the court's previous order?

Is the principle of res judicata applicable in this case?

Held:

The requisition of the property did not automatically lapse upon the expiration of the specified time in the earlier court order.

Requisition continues until an order of release is passed under section 6, and possession is delivered.

The statutory power to acquire the land was not stifled by the earlier court order.

The High Court's decision to quash the acquisition was deemed erroneous.

The Court set aside the Division Bench's order and restored the Single Bench's order.

The principle of res judicata is not applicable in this case as statutory action was not stifled by the earlier court order. The appeal is allowed.

Facts:

The respondent filed a suit for specific performance against the appellant in 1986.

In 2014, a third party, respondent No. 3, sought impleadment as Plaintiff No. 3 in the suit, claiming an assignment of rights.

The appellant opposed this impleadment, citing inordinate delay and prejudice to its defense rights.

Issues:

Whether the order allowing the impleadment application constitutes a 'judgment' or an 'interlocutory order'?

Whether the impleadment application filed after 27 years of the suit filing should be allowed?

What principles govern impleadment and amendment applications in suits for specific performance?

Held:

The court held that the order allowing the impleadment application after 27 years was a 'judgment' within the meaning of Letters Patent Appeal, as it affected the vital rights of the parties, particularly the appellant's defense rights.

The court emphasized the need for impleadment applications to be filed within a reasonable time, especially in commercial litigation. While acknowledging the wide discretion in allowing amendments, the court noted that amendments causing prejudice or affecting substantial rights of defense should not be permitted. Thus, the impugned judgment was set aside, and the Chamber Summons filed for impleadment was dismissed.

Facts:

The appellants, partners in M/s. G.D. & Sons, owned a Cinema building known as "Alpana Cinema" in Model Town, New Delhi.

The valuation of the Alpana Cinema property was contested under the Wealth Tax Act for the assessment years 1970-71 to 1974-75.

The Wealth Tax Officer initially adopted the land and building method for valuation but later made a reference to the Departmental Valuer for assessment.

The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) accepted the income capitalization method proposed by the appellants.

The Revenue challenged the ITAT's decision in the High Court, which upheld the Wealth Tax Officer's valuation method.

Issues:

Whether the income capitalization method or the land and building method should be used for valuing the Alpana Cinema property under the Wealth Tax Act.

Whether the Wealth Tax Officer has the discretion to choose between valuation methods under Section 7(2)(a) of the Act.

Held:

The Court held that the Wealth Tax Officer has discretion in choosing the valuation method, as Section 7(2)(a) of the Wealth Tax Act is enabling and not mandatory. The Court emphasized that the primary method for valuation under Section 7(1) is based on the market price, while Section 7(2)(a) provides an alternative method for businesses.

Referring to past judgments, including Commissioner of Wealth Tax, Calcutta v. Tungabadra Industries Ltd., Calcutta, the Court reiterated that the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal's decision is not binding on the High Court if it finds no error in the ITAT's decision. In the present case, the High Court found no fault in the Wealth Tax Officer's decision to adopt the land and building method. Additionally, the Court rejected the appellants' argument that the method favorable to them should be adopted, clarifying that such a rule applies only in cases of ambiguity in the taxing statute. Ultimately, the Court dismissed the appeals, affirming the High Court's decision.

Facts:

The establishment of the District Mineral Foundation (DMF) was mandated by the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957.

Notifications were issued by the Ministry of Mines and Ministry of Coal regarding contributions to the DMF.

The validity of these notifications, particularly regarding their retrospective effect, was challenged.

Issues:

Whether the notifications establishing DMFs could have retrospective effect.

The validity of contributions to the DMF.

Held:

The intention of Parliament was for State Governments to establish the DMF with effect from January 12, 2015, as mandated by Section 9B of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (Para 18).

The establishment of DMFs did not adversely affect anyone's vested rights, and thus, there is no objection to the operation of the notifications from January 12, 2015 (Para 19).

Delegated legislation is typically prospective, and retrospective effect is not permissible unless expressly authorized by the parent statute. There is no such authorization in this case (Para 21).

The liability to contribute to the DMF arose from the notification issued on September 17, 2015 (Para 37).

Contributions for coal, lignite, and sand for stowing were required from October 20, 2015, or from the date of establishment of the DMF in the concerned State, whichever is later (Para 42).

Subsequent notifications attempting retroactive substitution are deemed ultra vires the rule-making power of the Central Government (Para 44).

Decision: The establishment of DMFs should be considered operational from the date of their publication. Contributions to the DMF are required from the dates specified in the relevant notifications. Retroactive substitution of notifications is invalid.

Facts:

The petitioners, Indian Young Lawyers Association & Ors., filed a writ petition seeking the issuance of appropriate directions to enable female devotees aged 10 to 50 to enter the Lord Ayyappa Temple at Sabarimala, Kerala. They challenged the exclusion of women based on certain customs and usage, and also contested the constitutionality of clause (b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965.

Issues:

Whether the practice of excluding women based on biological factors amounts to "discrimination," thereby violating Articles 14, 15, 17, and not protected by 'morality' as used in Articles 25, 26.

Whether such exclusion constitutes an "essential religious practice" under Article 25 and whether the religious institution can assert such a claim under the right to manage its own affairs in the matter of religion.

Whether the Ayyappa Temple has a denominational character and if so, whether it is permissible for a religious denomination managed by a statutory board and financed out of the Consolidated Fund of Kerala and Tamil Nadu to indulge in practices violating constitutional principles/morality.

Whether clause (b) of the Kerala Hindu Places of Public Worship (Authorization of Entry) Rules, 1965 permits 'religious denomination' to ban the entry of women between the ages of 10 to 50 years and if it violates Articles 14, 15(3) of the Constitution by restricting entry of women on the ground of sex.

Whether clause (b) of the Rules, 1965 is ultra vires the Act, 1965 and if treated to be intra vires, whether it will be violative of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution.

Held:

The court, considering the significant issues involved, referred the matter to the Chief Justice to constitute an appropriate larger bench to address the aforementioned issues.

Facts:

The appellant, Bharat Deep Sethi, contested an interim order by the High Court directing him to pay Rs. 1,25,000/- per month to the respondent-landlord, Sonia Takkar. The appellant was a tenant under an unregistered lease deed occupying a shop in Delhi. The respondent claimed ownership of the property and filed a suit for eviction, which the Rent Controller initially ruled in her favor.

Issues:

The amount of rent to be paid by the appellant-tenant, with both parties disputing the appropriate sum.

The appellant sought leave to defend against eviction, contesting the existence of a landlord-tenant relationship.

Held:

The Supreme Court modified the interim order, directing the appellant to pay Rs. 40,000/- per month from June 2017 towards use and occupation, with arrears to be paid within four weeks. The matter was remitted back to the High Court for fresh consideration, allowing the appellant an opportunity to raise all contentions/issues.

The High Court was requested to expedite the proceedings and dispose of the matter preferably within three months. No coercive steps were to be taken by the respondent-landlord until the matter was finally disposed of by the High Court.