Facts:

The case involved Central Bank of India (Appellant) versus Virudhunagar Steel Rolling Mills Ltd. and Others (Respondents).

The Appellant provided credit facilities to the Respondent Company, which were secured by movable and raw materials.

Directors of the Respondent Company (Respondent Nos. 2 to 4) provided personal guarantees through various documents executed on August 30, 1974.

The Appellant filed a suit in 1980 for recovery of debts amounting to Rs. 12 lakhs.

The Trial Court decreed the suit against the company but dismissed it against the directors.

The High Court upheld the Trial Court's decision, stating that the directors were not liable for debts incurred before August 30, 1974.

Issues:

Whether the directors are liable for debts incurred by the company prior to the execution of personal guarantees.

Interpretation of the guarantee deeds executed by the directors.

Held:

In view of the foregoing discussion, there appears to be no controversy as to the fact that the Guarantee Deeds executed by Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 on 30.8.1974 rendered them personally liable for any transactions or advances made by the Appellant Bank to the Respondent Company after 30.8.1974. There is also no controversy whatsoever that the Bank account lay dormant after this date, all dealings having been transacted much prior thereto. Such being the position, it is not open to the Appellant Bank to pursue Respondent Nos. 2 to 4 for recovery of debts incurred by the Respondent Company in favour of the Appellant Bank.

Therefore, the Court concluded that the directors were only liable for transactions or advances made after August 30, 1974, and not for debts incurred by the company before that date. The appeal was dismissed, affirming the findings of the lower courts.

Facts:

LIC of India issued circulars restricting the assignment of insurance policies, especially those intended for trading purposes.

The respondents challenged these circulars, arguing that insurance policies are freely tradable and assignable under the Insurance Act, 1938.

The case revolved around the interpretation of Section 38 of the Insurance Act and subsequent amendments.

Issues:

Whether insurance policies are freely tradable and assignable.

The interpretation of Section 38 of the Insurance Act, 1938, and its applicability to assignments.

The validity of circulars issued by LIC restricting assignments.

Held:

The Court examined Section 38 of the Insurance Act, 1938, and its mandatory nature prior to its amendment. It concluded that insurers like LIC were mandated to accept assignments following the procedure laid down in the section.

The Court emphasized the importance of legislative intent and held that subsequent amendments granting insurers discretion did not apply retrospectively. It ruled that the circulars issued by LIC were ultra vires the statute and invalidated them.

Additionally, the Court rejected arguments based on public policy, highlighting the contra proferentem rule, and emphasized the importance of contractual obligations. Ultimately, the Court upheld the judgment of the High Court, declaring insurance policies to be freely tradable and assignable in accordance with the provisions of the Insurance Act.

Facts:

The Railways leased out Front Second Class Luggage Rake (FSLR) and Ventilated Parcel Van (VP) for a two-year period. The notification inviting tenders for this lease was challenged on the grounds that it denied traders the ability to transport goods at specified rates. Initially, a Single Judge of the High Court quashed the notification, but a Division Bench issued directions to incorporate regulatory checks on the lessee's power in setting tariffs.

Issues:

Whether the notification inviting tenders for the lease of FSLR and VP was valid.

Whether the regulatory checks imposed by the Division Bench were justified.

Held:

The statute did not prescribe a specific manner for leasing the wagons. Therefore, the absence of a prescribed method did not render the lease action illegal.

The burden of proving a violation of Sections 70 and 71 of the Railways Act, 1989 rested on the appellant, who failed to provide evidence of undue preference being given to any person, especially considering the lease was awarded through an auction process.

The direction by the Division Bench to fix an upper limit on rates chargeable by the contractor aimed to regulate the contractor's power in setting tariffs and had attained finality as the respondents did not challenge it further .

The Railways must adhere to the ethos and parameters set by the Railways Act. While the executive has the right to formulate policy, it cannot shift the fundamental nature of the Railways without parliamentary approval.

The Railways are empowered to auction space for a specific period, provided the auction contractor adheres to prescribed tariffs. They must ensure that successful tenderers do not charge carriage prices exceeding those set in the Coaching Tariff No. 24 Part III. The Appeal is accordingly disposed of.

Facts:

The case involved the sale of secured assets by a secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act.

The auction sale was challenged on the grounds that the consideration money did not reflect the correct value of the secured assets.

Issues:

Whether the sale of secured assets by a secured creditor under the SARFAESI Act can be controlled by the company court or the official liquidator.

Whether the auction sale was conducted fairly and whether the consideration money reflected the correct value of the secured assets.

Held:

The SARFAESI Act is a complete code in itself and does not require supplementation from the Companies Act. The necessary provisions from the Companies Act have already been incorporated into the SARFAESI Act to harmonize the two legislations.

The involvement of the official liquidator in the sale process is mandated by express provisions of the SARFAESI Act and Rules, not to supply any omission in the SARFAESI Act but because of explicit provisions therein.

The Parliament's clear intention expressed in Section 13 of the SARFAESI Act is that a secured creditor has the right to enforce its security interest without court intervention. However, the Act provides mechanisms for redressal of grievances by borrowers, including companies under liquidation.

The sale confirmed in favor of the auction purchaser was upheld as valid. No illegality or irregularity was established against the conduct of the auction. The offer made during the auction was fair, and the sale was conducted in a competitive and transparent manner.

Fluctuations in property prices do not warrant reopening a confirmed sale unless there are compelling reasons to do so. Once a sale is confirmed and possession is delivered to the purchaser, it should not be disturbed without valid cause.

Decision: The appeals were disposed of, affirming the validity of the auction sale conducted under the SARFAESI Act.

Facts:

The appellant, Pramod, challenged the denial of his appointment to the post of Principal in a private Polytechnic Institution administered by Shri Shiva Ji Education Society.

The core issue revolved around whether the appellant, as the senior-most lecturer, was entitled to be considered for appointment to the post of Principal as required by Rule 3 of the MEPS Rules.

The appellant had been working at the institution since 1977 and fulfilled the qualifications for the post. Despite this, he was denied promotion to the Principal's position, leading to legal proceedings.

The High Court ruled against the appellant, stating that appointment to the post of Principal could also be made by nomination or direct recruitment, not solely by promotion. However, the Supreme Court disagreed with this interpretation.

Issues:

Whether the appellant, as the senior-most lecturer, was entitled to be considered for appointment to the post of Principal by promotion in accordance with Rule 3 of the MEPS Rules.

The applicability of the Government Rules 2012 to private polytechnics like the respondent institution.

The determination of the appellant's superannuation age and its impact on the case.

Held:

The Court held that the MEPS Rules, being statutory, could not be ignored, and Rule 3(3) mandated the appointment of the senior-most member of the teaching staff as Principal. The Court emphasized that the Government Rules 2012 did not apply to private polytechnics like the respondent institution.

The Court addressed the issue of the appellant's superannuation age, noting discrepancies and lack of clarity in the applicable regulations. Despite this, the Court ordered the immediate reinstatement of the appellant within two weeks and directed his appointment as Principal by promotion within four weeks.

The appellant was deemed to have been appointed Principal from December 1, 2012, and entitled to all consequential benefits. Additionally, the Court awarded costs of Rs. 50,000 to the appellant, payable by the respondent society.

Facts:

The state of Kerala aimed to achieve a liquor-free environment through various measures, including control over manufacture, wholesale and retail supply, and consumption. The policy included restrictions on public consumption of alcohol.

Issues:

Whether the exclusion of five-star hotels from the ban on serving alcohol in their bars is constitutionally valid under Article 14 and Article 47.

Held

The state's policy consists of three elements: control over manufacture, wholesale and retail supply, and consumption of alcohol. The policy is aimed at curbing alcohol consumption, which is disproportionately high in Kerala compared to other states.

Article 14 allows for reasonable classifications, and Article 47 imposes a responsibility on state governments to contain or curtail alcohol consumption. The policy to ban public consumption of alcohol except in five-star hotels is encouraged by the court.

The court found the classification of hotels based on star ratings reasonable and not arbitrary. The exemption for five-star hotels from the ban on public consumption of alcohol is justified, particularly considering tourism considerations.

Judicial review of state policy should only occur if it is arbitrary, unfair, or violates fundamental rights. Courts should give reasonable time for state policies to be effective.

The state should review its policy if there is an increase in alcohol consumption or laxity in enforcement. The court also noted the socio-economic impact of the policy, including job losses in the bar industry.

Decision: The appeals were dismissed, upholding the state's policy on alcohol consumption, including the exemption for five-star hotels.

Facts:

The case pertains to the issuance of Government Order (G.O.) No. 118 dated May 23, 2006, by the Tamil Nadu government, which stated that any Hindu possessing the required qualifications and training could be appointed as an Archaka in Hindu temples.

Issues:

The primary issue before the court was the validity of G.O. No. 118 dated May 23, 2006, and whether appointments of Archakas should be made in accordance with the Agamas, subject to conformity with constitutional mandates and principles.

Held:

The court held that appointments of Archakas should be made in accordance with the Agamas, subject to their due identification and conformity with constitutional mandates and principles.

The rights guaranteed by Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution are circumscribed and to be enjoyed within constitutionally permissible parameters. The court clarified that it is within its duty as the Constitutional arbiter to determine whether a belief or practice claimed is a fundamental part of religious practice.

The validity of the G.O. depends on whether the prescriptions under a particular Agama or Agamas are contrary to any constitutional mandate. The court highlighted that the blanket fiat of the G.O. allowing any Hindu possessing the requisite qualification to be appointed as an Archaka may potentially violate constitutional principles.

The court rejected the argument that the writ petitions were not maintainable, stating that the institution of a writ proceeding does not need to await actual prejudice. The issue raised concerns religious faith and practice, which is of public interest.

Facts:

The informant alleged that her father-in-law and husband were murdered at their house by several assailants.

Charges were filed against multiple accused under various sections of the Indian Penal Code and Arms Act.

The Trial Court convicted the accused, while the High Court acquitted one and upheld the conviction of the others.

Appeals were filed challenging the High Court's judgment.

Issues:

Whether the convictions and sentences imposed by the Trial Court were justified.

Whether the acquittal of one accused and the convictions of the others by the High Court were proper.

Whether there were procedural irregularities in the filing of the FIR and inquest report.

Held:

The Court, after thorough examination, upheld the High Court's judgment and dismissed the appeals. It found that while there were discrepancies in the initial statements regarding one of the accused, the evidence presented was sufficient to establish the guilt of the others.

The Court also addressed arguments for enhancement of sentences but declined to intervene, considering the principles of criminal jurisprudence and the circumstances of the case.

Facts:

The appellant, Gautam Kundu, filed a bail application under Section 439 Cr.P.C. while facing prosecution under Section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA). Simultaneously, proceedings under Section 24 of the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (SEBI Act) were pending.

Issues:

Whether the conditions for grant of bail specified in Section 45 of PMLA override the provisions of Section 439 Cr.P.C., especially when there are pending proceedings under SEBI Act.

Held:

The court held that PMLA is a special statute enacted by the Parliament to address the offence of money laundering, and its provisions prevail over the general provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, as per Section 5 of Cr.P.C..

Section 45 of PMLA, starting with a non-obstante clause, mandates two conditions for granting bail in cases where the accused faces imprisonment for more than three years under Part-A of the Schedule of PMLA. These conditions include giving the prosecutor an opportunity to oppose bail and satisfying the court that there are reasonable grounds to believe the accused is not guilty and will not commit an offence while on bail.

The court emphasized that the conditions specified under Section 45 of PMLA are mandatory and must be complied with, as reinforced by other provisions like Sections 65 and 71 of PMLA. Even if the bail application is made under Section 439 of Cr.P.C., these conditions apply.

Additionally, Section 24 of the SEBI Act presumes that proceeds of crime are involved in money laundering unless proved otherwise, shifting the burden of proof onto the appellant.

The court affirmed that the conditions laid down under Section 45 of PMLA bind the High Court, even when considering bail applications under Section 439 Cr.P.C..

Decision: The court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the High Court to refuse bail, considering the circumstances and the mandatory conditions specified under Section 45 of PMLA.